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In the first of three essays, we study the relationship between corporate debt structures and the strength 
of creditor rights. Firms use a more concentrated debt-type structure as a reaction mechanism to stronger 
creditor rights. We show that managers form more concentrated debt structures in response to stronger 
creditor rights in order to first, reduce bankruptcy costs and second, to provide more monitoring 
incentives for creditors. Across 46 countries, we document that firms have more concentrated debt-type 
structures in countries with stronger creditor rights. Based on an examination of the cross-sectional 
heterogeneity of firms to different creditor rights regimes, we confirm our two proposed mechanisms. 
This study extends the literature of debt structure to an international setting and is the first to document 
the effect of cross-country legal and institutional determinants on the choice of debt structures.   
In the second essay, we investigate how uncertainty about economic policies influence corporate credit 
spreads. We find a large and positive association between corporate credit spreads and a news-based 
index of policy uncertainty. We document that a one standard deviation increase in policy uncertainty 
results in 25 basis points increase in the credit spreads of corporate bonds controlling for bond, firm and 
macro-economic variables. We find that the influence of policy uncertainty on corporate credit spreads 
differs across firms and is more pronounced for firms with higher investment irreversibility and 
dependence on government spending. We also document a larger impact of policy uncertainty during 
economic recessions. Our results show that not only firm-level default probabilities, but also bond-CDS 
bases increase in response to elevated policy uncertainty. 
The third and final essay empirically measures the financial and economic costs (benefits) to firm 
value associated with deteriorations or improvements in the firm’s credit quality. We document that firms 
incur economically large and statistically significant costs to their values following credit-rating 
deteriorations.  Consistent with an asymmetric effect, we find significant but smaller firm-value benefits 
associated with credit-rating upgrades. The financial costs to a firm’s market value associated with each 
notch downgrade to the investment and speculative grade categories are 7.1% and 14.8%, respectively, 
and these costs are generally larger than the economic costs to the firm value from credit rating 
downgrades. Using a continuous KMV distance to default model, we conclude that deteriorations 
(improvements) in a model-generated credit rating quality can also adversely (positively) affect firm 
value. Our findings have implications for corporate financing and leverage decisions, and for the 
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Debt financing has been the main vehicle for raising capital for projects throughout the history of 
corporate finance. In the US, the size of the corporate debt market reached 39.5 trillion dollars in 2015, 
outsizing the US equity market by 1.5 times 1 . Nowadays, debt contracts play a significant role in 
connecting financial markets around the world. The internationalized debt markets have proven to be able 
to facilitate access to cheap debt capital for firms in different countries and at the same time, aid the 
transmission of economic and credit shocks throughout the global markets. Related examples abound and 
include the East Asia crisis of 1997 as well as the debt-related hardships across European economies 
following the credit crunch of 2008.  
When firms raise debt from the market, they do it in a variety of forms and contractual formats, with 
varying amounts and different maturities. Creditors, on the other hand, face a variety of risks when 
lending to corporations including firm-specific, market-related as well as political and institutional risks. 
In this thesis we shed light on different aspects of debt financing by studying the behaviour of corporate 
debt structures, the pricing of policy uncertainty in debt contracts and the costs of debt associated with 
deteriorations in credit ratings. Therefore, this thesis answers three questions about debt financing: (1) 
How do creditor rights affect debt-type concentration? (2) How does policy uncertainty impact the cost of 
debt financing? (3) How large are the costs and benefits of credit rating changes? 
In chapter 2 (first essay), we provide answers for the first question by examining how the strength of 
creditor rights influences the extent to which a firm’s debt-type structure is concentrated or 
heterogeneous. To pursue this, we investigate the effects of legal determinants and particularly the 
strength of creditor rights on the formation of different corporate debt structures. Legal and contractual 
aspects of debt are central to how firms and creditors enter into financing contracts. Countries worldwide 
have developed institutions and mechanisms to enforce debt contracts without the necessity of exerting 
violence. How these institutions are designed and perform influences creditors’ and borrowers’ 
expectations of the outcomes of debt contracts, particularly in the event of bankruptcy. With significant 
variations in the strength of creditor rights across different countries, the influence of such rights on 
firms’ use of debt instruments and their combinations becomes largely important.  
                                                     






Theoretically, we predict that firms change their debt concentration when creditor rights are strong. 
Our main hypothesis is that firms react to stronger creditor rights by increasing their debt concentration in 
order to decrease the costs associated with multiple lenders at the time of restructuring. Our second 
hypothesis concerns the monitoring costs and incentives of creditors to do monitoring when creditor 
rights are strong. With stronger creditor rights, the benefits of monitoring for creditors decline and 
therefore the manager has the incentive to form a more concentrated debt structure to lower the cost of 
financing in the absence of risk shifting incentives (Acharya et al., 2011).  
To study these hypotheses, we empirically investigate how the strength of creditor rights in 46 
countries impacts corporate debt–type structures. Our main source of data comes from the newly 
available database of S&P Capital IQ debt structures.  Data for creditor rights come from Djankov et al. 
(2007). We find that, all else equal, the strength of creditor rights results in a 6% decline in debt-type 
concentration controlling for firm, macro and institutional determinants. We further find that in a cross 
section of firms, the influence of creditor rights on firms’ debt- type structures is not uniform and it is 
stronger for firms with higher costs of bankruptcy or higher monitoring costs. This study confirms our 
two main hypotheses and provides insight about the mechanism through which creditor rights influence 
debt type concentration.    
This study makes two important contributions to the literature. First, it adds to the literature of law and 
finance pioneered by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998, 1999), by documenting 
how creditor rights impact the debt-type structures of firms. Second, this study extends the literature of 
debt-type characteristics (Colla, Ippolito, and Li, 2013; and Rauh and Sufi, 2010), by studying this 
variable across different countries and documenting the importance of creditor rights on firms’ choices of 
debt type concentration.  
In chapter 3 we address the second question of whether and how policy uncertainty affects the credit 
spreads of US corporate bonds. This question is timely, considering the already elevated and yet 
increasing concerns among investors about government policies and their role particularly in the post-
crisis era. The government’s role is to set the scene for the market participants to be engaged in efficient 
financial transactions. However, if the policy makers are not able to decide effectively they can cause 
investors to react to these uncertainties by decreasing their investments or by postponing their financial 
decisions.  This chapter addresses the mounting debate about how politicians and policy makers influence 
financial markets and in particular the debt markets. Some recent examples of such effects include the 
recent prolonged Greek debt crisis and its contagion across Europe2, as well as the governmental policies 
                                                     





about consumer and federal debt in the United States. In the former, the inability of policy makers and 
politicians in tackling Greece’s problem, and thus the resulting policy uncertainty was considered as one 
of the main contributors to the crisis. In the latter, disagreements between the approaches of the 
Democratic and Republican parties towards government debt and student loans add significant 
uncertainties to the debt markets. The impact of such policy uncertainties on corporate debt prices, and 
principally the corporate credit spreads is largely unknown. Therefore, we specifically ask: Do higher 
policy uncertainties translate into higher credit spreads? Second, if it does so, through what mechanism? 
Third, does the effect of policy uncertainties also have systematic effects?  
Since policy uncertainty is not directly observable, we use our main measure of policy uncertainty to 
be the index of Baker, Bloom and Davis (2015), which incorporates the sentiment of investors about the 
degree of uncertainty in the market. We use monthly corporate bond data from TRACE and FISD 
databases from 2002 to 2012. We find that the increased policy uncertainty results in increased corporate 
credit spreads. We further control for the business cycles of the market to make sure that our results are 
not driven by changes in the fundamentals of the market. We also control for the other sources of 
uncertainties in the economy to be able to distinguish the influence of policy uncertainty on corporate 
credit spreads from other sources of uncertainties.  
To understand through what channels policy uncertainty influences the corporate credit spreads of 
firms in the US, we study whether the influence of policy uncertainty on corporate credit spreads is 
homogenous across all firms. We find that for firms with more irreversible investment opportunities and 
more reliance on government spending, the influence of policy uncertainty on credit spreads is stronger 
and more significant.  Moreover, we use a number of methods to handle the endogeneity in our study, 
including controls for macroeconomic, legal and political controls as well as using instrumental variables. 
Finally, we study how different components of credit spreads are affected by policy uncertainty.  We find 
that the default premium and Bond-CDS basis both increase with policy uncertainty.  
Our study extends the literature of determinates of corporate credit spreads (Campbell and Taksler, 
2003; Ericsson, et al., 2009; Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Elkamhi et al., 2012; Avramov et al., 2007; 
Chen et al., 2007) by documenting how policy uncertainty impacts corporate credit spreads in the US. 
In chapter 4 (third essay) we address our third question that asks how large are the costs and benefits 
of credit-rating changes? We look at a lasting puzzle in the corporate finance literature that questions why 
firms have lower levels of debt in their capital structures compared with what the theory predicts. This 
phenomenon is referred to as the under-leverage puzzle, a term coined for the first time by Graham 
(2000). Particularly, we explore the costs of debt to firm value and document the existence of a certain set 





of costs, namely the costs of credit rating deterioration. We study how large are the costs to firm value 
when credit rating deteriorates (improves) due to high levels of debt. Our findings contribute to the debate 
about the optimal levels of debt in corporate capital structures by showing that debt can be costlier to firm 
value than previously thought, and its costs can materialize much before distress or default.  
One solution for the underleverage puzzle has been to account and measure costs prior to the point of 
default. The objective of this paper is to measure the costs and benefits of credit rating downgrades and 
upgrades to e firm value, and use them as identifiable and measurable costs of debt prior to default.  
We study the impact of economic and financial credit rating deteriorations and improvements to firm 
value. By financial credit rating changes, we consider those changes in credit rating of a firm that occur 
because of a change in the amount of debt. Economic credit rating changes are independent of the level of 
debt and are mostly related to general economic conditions. 
We find that the influence of a credit rating on firm value is asymmetric. Deteriorations in credit 
ratings result in higher absolute value changes in firm value than improvements in credit ratings. Since 
credit ratings can be anticipated in the market, we control for the leakage of information in the market by 
studying the influence of ratings implied from a credit rating model. We find that the influence of implied 
credit rating changes on firm value exist but are more muted than real credit rating changes in the market. 
Finally, we use an event study methodology to measure the relative costs and benefits of single and 
multiple credit rating changes. Using propensity score matching, we find that the cumulative costs of 








2 Creditor Rights and Corporate Debt Heterogeneity around the 
World 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The law and finance literature dating back to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998, 
1999) demonstrates the important connections between the country-wide strength of creditors’ protection 
and firms’ financing decisions. Although debt has historically formed a larger proportion of corporate 
capital structures in developed countries, the influence of legal determinants on debt markets has been 
studied less compared to that in equity markets (Esty and Megginson, 2003; Cho et al., 2014). The related 
literature concerning international debt markets and capital structure has focused predominantly on the 
impact of creditor rights on leverage and maturity (e.g., Bae and Goyal, 2009; Cho et al., 2014; Djankov, 
McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2007; Acharya, Amihud, and Litov, 2011). In this paper we study the relationship 
between creditor rights and a related but much less studied topic in capital structure, namely, the 
concentration of debt types in corporate debt structures. Specifically, we study whether and how legal 
risk, measured as the strength of creditor rights, affects debt-type concentration in a sample of firms 
across different countries. To our knowledge, our paper is one of the first to provide empirical results 
about cross-country debt structures and creditor rights. 
There are many reasons that make an empirical study of debt-type structures timely. First, while a 
large body of literature has so far provided theoretical explanations for variations in concentration of debt 
structures (Diamond, 1991 and 1993; Park, 2000; Bolton and Freixas, 2000), empirical studies of debt 
structure are rare due mostly to the related data becoming available only recently. Second, although the 
choice of debt type by firms has been at the center of empirical corporate finance, unavailability of data 
has limited such studies to the choice among public, private and bank debt. Finally, Rauh and Sufi (2010) 
show that ignoring debt-type variations can lead to misleading results about corporate capital structure 
variations.   
Our study extends to an international level the important studies by Colla, Ippolito, and Li (2013) and 
Rauh and Sufi (2010), who address debt structures for publically traded U.S. firms. Rauh and Sufi (2010) 
were the first to document that about a quarter of their sample of U.S. public firms experience significant 
year-to-year changes in their debt compositions while they show no significant changes in their debt 




firms specialize or use exclusively one type of debt instrument. These studies suggest a number of 
unanswered questions concerning debt structure at the international level. Although these studies provide 
valuable insight on the behaviour of corporate debt structures, important questions remain unanswered. 
Particularly, while the substantial influence of country-wide institutions on capital structures is well 
documented, there is no evidence on whether cross-country institutional and legal differences impact the 
choice and number of different debt types that a firm employs in its capital structure. Specifically, does 
the strength of creditor rights protection increase or decrease the concentration of debt instruments 
employed by firms in different countries?  
Theoretically, we predict that firms change their debt-type concentration in response to stronger 
creditor rights. As legal risk increases, managers face costlier economic default (Houston et al., 2010). 
This in turn can induce firms to increase debt-type concentration (i.e. fewer number of debt types) to 
mitigate the cost of reorganization associated with multiple debt-type holders (Esty and Megginson, 2003; 
Qian and Strahan, 2007). Additionally, changes in the level of creditor protection impacts creditors’ 
monitoring incentives. In this sense, stronger creditor rights lower creditors’ monitoring benefits, 
resulting in reduced monitoring intensities and thus higher expected rates of default (Houston et al., 2010; 
Colla et al., 2013). At the same time, strong creditor rights make default costlier for shareholders and thus 
reduce a firm’s risk-taking incentives. Therefore with stronger creditor rights, managers can provide 
higher monitoring incentives for creditors by ex-ante forming more concentrated debt structures to lower 
the costs of financing in the absence of risk shifting incentives (Acharya et al., 2011). 
We test these hypotheses using the debt type structure of a sample of firms across different countries.  
As legal systems are highly persistent over time, a cross-country study provides the necessary cross-
sectional heterogeneity of legal systems and particularly of creditor rights. We use data from the new 
database on firms’ debt structures across the world available through S&P Capital IQ to examine the debt 
structures of public firms in 46 countries. We categorize different forms of debt into the seven distinct 
categories of commercial paper, capital leases, lines of credit, long-term debt, notes, trusts and other debt 
types. Our final panel data set contains 138,801 firm-year observations for 25,700 unique firms over the 
period 2001 to 2013.  
To address unobserved heterogeneity in our data, we use a number of econometric methods. 
Importantly, with the existence of time-invariant country-specific determinants as well as time-varying 
firm-level determinants of debt structure, we employ a recently developed econometric method called the 
correlated random effect (CRE) following Blundell and Powell (2003), Altonji and Matzkin (2005) and 
Wooldridge (2009). This specification enables us to estimate simultaneously the constant and time-
varying regressors with random and fixed effect estimations, respectively.  




debt structures. We use two different indexes to measure the level of concentration in corporate debt 
structures and show that our results are robust to this choice. To account for the possible effects of 
omitted variables on our results, we control for a wide range of cross-country institutional differences as 
well as macroeconomic and cultural determinants. Moreover, we use instrumental variables to deal with 
other possible endogenous effects.  
All else held equal, a one standard deviation improvement in the strength of creditor rights reduces 
debt-type heterogeneity by 6%, after accounting for firm, macro and institutional-level determinants. 
Interestingly, this negative relation between the strength of creditor rights and debt-type heterogeneity can 
be replicated using each of the components of the creditor rights index, as introduced by Djankov et al. 
(2007).    
Next we explore whether all firms in different countries are equally affected by the strength of creditor 
rights. We further test our hypothesis in cross sections of firms and provide two separate reasons why the 
impact of the strength of creditor rights on a firm’s debt-type concentration may not be homogenous. 
First, if bankruptcy is not equally costly for all firms in the economy, then we should expect some cross-
sectional variation in their reluctance to use a concentrated debt structure when creditor rights in the 
country are stronger. Second, we expect that the debt-type concentration of firms with higher monitoring 
costs is more sensitive to changes in the strength of creditor rights. We confirm the above mechanisms by 
studying the heterogeneous impact of the level of creditor rights on firms with different expected costs of 
default and expected monitoring costs. Our findings provide novel insights into the mechanisms through 
which variations in creditor rights affect corporate debt structures. All else held equal, we confirm that 
firms with higher expected bankruptcy or monitoring costs, that are operating under stronger creditor 
rights regimes are more likely to form more concentrated debt structures in order to decrease the high 
costs associated with multiple debt types at default or to give more incentives to creditors to monitor. 
Our paper makes three important contributions to the current literature.  First, we extend the literature 
on the impact of legal institutions on corporate finance (e.g., La Porta et al., 2000, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 1998, 1999; Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009; Benmelech and Bergman, 
2011; Cho et al. 2014; Houston et al., 2010) by showing how different creditor rights protection regimes 
can influence corporate debt structures across countries. Second, our study extends the literature on the 
principal-agent relationship and its implications for capital structure composition by emphasizing the 
importance of conflicts of interest among different debt-type holders and how these potential conflicts 
may give incentives to managers to change the optimal debt structures of their firms. Finally we 
contribute to the literature of debt-type characteristics (Colla, Ippolito, and Li (2013) and Rauh and Sufi 
(2010) and extend it to an international level, by studying the influence of legal characteristic and creditor 




The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the theoretical background 
that leads to our main hypotheses. Section 2.3 presents the data and summary statistics. Section 2.4 
presents empirical results, including controls for omitted variables, use of instrumental variables, 
alternative sample compositions and estimation methods. Section 2.5 studies the cross-sectional effects of 
creditor rights on firms with different characteristics and sheds light on our proposed mechanisms. 
Section 2.6 concludes. 
 
2.2 BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
There is considerable variation across countries regarding the rights granted to creditors. For example, 
it is widely documented that civil law and common law countries vary considerably in their creditor 
protection. Creditor rights are predominantly concerned with the resolution of disputes between creditors 
and borrowers in distress or default. With better creditor protection the expected costs in default are lower 
for lenders but higher for equity-holders and managers. Schwartz (1997), Acharya et al. (2011) and Vig 
(2014) suggest that since such state-wide dispute resolution procedures, i.e. laws and regulations, apply to 
all firms uniformly, they may lead to market inefficiencies.  
The literature shows that stronger creditor rights influence creditors and borrowers differently. For 
creditors, better creditor protection increases expected recovery rates (Davydenko and Franks, 2008), 
improves access to collateral and reduces the deadweight costs associated with secured debt (Vig, 2013). 
Moreover, creditors are less concerned about managerial risk-taking and wealth transfers to shareholders 
with stronger creditor rights (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Klock, Mansi and Maxwell, 2005). This 
motivates possible lenders with incentive to provide credit to more borrowers, thus leading to increased 
supply of credit in the economy (La Porta, Lopez, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998)  
From borrowers’ side, stronger creditor rights increase managers and firms’ costs in the event of 
bankruptcy, and therefore can shrink the demand for credit (Houston, Lin, Lin and Ma, 2010). This leads 
to more complex expectations about how creditor rights influence firm behavior and invokes important 
policy-related questions regarding the optimal strength of creditor protection in an economy (Acharya, 
Amihud, Litov, 2011). As Acharya et al. (2011) suggest, stronger creditor rights in the event of default 
can lead to inefficient liquidation and damage shareholders by eliminating their continuation option. 
Houston et al. (2010) document that stronger creditor rights increase the firm and management costs 
associated with bankruptcy. The component of creditor rights that allows replacing the manager during 
the reorganization can even impose private costs to the managers. Furthermore, when creditor rights 





The bulk of evidence in the literature shows that the disincentive of debt financing to the firm and 
manager due to the increased costs of default, predominantly determines the influence of stronger creditor 
rights on corporate decisions. The related bankruptcy literature (e.g. Aghion, Hart and Moore, 1992; Hart 
et al., 1997) emphasizes that strong creditor rights can lead to ex-post inefficiencies in liquidation. In this 
regard, Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that stronger creditor rights incentivise lenders to penalize 
managers and shareholders in the case of distress and in turn incentivize the managers to avoid distress. 
Adler (1992) argues that with stronger creditor rights, managers have incentives to reduce risk ex ante in 
order to avoid insolvency. Manso (2011) suggests that stronger creditor rights can adversely impact 
innovation since managers become reluctant to take higher risks as they may get penalized more severely 
in case they fail. Managers may forego risky profitable investments or engage in value-destroying 
diversifications to reduce risk and avoid the high costs of default in response to stronger creditor rights 
and stronger creditor rights can lead to deadweight costs to the economy (Acharya et al., 2011). 
In corporate financing studies, Acharya, Sundaram, and John (2011) show that stronger creditor rights 
reduce corporate leverage. In response to improvements in US creditor right laws, Adler, Capkun and 
Weiss (2007) show that firms delay default and hence waste assets considerably. A variety of other 
studies show that creditor rights impact capital structures and corporate financing decisions. Comparing 
the bankruptcy codes in the US and UK, Acharya, John and Sundaram (2011) conclude that creditor 
protection codes significantly influence leverage across countries. Consistent with this notion, Vig (2013) 
shows that improvements in creditor rights in India result in the reduction of debt financing activities of 
firms. Davydenko and Franks (2008) study the recovery rates for the UK, Germany and France and find 
that variations in bankruptcy codes affect financing contracts to compensate for legal deficiencies.  
2.2.1  Hypotheses 
We hypothesize that legal risk affects the concentration of corporate debt structures. Managers and 
shareholders respond to stronger creditor rights environments by ex-ante choosing more concentrated debt 
structures. Since more concentrated debt structures reduce the ex-ante costs of bankruptcy to the firm, 
more concentrated debt structures are a rational response to the increased costs of default associated with 
stronger creditor protection laws.  
 
Hypothesis 1- Bankruptcy Costs: All else held equal, firms use more concentrated debt-type structures 
in countries with higher creditor rights to reduce renegotiation and liquidation costs to the firms’ owners 





The impact of more concentrated debt structures on the costs of default is well documented in the 
literature. According to Jensen (1976) and Myers (1977), bankruptcy costs are positively influenced by 
conflicts of interest between debt holders and shareholders. Welch (1997), Hackbarth and Mauer (2012) 
and Colla et al. (2013) show that increased bankruptcy costs are also influenced by conflicts of interest 
between different groups of debt holders. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) and Gertner and Scharfstein 
(1991) provide a theoretical setting in which firms, depending on their fundamentals, minimize the 
expected costs of bankruptcy by borrowing from fewer sources. In these studies, a more concentrated debt 
structure facilitates faster and cheaper restructuring. Consistent with these predictions, Gilson, John and 
Lang (1990) and Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) document that more heterogeneous debt 
structures increase the time and costs of restructuring. Ivashina, Iverson, and Smith (2011) conclude that a 
fewer number of creditors facilities the restructuring process under Chapter 11, decreases the liquidation 
probability and leads to higher recovery rates. Diamond (1991), Rajan (1992) and Berglöf and von 
Thadden (1994) suggest that debt structure can impact renegotiation costs for distressed firms.  
Overall, the evidence reported in the literature implies that more concentrated debt structures facilitate 
restructuring and lead to lower costs of default for firms and shareholders if all else is held equal. This 
proposition is partially confirmed by the findings of Esty and Megginson (2003) and Qian and Strahan 
(2007) that higher creditor rights are associated with more concentrated syndicated loans. In this paper, 
we propose that in higher creditor rights regimes firms choose more concentrated debt-type structures, i.e. 
reduce debt-type heterogeneity, to decrease the costs to managers and shareholders at default.  
 
Hypothesis 2- Monitoring Incentives: All else held equal, managers choose more concentrated debt 
structures in countries with stronger creditor rights to give more incentives to creditors to monitor. 
 
Another mechanism through which creditor rights affect the corporate debt structure is through their 
effect on creditors’ monitoring activities. The literature shows that asymmetric information and 
conflicting incentives between managers and creditors can incentivize managers to engage in asset 
substitution activities, and shift risks to the debt holders (Green and Talmor, 1986; Mauer and Sarkar, 
2005; Basak, Pavlova, Shapiro, 2012). One way to mitigate this problem is by borrowers monitoring firm 
activities. Since monitoring is costly, creditors trade-off the costs and benefits of monitoring to decide the 
optimal level of monitoring intensity.  
With stronger creditor rights, creditors incur fewer losses in the event of default and borrowers incur 
higher costs. The decline in the expected loss in default to creditors, necessarily reduces their benefits of 
monitoring and thus leads to reduced monitoring intensities (Colla et al., 2013). The decline in the level of 




al (2011) show that reduced monitoring intensity can lead to a higher probability of default. 
Although stronger creditor rights reduce the incentives of creditors to monitor, the literature shows that 
it motivates the manager to take smaller investment risks. Acharya et al., (2011) document that in 
countries with stronger creditor protection, firms are more likely to engage in diversifying acquisitions 
that are value-destroying, in order to acquire targets with higher recovery rates and lower cash flow 
volatilities. In other words, reductions in the monitoring incentives for creditors in response to stronger 
creditor rights do not result in higher risk-taking behavior by managers. This well-documented behavior 
may indicate that managers are concerned more about increased re-structuring and default costs due to 
stronger creditor rights, than the opportunity for risk-shifting provided by a decline in the monitoring 
incentives for creditors.  
Therefore, stronger creditor rights influence the optimal debt structure decisions of managers by 
inducing them to adopt more concentrated debt-type structures. This is beneficial for the managers since it 
increases the monitoring incentives of creditors and decreases the costs of debt financing due to the low 
risk-shifting incentives of managers. It also facilitates re-contracting at the time of default when creditors 
are strong. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997), Chen, 
Harford, and Li (2007), we expect that firms react to the diminished monitoring incentives of lenders by 
choosing more concentrated debt structures to enhance monitoring effectiveness. This confirms the 
findings of Adler (1992) that managers tend to avoid insolvency ex-ante by reducing their risk-taking 
given stronger creditor rights.  
The related literature provides evidence for this reaction. In his seminal paper, Park (2000) documents 
that an optimal debt structure should maximize the incentives of lenders to monitor by delegating 
monitoring to a single senior claimholder. Using syndicate loan data, Sufi (2007) shows that the 
syndicate’s lead bank maintains a larger portion of the syndicated loan and thus forms a more 
concentrated loan structure when lending banks require more intensive monitoring. Recently, Colla et al. 
(2013) document that firms encourage monitoring by reducing debt-type heterogeneity. Overall, the 
literature asserts that more concentrated debt structures provide creditors with stronger incentives to 
monitor.  
2.3 DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Our data are compiled from a variety of sources for country-specific, legal, institutional and firm-level 
variables. In this section, we provide details of the data sources and descriptions of the related variables 




2.3.1 Creditor Rights Index 
We use the creditor rights index that is introduced to the literature by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), and Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007). This index has four 
components, each of which is a dummy variable that equals one if certain lender rights are embodied in a 
country’s laws and regulations and zero otherwise. The index ranges between zero and four with zero 
representing the lowest creditor-rights index and four the highest.  The first index component concerns 
whether the consent of creditors is required for firm decisions for example when the borrowing firm files 
for reorganization, or decides on a minimum dividend payment.  
The second component concerns the seizure of collateral by creditors and specifically addresses 
whether secured creditors can appropriate collaterals upon the approval of a reorganization petition. This 
applies when courts do not impose asset freezes or automatic stays.   
The third component concerns the priority of payments from liquidation proceeds. The related dummy 
here equals one if secured creditors have priority over these proceeds. The last component addresses when 
the incumbent manager is removed during the reorganization process so that the firm is controlled by an 
alternative administrator.  
The initial creditor-rights index first introduced in La Porta et al. (1998) was later updated by Djankov, 
McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) to include more recent changes across 129 countries. We use the 2002 
values of this index in our analysis, following Djankov et al. (2007) and Brockman and Unlu (2009). 
Holding the index constant over time is unlikely to lead to biases due to the high level of persistence in 
this index as discussed in Djankov et al. (2007), Brockman and Unlu (2009), and Cho et al. (2014).3   
2.3.2 Firm-level Data 
Our primary database for firm-specific variables is the Compustat Global database which covers about 
130 countries and 45,000 active firms.4 We use the Compustat North America databases for firm data for 
firms in the U.S. and Canada. To construct market-related variables such as book to market and market 
equity, we obtain market equity data for non-U.S. firms from the Compustat Security Daily database. We 
convert the financial data across all countries into U.S. dollars using the World Bank Currencies 
database.5  
                                                     
3To illustrate, Djankov et al. (2007) find that only 13 out of 129 countries experienced changes in creditor rights 
during 1991 to 2004. 
4 Firms in countries other than the U.S. and Canada tend to be under-represented in this database. 
5 Compustat provides two location indicators, location of the headquarters (LOC) and the location in which the 
company is incorporated (FIC). Our main location indicator is the latter. However, this choice has little influence on 





The main source of data for debt structure is the CapitalIQ Debt database which provides such data for 
more than 60,000 public and private firms globally from 2001 to 2013. CapitalIQ provides data on debt 
attributes such as debt type and seniority, maturity, and the issued currency. The debt types are classified 
at two levels: the broad first level (descriptiontext) and the more detailed second level 
(capitalstructuredescription). Combining these two levels provides a large number of possible debt types. 
We recognize the following seven distinct and mutually exclusive debt types in this database: Capital 
Leases, Commercial Papers, Lines of Credit, Long-term Debts, Notes, Trusts and Other Debts. We merge 
the aggregate annual value of each debt type with the data from the Compustat database. In addition to 
firm-specific debt types, we are also interested in the number of debt types in each country.  
We use firm-level explanatory variables similar to those used by Colla et al. (2013). These variables 
whose construction in detailed in Appendix 1 include firm size, market to book ratio, profitability, 
tangibility, maturity, cash flow volatility and leverage. To obtain the final dataset, we remove utilities 
(SIC Codes from 4900 to 4949) and financial firms (SIC Codes from 6000 to 6999), and delete firm-years 
with missing Total Assets and leverage ratios outside the closed unit interval as in Lemmon, Roberts, and 
Zender (2008). A reason for doing so is that we require that all the explanatory variables be non-missing 
in the multivariate regressions. The data are winsorized at the 1% level to minimize the effects of outliers.  
2.3.3 Country-level Variables 
Macroeconomic proxies for the level of development: As measures of the level of a country’s 
economic development, we use per capita GDP, growth in per capita GDP, inflation and per capita GNI 
(Gross Net Income) from the World Bank databases. Countries with higher per capital GDP tend to have 
more developed financial markets. Inflation shows the consistency between fiscal and monetary policies 
as relevant imbalances may lead to an increased cost of financing through added inflation risk and its 
perturbation effects. The effect of inflation on the overall term structure can lead to changes in the optimal 
maturities of corporate debt structures and reallocations among its various debt types. 
The behavior of borrowers in developed and developing countries are different. Generally, firms in 
developed countries are more mature, with greater access to a larger pool of financial assets. To account 
for the differences in markets and borrowers across developed and developing countries, we use the 
World Bank’s data and categorizations of high, medium and low-income countries. According to the 
World Bank, low-income countries have less than $1,045 in per capita GNI in U.S. dollars, middle-
income countries have between 1,045 and 12,746 in per capita GNI, and high-income countries have 
more than12,746 in per capita GNI.  
Sovereign rating: Increases in sovereign ratings increase overall market risks and can raise the yields 




premiums to risk-adjust their discount rates. Higher country risk may also be related to the levels of 
corruption and weak institutions as argued by Durbin and Ng (2005). We convert the alphabetical ratings 
from the Fitch Sovereign Rating database to numerical equivalents where a rating of AAA equals 1 while 
a rating of D equals 29. On this scale, each notch change in a credit rating adds or subtracts one to or from 
the numerical equivalent. These monthly ratings change at different frequencies, depending on national or 
global events and conditions. We hold these rating equivalents constant over months where no credit 
news or updates are available, and annualize this measure by taking annual averages of the monthly 
values.  
Financial development: To capture financial development, we use the ratio of total private domestic 
credit to GDP (Qian and Strahan, 2007), and also the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP that essentially 
measures financial depth (King and Levine, 1993). The selection of leverage and debt types may be 
affected by the level of financial market development. Specifically, a greater availability of funds may 
induce firms to become more leveraged and consequently employ a wider variety of debt types in their 
external financing decisions. 
Origins: We include legal origins in our study according to La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), and Qian and 
Strahan (2007). These studies show that investor protection rules and the quality of law enforcement are 
systematically influenced by the legal origins of countries. We consider four distinct legal origins; 
namely, English, French, German and Nordic. Except for the English legal system which is common law, 
the remaining three are civil law systems. Studies find that the magnitude of investor protection also 
varies in response to changes in legal systems. For example, Beck et al. (2003) find that the English legal 
system is more efficient in protecting the rights of creditors since essentially it is designed to protect 
individual property owners against expropriation by the crown. In contrast, the French civil law was 
developed mainly to unify the legal system and stabilize the control of the state over courts (e.g., 
Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003; La Porta et al., 1998; Easterly and Levine, 2002). The data regarding legal 
origins comes from La Porta et al. (1998) and Qian and Strahan (2007). La Porta et al. (1998) argue that 
common law countries offer better legal protection for lenders. Hoffman (1998, pp. 76-77) argues that 
common law systems provide better flexibility in the types of collaterals that can be seized in the event of 
default and also on the forms of liens that can be applied to assets. Coffee (2000) shows that common law 
countries deliver higher flexibilities in addressing new and unexpected cases, while civil law countries are 
more constrained by the set of currently established laws. 
2.3.4 Measure of Debt-Type Heterogeneity  
As a measure of debt-type heterogeneity we use a normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) used 




value of debt in a firm’s capital structure.6 When this index is at its minimum value of zero, the firm has 
the lowest debt-type heterogeneity (highest debt-type heterogeneity) as it has equal proportions of each of 
the seven debt types in its capital structure. When this index is at its maximum value of one, the firm has 
the highest possible Heterogeneity since it “specializes” in only one debt type. To check the robustness of 
our results to an alternative measure of debt-type heterogeneity we also use another measure of debt-type 
heterogeneity, SP90i,t, which is a dummy variable that equals one if a debt type constitutes more than 
90% of a firm’s debt structure and zero otherwise (Colla et al., 2013). 
 Figure 2.1 depicts the median heterogeneity index values across different countries.  As this figure 
shows, a typical firm in Croatia and Turkey exhibits the highest debt type Heterogeneity while one in 
Portugal, Malaysia and Sri Lanka exhibits the lowest debt type Heterogeneity.  
[Please place Figure 2.1 about here.] 
2.3.5 Summary Statistics 
Table 2.1 briefly describes our data. Firms are highly specialized in a few debt types, as the mean 
Heterogeneity value is as high as 71%. We also observe that almost half of the firms across countries use 
a single debt type extensively. The mean value of the SP90 variable suggests that 45% of the firms have 
more than 90% of their debt in a single debt type. Our sample covers the full range of possible creditor 
rights from 0 to 4, with a mean (median) index around 2 (1.89). Firm-level variables show moderate 
variations. Size and the market to book ratio have the highest variations with standard deviations above 2, 
while profitability, tangibility, cash flow volatility and book leverage have standard deviations below one. 
[Please insert Table 2.1 about here.] 
 
Table 2.2 reports the average percentages of each debt type, average Heterogeneity index, number of 
unique debt types, average country-level indicators and average information-sharing factors for the 
countries in the sample. Countries vary largely in their debt combinations and their number of different 
                                                     
6 Formally, we compute this index in the following two steps. First, we compute the total sum of squares, SSi,t 
















































debt types at the aggregate level. The United States, Japan, China, Australia and United Kingdom use the 
largest set of contract forms, while Morocco, Panama, Zimbabwe, Hungary and Kenya use the lowest 
number of debt contract types. Zimbabwe, New Zealand, Argentina, Croatia and Turkey have the highest 
debt-Heterogeneity indexes, while Portugal, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Colombia and India have the lowest 
debt-Heterogeneity indexes. The relation between a country’s economic and financial development status 
is not closely aligned with its degree of debt-type heterogeneity.  
[Please insert Table 2.2 about here] 
 
A possible limitation of the data used to construct Table 2.2 is data coverage. Our data may not 
capture the whole set of debt contracts that exist in a given country particularly if firms in that country are 
underrepresented in the databases used herein. This occurs more frequently for firms from countries with 
low economic development. We attempt to deal with this possibility by examining groups of countries 
based on their development statuses.  
Table 2.3 reports the correlations between the main explanatory variables. The first column of 
numbers provides some indicative evidence about the influence of the explanatory variables on debt-type 
heterogeneity. GDP, inflation, and public and private registries are all negatively correlated with the HHI 
debt-type Heterogeneity index while SP90, creditor rights, cash flow volatility, market to book ratio, and 
sovereign rating are positively correlated with the HHI debt-type Heterogeneity index. Since the main 
variable of interest, creditor rights, is not highly correlated with debt-type Heterogeneity and the other 
determinants, a possible endogeneity effect may not be a major concern. Nevertheless, we still examine 
this possibility later in the paper. 
 [Please insert Table 2.3 about here] 
 
2.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Our regression estimation strategy begins with a pooled OLS specification, a random-effects 
specification and the correlated random-effects (CRE) specification when Heterogeneity is the dependent 
variable. We subsequently use the CRE specification as our default estimation specification since CRE is 
a consistent method for the estimation of both time-varying and slow-moving (or time-invariant) 
determinants. To deal with possible endogeneity problems, we control for macroeconomic as well as 
institutional and political features of each of the countries. Moreover, we use the instrumental variable 
approach and two stage least square estimations using legal origins and ethnolinguistic fractionalization 





2.4.1 Estimation Method and Unobserved Heterogeneity 
A usual problem in cross-country panel-data studies is the existence of unobserved heterogeneity. 
From an econometric perspective, this problem can make OLS estimates problematic. As this problem 
can be induced by independent variables that are observable or unobservable (i.e., not included in the 
regression model), we have three different cases based on our assumption about the error terms. 
In Case 1, a fixed-effects specification becomes appropriate if the error terms are correlated with the 
regressors. A problem with using fixed effects in our setting is that the institutional variables are mostly 
time-invariant and therefore a fixed-effects model fails to capture the effect of these variables. While a 
fixed-effects model allows the marginal effects to be identified, it is only limited to the time-varying 
effects since a large set of country-specific factors rarely change over time.  
In Case 2, the unobserved heterogeneity is distributed independently of the regressors. In this case, 
random-effects estimates with GLS are commonly used that are essentially more efficient than OLS 
estimates. A problematic feature in random-effects models is the assumption that country effects are 
uncorrelated with regressors. Therefore such estimates are not consistent if the true model is a fixed 
effects.7  
Selecting either of the above estimation methods comes with some costs to results. Studies in the 
related literature differ in their selections. For example, Bae and Goyal (2009) uses random-effects 
models, while Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012) and Qian and Strahan (2007) use fixed-effects models. We 
also use the Correlated Random Effects (CRE) method of Blundell and Powell (2003), Altonji and 
Matzkin (2005) and Wooldridge (2009). This approach significantly reduces the costs of either of the 
above models while also capturing the correlation effects from both observable and unobservable 
variables. Our base regression model, using a correlated random effect (CRE) estimation method is: 
𝐻𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜂𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + ℎ𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡,     𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 (2.1) 
 
where the Xitvector contains all time variant or invariant explanatory variables, and the composite 
error vit is serially correlated and given by: 
𝜈𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (2.2) 
 
 Where 𝑐𝑖  is the unobserved heterogeneity and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the error term. We can rewrite Equation (2.1) 
by unbundling its covariates as 
 
                                                     
7 For more of a discussion on this estimation method, please refer to Baltagi (2008), Wooldridge (2010), Hsiao 




𝐻𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑔𝑡𝜃 + 𝑧𝑖𝛿 + 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝛾 + ℎ𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (2.3) 
 
where gt captures the time-effect, zi accounts for the time-invariant variables, wit contains variables  
that change both across firms or countries and over time, and ℎ𝑖  is the unobserved heterogeneity. 
Specifically, zi in our base regression contains institutional controls that are mostly constant, wit contains 
size, market to book, profitability, tangibility, cash flow volatility, and leverage; and 𝑔𝑡 contains the log 
of GDP per capita, inflation, and the sovereign rating. This approach allows us to have a combination of 
fixed and random effects. Thus, the unobserved heterogeneity hi is a combination of a fixed variable, and 
a linear function of the regressors. More formally,  
𝐸(ℎ𝑖| 𝑋𝑖1, 𝑋𝑖2, … , 𝑋𝑖𝑡) =  𝐸(ℎ𝑖| ?̅?𝑖) = 𝜇 + ?̅?𝑖 𝜗 (2.4) 
 
where X̅ is the vector of the means of regressors over the T periods (Mundlak, 1978; Chamberlain, 
1980, 1982). From this equation, a firm-specific fixed effect is obtained using the following 
decomposition 
ℎ𝑖 =  𝜇 + ?̅?𝑖 𝜗 + 𝛼𝑖 (2.5) 
 
where 𝛼𝑖 captures the fixed effect. Therefore, Equation (2.1) can be rewritten as 
 
𝐻𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜇 + 𝑋𝑖̅̅ ̅ 𝜃 + 𝑣𝑖 (2.6) 
 
where  
𝑣𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (2.7) 
 Therefore, the above CRE model can be interpreted as a combination of a fixed- and a random-
effects model. Using this model, we can obtain the fixed-effects estimates for θ and γ. The model is 
estimated using a feasible GLS. Taking the dimension of the 𝑣𝑖 as T ∗ 1, then the covariance matrix will 
have a random-effects structure given by  
𝛺 = 𝐸(𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑖

















2.4.2 Does the Level of Creditor Rights Influence Debt-type Heterogeneity?  
In this section, we present panel regression results on the determinants of the number of debt types 
used by international firms in 46 countries from 2001 to 2012. Including all the controls, our results are 
robust and we continue to find that greater creditor rights increase debt-type heterogeneity (reduce 
heterogeneity).  
In our first set of regressions, we study the effect of creditor rights on each measure of debt-type 
heterogeneity; namely, 𝐻𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 . As discussed previously, 𝐻𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 values of 0 and 1 
represent the lowest and highest degrees of heterogeneity. Our generic regression model is 
 
𝐻𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑔𝑡𝜃 + 𝑧𝑖𝛿 + 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝛾 + ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡 𝜑 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 (2.9) 
 
where the 𝑤𝑖𝑡  are the firm-specific variables including size, market to book, profitability, tangibility, 
cash flow volatility, and leverage (e.g., Colla et al., 2013); the  𝑔𝑡  are time-varying country-specific 
variables including inflation, sovereign rating, developed dummy, and information sharing; the 𝑧𝑖  are 
time-invariant regressors including the common law dummy and creditor rights; and 𝑡 captures the time 
effect. 
Before presenting the regression results using the various specifications, we depict the fitted values 
from a basic OLS regression of debt-type heterogeneity on the creditor-rights index in Figure 2.2. This 
figure provides preliminary evidence about the relationship between creditor rights and debt-type 
heterogeneity by using the average country-wide debt concentration (specialization) and the strengths of 
creditor rights index as the dependent and independent variables, respectively. As the graph suggests, 
improvements in creditor rights is associated with lower debt-type heterogeneity (higher specialization). 
New Zealand, Zimbabwe, Panama, U.K. and Kenya have strongest creditor rights, whereas France, 
Columbia, Mexico and Peru have the weakest. The graph depicts that the average debt-type heterogeneity 
of the latter group clearly stays below that of the former. The fitted line suggests a positive relation 
between debt concentration and the strength of creditor protection. 
[Please insert Figure 2.2 about here] 
 
We report the results using OLS and random-effects specifications in Table 2.4, and the CRE 
specification in Table 2.5. These two tables make a comparison possible across these three specifications, 
particularly since this paper is one of the few to incorporate a CRE specification. Based on the results 
reported in Table 2.4, debt-type heterogeneity is negatively and highly significantly related with the 




determinants are also similar across both estimation specifications of random effects and CRE. Debt-type 
heterogeneity decreases with an increase in the firm-specific variables other than the market to book ratio. 
Debt-type heterogeneity is also lower for high income countries and countries with English legal origins, 
and is not significantly associated with inflation, sovereign rating or information sharing.  
[Please insert Tables 2.4 and 2.5 about here] 
 
Table 2.5 reports the regression results with debt-type heterogeneity as the dependent variable when 
estimated using the CRE specification. In a univariate model, there is a negative and significant relation 
between creditor rights and debt-type heterogeneity. This table shows that a firm’s debt-type structure 
becomes less heterogeneous as the strength of creditor rights improves. The negative and highly 
significant relation in the univariate case of column 1 remains so after controlling for firm-specific 
(column 2) and other macroeconomic and legal determinants in column 3. The magnitudes and 
significances of other firm and country-specific determinants differ moderately with those reported earlier 
in Table 2.4. Firms that are larger and more levered, and firms located in developed countries tend to use 
more types of debt. In columns 4 through 7, we study the influence of each component of the creditor 
rights index on corporate debt-type heterogeneity. Based on these four columns, improvement in each of 
the creditor rights components is associated with reduced debt heterogeneities, and the effects are large 
and significant. We also note that the effects of the four creditor rights components are robust to firm, 
macro and legal controls. This result is important as it indicates that the influence of creditor rights on 
debt-type heterogeneity is the sum of the impact of all its components, while each of these components 
can separately drive our results.  
Since the CRE specification accounts for possible omitted variable biases, the results reported in Table 
2.5 are more reliable compared to those reported in Table 2.4. Nevertheless, the estimates reported in both 
tables agree on the direction and the magnitude of the association between debt-type heterogeneity and 
our main variable of interest, namely, the creditor rights index. In the rest of the paper, we only report the 
estimates from the CRE specification for brevity.  
 
2.4.3 Robustness Test: Alternative Measure of Debt-type Heterogeneity 
In this section, we investigate whether our results are robust to the choice of an alternative measure of 
debt specialization. For this purpose, we use a specialization index introduced by Colla et al. (2013). This 
index is a binary variable that equals one when a single debt type has more than a 90% weight in a firm’s 
debt structure in any given year, and is zero otherwise. Therefore, when this index equals 1 it indicates 




the strength of creditor rights and this alternative index, if stronger creditor rights lead to more 
concentrated debt structures. We refer to this index as SP90 throughout the paper.  
In Table 2.6, we examine the robustness of our results using this index as the dependent variable. Here 
we use a Probit model due to the binary nature of the dependent variable. Other controls remain the same 
including firm-level controls in column 2, and firm, macro and legal controls in column 3. Columns 4 
through 7 report the effects of each of the creditor rights components on the SP90 index of debt-type 
heterogeneity. As expected, the creditor rights index and each of its components have positive and 
significant relations with SP90. The coefficients of the creditor rights index and its components are 
consistent with our findings reported earlier in Tables 2.4 and 2.5.  
[Please insert Tables 2.6 about here] 
 
Other determinants also have consistent signs with those in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. Larger, more leveraged 
firms, with higher profitability, leverage and maturity have more heterogeneous debt structures. The 
effect of each index component on debt-type heterogeneity remains large and significant. Results in this 
section confirm our original findings that firms in countries with stronger creditor rights protection form 
more concentrated debt structures.  
 
2.4.4 Robustness Test: Omitted Variables  
2.4.4.1 Omitted institutional variables 
The main challenge in interpreting our baseline results causally is the possibility that the creditor rights 
variable may capture the effects of a country’s institutional settings, and at the same time choice of 
different debt structures may also be under the influence of country’s such institutional determinants. To 
address this concern, we examine whether the association of debt-type heterogeneity with creditor rights 
is robust to the inclusion of country’s legal and political controls.  
While controlling for legal origins in our base regressions partially addresses this concern, in this 
section we extend such controls by including determinants from the economic literature on political and 
legal institutions. This literature particularly asserts the importance of property rights and contract 
enforcement in determining cross-country economic outcomes. Thus, these variables are conceptually 
related to the strength of property rights (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Importantly, Acemoglu, (2003 
argues that these institutional indicators cannot be substituted by the legalities of creditor rights 
protections due to largely different natures of contracting and enforcement institutions. The determinants 




enforcement, contract viability, contract enforcement costs and time, depth of creditor information, 
strength of legal rights, property rights and information sharing. We describe the relevance and 
construction of these determinants below.  
 Law and order: This variable is measured on a scale from 0 to 6, where higher values mean 
stronger law and order (Bae and Goyal, 2009). This index, which is obtained from the ICGR database, 
also measures the willingness of a country’s citizens to accept established disciplines imposed by law and 
order-establishing institutions of that country (Knack and Keefer, 1995). Higher index values correspond 
to stronger courts, more thorough political institutions, and smoother mechanisms for the transitions of 
political power (Knack and Keefer, 1995).  
 Corruption: This variable, which is obtained from the ICRG database, is a 6 points index with 0 
and 6 showing very high and very low corruption risk, respectively. High corruption adversely affects 
foreign investment, the economy and financial markets in a country. In countries with high corruption 
indexes, the government performs inefficiently since the assumption, transition, and wielding of power is 
not based on merit or sound policies. 
 Bureaucracy quality: This index from the ICRG database is a determinant of the political rights 
index. The belief is that stronger and more independent bureaucracies reduce the tendencies of new 
governments to change laws and regulations (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Bae and Goyal, 2009).  
 Efficiency of debt enforcement: This index is a critical determinant in financial, and particularly 
debt markets. Djankov et al. (2007) build this index using information about time, cost, and the transfer of 
assets in the cases of bankruptcy or liquidation. They show that this index is closely related to the legal 
origins of each country and is a strong predictor of the development of the debt markets.  
 Contract viability: This index from the ICRG database captures the risk that any contract can be 
unilaterally canceled or modified by the state or related authorities. It is of concern to foreign investors, 
particularly when the index level is low. Lower index values indicate more risk of asset expropriation for 
both domestic and foreign investors. Expropriation risk is shown to be important by Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005) and Knack and Keefer (1995). Contrary to these studies that use this index cross-sectional 
(the former uses an index average between 1985 and 1995), we use this index in both their time-series and 
cross-sectional dimensions.  
  Contract enforcement costs and time: These two measures are obtained from the World Bank 
Doing Business database. They measure how efficient the bankruptcy courts are in a country. Since courts 
are the main institutions for legal enforcement (Bae and Goyal, 2009), this index mainly indicates the 
effectiveness of the legal system. Less time and cost indicate better resolution of distress, clearer asset 




 Depth of creditor information index: This index obtained from the World Bank’s Doing Business 
database concerns the credit information in a country. It shows how the scope and accessibility of 
information about credit is influenced by rules and regulations. The collector and redistributor of credit 
information can be either a private or public bureau. The index varies from 0 (not reliable) to 8 (most 
reliable), and is the sum of the zeros or ones given to each of eight features of the credit registries. Such 
features include, for example, if data about individuals as well as firms can be distributed, if at least 2 
years of such data are distributed, and if borrowers are allowed by law to access their information 
collected by the credit bureau.  
 Strength of legal rights index: This is an index between 0 and 12 from the World Bank database. 
This index measures how well a legal system protects both the lender and the borrower in a debt contract. 
Higher index levels are associated with smoother lending mechanisms.  
 Property rights: This index is obtained from Economic Freedom as compiled by the Heritage 
Foundation. Property rights are shown to influence growth, asset allocation and development of financial 
markets (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Claessens and Laeven, 2003). Higher property rights lead to 
better enforcement of contracts (Bae and Goyal, 2009) and provide more motivation for innovation and 
investment. Countries with a higher property rights index are also shown to be more developed.   
Information sharing: Another set of country-level variables that can influence the creditor-borrower 
relationship is the existence of information sharing institutions. According to Djankov et al. (2007), there 
are two key aspects of information sharing in every country; namely, the existence of public and of 
private registries. Public credit bureaus are government-operated institutions that are engaged in 
collecting credit-related information on certain borrowers and providing such information to present or 
prospective creditors. These institutions may include a country’s central bank, whose mandate would 
center more on collecting information about banks and banking-related corporations (Qian and Strahan, 
2007). Information sharing is a dummy variable that equals one if either public or private registries exist 
in a country and zero otherwise. Such institutions are becoming more prevalent across the globe. The 
number of countries with such private bureaus has increased from 55 in 2003 to 120 in 2014. The 
importance of these institutions is that they provide more information in a more customized manner, and 
cover more non-bank lenders (Djankov et al., 2007). The existence of such registries facilitates the 
availability and exchange of information throughout the financial system, particularly between lenders 
and borrowers. Related data for information-sharing institutions is obtained from the survey of Jappelli 
and Pagano (2002) of banking supervision, also included in the World Bank’s Doing Business website.  
 
Table 2.7 reports our results. We include the creditor rights index in every column and add the above-




determinants as in our base regression model. Based on the results summarized in this table, we observe 
that the previously identified negative relationship between debt-type heterogeneity and creditor-rights is 
robust after controlling for each of these additional variables. We find that debt-type heterogeneity is 
higher with lower corruption, bureaucracy quality, property rights, contract viability, depth of the creditor 
information index and the strength of legal rights, and it is lower with lower law and order and efficiency. 
 [Please insert Table 2.7 about here] 
 
2.4.4.2 Control for omitted macro level variables and culture 
A second potential concern with our results is that the creditor rights index may be capturing the effect 
of a country’s macroeconomic conditions. To this point, we have shown how variations in time and the 
cross-section of creditor-rights institutions are related to debt-structure heterogeneity. We now test the 
robustness of this relation controlling for the following four country-level variables: domestic credit to 
GDP, stock market traded value to GDP, and GDP growth and liquid assets (M3) to GDP.  
As an indicator of the maturity of financial and debt markets in a country, domestic credit to GDP is a 
widely used measure of a country’s level of financial development (Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 
2007). The stock market traded value to GDP, which measures the activity or liquidity of stock markets, 
is also used as a measure of financial development (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). GDP growth provides a 
measure of how quickly a country’s economy is growing. The liquid assets to GDP ratio measures the 
financial depth of an economy (Qian and Strahan, 2007).8 The inclusion of these four variables may 
diminish the relation between creditor rights and debt-type heterogeneity based on the argument by 
Glaeser et al. (2004) that country-level factors, like financial development and depth of markets, are the 
consequences of a country’s creditor rights institutions as well as its legal origins.  
Another possible concern is that the debt-type structure may be influenced by country-wide number of 
different debt types. This being the case, the cross-country variations in debt-types used by firms may be 
simply the result of the number of available debt types provided by the country where the firm operates. 
We address this concern by controlling for the number of different debt types aggregated over each 
country.  
The result from regressions including the above five additional country-level variables for the 
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 index as the dependent variables is reported in column 1 of Table 2.8. The effect of the 
creditor rights index remains highly significant after including these additional controls. Since its level of 
                                                     
8 It is computed as the sum of the central bank’s currency and deposits (M0), electronic and physical currency (M1), 




significance is reduced marginally, this suggests that the indicators of the financial market’s maturity and 
depth may capture some of the effects of stronger creditor rights institutions. We also observe that both 
measures of debt-type heterogeneity decrease with Domestic credit to GDP, and increase with Stocks 
traded to GDP and Liquid assets to GDP.  
[Please insert Table 2.8 about here] 
 
Studies have shown the importance of culture, generally proxied by religion, on the development of 
financial markets (Qian and Strahan, 2007). While Stulz and Williamson (2003) find that religion is 
correlated with creditor protection, Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) find that the effect of religion 
on financial markets can be largely captured by legal origins. La Porta et al. (1998) find that nearly all 
country-specific variables, including culture, correlate with legal origins. Thus, including religion in the 
estimated relationships may alleviate any biases caused by omitted variables.  
We use dummy variables to aid in determining the robustness of our previous results to the most 
prevalent religion in a country (as in Qian and Strahan, 2007; Stulz and Williamson, 2003). The religions 
chosen to be captured by dummy variables are Atheism, Buddhism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Judaism, 
Islam, and Orthodoxy, which means that their coefficients are relative to the other religions not so chosen 
(i.e. Christianity, Protestantism, and followers of Indigenous rituals).  
These regression results are summarized in column 2 of Table 2.9. The estimated relation between 
creditor rights is large and significant for  𝐻𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡. Relative to the religions not included in the 
regressions, the measure of debt-type heterogeneity is significantly higher for Atheist and Buddhist 
countries. Debt-type heterogeneity is also significantly higher for Catholic countries. Overall, the 
robustness of the creditor rights relation with debt-type heterogeneity controlling for religion suggests that 
this relation is robust to the effect of culture as captured by religion.   
2.4.5 Robustness Test: Instrumental Variable Analysis 
To address any further concerns regarding the existence of endogeneity in our study of the effects of 
creditor rights on debt-type heterogeneity we conduct robustness tests using an instrumental variable 
analysis. As argued before, one possible source of endogeneity in our setting is omitted variable bias. In 
previous sections we have controlled for a number of possible unobserved variables including additional 
institutional and macroeconomic determinants. There may still remain unobservables that are specific to 
the relationship between creditor rights and corporate debt structures that are not captured by 




A still possible yet less important source of endogeneity can be reverse causality. In this regard, the 
strength of creditor rights influences debt-type structure and at the same time corporate debt-type 
structures may impact the strength of creditor rights9.  
 To further detail with endogeneity due to a possible omitted variable bias and reverse causality, we 
conduct an instrumental variable analysis. Our selected instrumental variables need to exogenously 
determine the strength of creditor rights and have no direct influence, but through their impact on creditor 
rights, on corporate debt-type structures.  
We use two different variables as instruments for the strength of creditor rights. To choose our first 
instrumental variable, we follow the law and finance literature where the emphasis is on the role of 
historically different legal traditions on the development of today’s financial markets (LLSV, 1999; 
Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2007; and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2003). For that we use the 
exogenous nature of legal origins since in many emerging countries they were imposed by colonial 
powers (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1999) and even 
in countries with no history of colonialism, these institutions can be effectively considered as pre-
determined (Acharya et al. 2011). More importantly, the impact of legal origin on the debt structures of 
firms is not direct and is mainly through a country’s institutional and legal framework. Hence, as our 
main instrumental variable we use legal origin (English, French, German and Nordic) where the Nordic 
dummy is dropped to avoid the dummy variable trap.  
Our second instrumental variable is ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) (Houston et al., 2010). 
The impact of ethnic fractionalization on the quality of institutions is widely documented in the literature, 
for example in the work of Mauro (1995). La Porta et al. (1999) argue that ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization matters for countrywide legal and political institutions even after controlling for the 
effect of legal origins. Importantly, the literature shows that higher fractionalization leads to countries 
adapting institutions that allow one powerful group to seize the power (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Levine, 2003 and 2006), largely weakening the law and order. In such countries, creditors are less 
protected and we expect that for them, the creditor rights protections be weaker. On the other hand, 
fractionalization does not impact firms’ debt structure directly and it mainly impacts formation of capital 
market through legal and institutional settings, making it an appropriate candidate instrument for the 
strength of creditor rights.   
The traditional measure of ELF is constructed as the likelihood that two randomly selected individuals 
                                                     
9 It is noteworthy that the possibility of a reverse causality problem in our setting is minimal since it is unlikely 
that corporate financing decisions influence a country’s legal outcomes, particularly the strength of creditor rights 





in a given country are from two different ethnic groups. The index is therefore calculated as a Herfindahl 
index (Mira, 1964). Although the data used to build this index is more than 50 years old, it is used by, for 
example, Easterly and Levine (1997) and Houston et al. (2010) along with other economic and financial 
studies. We note that aside from the out-datedness of the index, there is growing criticism concerning its 
validity. For example Alesina, Dewleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg (2003) argue that this 
index is chiefly concerned with language differences and does not adequately reflect ethnic variations. 
For example, it classifies blacks and whites in the USA as belonging to the same group. Another 
difficulty with this measure is that classification of different ethnic classes is rather subjective as there 
such definitive categories are not available. Alesina et al. (2003) also contend that fractionalization can 
even form endogenously as a result of migration when using the fractionalization index of Atlas, Narodov 
and Mira (1964).  
We use a more developed measure of ELF developed by Alesina et al., (2003). This index addresses 
the above limitations in a variety of ways. First, the index uses a broader definition for ethnic groups in 
each country. Second, this index is not limited to language differences but also takes into account 
religious and ethnic variations. Using more recent data, this index covers more countries compared to the 
traditional index. When the authors study the effect of this new index on the quality of governance and 
institutions, they find that fractionalization is at least as important as the legal origins. Particularly, while 
ethnic fractionalization may possibly dominate legal origins in terms of its effects on institutions, Alesina 
et al., (2003) assert that the index can well be interpreted as important as legal origins.  
We report the results for a 2SLS specification using each of the above instruments separately in Table 
2.9. As done previously, we also control for firm, macro and institutional indicators, using industry and 
year fixed effects. The first and second columns in Table 2.9 use the main heterogeneity index and the 
SP90 index, respectively, as the dependent variable. The F-statistics (>200) rule out the possibility of 
weak instruments. As expected, Column 1 shows that stronger creditor rights decrease debt-type 
heterogeneity. The second confirms this finding by showing that the SP90 index is positively associated 
with creditor rights. One standard deviation increase in the creditor rights index is associated with a 3% 
decline in the standard deviation of the heterogeneity index and a 1% improvement in SP90, both 
verifying more concentrated debt structures in response to stronger creditor rights. Overall, this result is 
consistent with the conclusion that the positive effect of creditor rights on debt-type structures is not 
likely to be influenced by an omitted variable endogeneity problem, as the effect stays highly significant 
using either of these instrumental instruments. 






2.4.6 Robustness Test: Alternative Sample Composition and Estimation Methods 
As shown earlier in Table 2.2, firms in the U.S. and Japan constitute a considerable portion of our 
sample with more than 21% and 12% of total observations, respectively. We test if this over-
representation materially affects our previous estimates by using three samples that exclude U.S. firms, 
Japanese firms and both U.S. and Japanese firms in the first three columns of Table 2.10, respectively. 
Based on these results, we find that our previous results are robust to all exclusions, and that in fact the 
creditor rights coefficient increases in magnitude for these subsamples.  
[Please insert Table 2.10 about here] 
 
Next, we address the possible effects of cross-listed firms on our results since our initial sample 
includes cross-listed firms that are exposed to two or more different country settings, including political, 
economic and legal rules and regulations. This may partially muddle our results as managers and creditors 
may interpret a firm’s legal settings as a mix across the countries in which it is traded. To determine the 
sensitivity of our previous results to their inclusion, we eliminate any firm in our original sample that is in 
the sample of cross-listed firms identified by Sarkissian and Schill (2014, 2009 and 2004). 10  In 
untabulated results, we obtain similar results when the main tests are redone using this new sub-sample.  
Another possible concern may rise from the effect of a large number of firms with upper bound 
specialization indexes. Roughly 20% of our sample firms have the maximum specialization index of 1, 
meaning that their debt structures contain only a single debt type. We investigate whether our results are 
influenced by this issue, using a formal Tobit specification. The last column of Table 2.10 reports the 
results of this Tobit specification. Our results in this column are very similar to other three columns, and 
confirm that the impact of creditor rights on corporate debt-type heterogeneity is not under the influence 
of perfectly specializing firms.  
 
2.5 CROSS-SECTIONAL HETEROGENEITY 
In section 2.2, we developed the predictions that managers may choose a more concentrated debt 
structure to: (1) ex-ante reduce the default and bankruptcy risk associated with stronger creditor rights, 
and/or (2) increase the incentives for lenders to monitor to offset the lower benefits of monitoring for 
lenders and the higher costs for r managers associated with stronger creditor rights. In this section, we test 
the role of these two mechanisms by examining their effects of debt-type heterogeneity across countries 
                                                     




with different strengths of creditor rights where firms within each country are not expected to be equally 
affected by the strength of within-country creditor rights.   
As we argued before, improvements in creditor rights can impact firms’ choice of debt structure in two 
ways. First, since stronger creditor rights increase the costs of default for the manager, the manager may 
ex-ante reduce the default and bankruptcy risk by choosing a more concentrated debt structure. Second, as 
stronger creditor protection necessarily reduces the benefits of monitoring, and therefore the literature 
shows that it can lead to higher default rates. Since default becomes costlier for the manager with stronger 
creditor rights, he can increase the creditors’ monitoring incentives by ex-ante choosing a more 
concentrated structure as his incentives for high risk projects is reduced as an outcome of strong creditor 
protection. Here, we test these mechanisms by studying the heterogeneous effects of creditor rights across 
countries with different strengths of creditor rights.   
According to the first proposed mechanism, we may expect some cross-sectional variations in debt-
type heterogeneities when creditor rights in a country are stronger if bankruptcy is not equally costly for 
all firms within that country. Particularly, we expect that firms with higher ex-ante costs of bankruptcy to 
specialize more with stronger creditor protection. According to the second mechanism, we expect to see 
higher debt-type structure concentration for firms that have higher ex-ante costs of monitoring in response 
to higher creditor rights. We now discuss the metrics that are used to measure bankruptcy costs and 
monitoring incentives. 
2.5.1 Bankruptcy Costs 
We use two different measures from the literature to identify firms that face higher bankruptcy costs; 
namely cash flow volatility and tangibility (Colla et al., 2013). Firms with higher cash flow volatility face 
higher expected costs of bankruptcy and firms with higher asset intangibility incur higher costs of 
bankruptcy (Titman and Wessels, 1988; and Rajan and Zingales, 1995).  
To construct the measure of cash flow volatility, we follow Kryzanowski and Mohsni (2013) using a 
rolling window containing the past six years of data. In this method, a firm’s cash flow volatility (𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡) 
equals income before extraordinary items (Compustat item #18), less changes in the working capital less 
depreciation and amortization (Compustat item #14).  Intangibility is defined as one minus the ratio of net 
Property, Plant, and Equipment (Compustat item #8) to the book value of assets (AT). Our main variables 
of interest here are the interactions between these two measures and the index of creditor rights. As higher 
cash flow volatility and asset intangibility lead to higher ex-ante bankruptcy costs, we expect that the 
interaction of either with the creditor rights index will have a negative impact on the heterogeneity of 




The first two columns of Table 2.11 report our results. Following our original setting, we control for 
the same set of firm, macro and institutional determinants with industry and year fixed effects. The first 
column studies how firms with higher intangibility choose the heterogeneity of their debt structures in 
countries with higher creditor rights. The negative and highly significant estimate of the interaction of 
creditor rights and the intangibility index reported in the first column of Table 2.11 supports our 
expectations that firms with more intangible assets when creditor rights are higher use more concentrated 
debt-type structures. The second column studies the effect of cash flow volatility. Similar to the first 
column, the interaction of cash flow volatility and creditor rights negatively and significantly influence 
the heterogeneity index. This further corroborates our predictions that higher bankruptcy costs associated 
with stronger creditor rights induce firms to select lower debt heterogeneities and thus invest in more 
concentrated debt structures.  
[Please insert Table 2.11 about here] 
2.5.2 Information Collection Costs and Incentives to Monitor 
If our second hypothesis about the effect of monitoring incentives on debt structure is correct, we 
expect that firms with higher cost of monitoring that are located in countries with stronger creditor rights 
to select more concentrated debt structures. This is expected since more concentrated debt structures 
provide more monitoring incentive to creditors (Houston et al, 2010; Colla et al., 2013) and thus allow 
managers to lower default costs and raise funds at lower costs ex-ante when creditors have more power 
legally. A general approach in the literature to proxy monitoring and information collection costs is to use 
R&D expenses (Sufi, 2007; Colla et al., 2013). However, this choice is somewhat problematic. First, 
there is no one to one relationship between higher R&D expenses and higher monitoring costs since firms 
with similar R&D expenses can have different monitoring costs due to varying levels of transparency. 
Second, the R&D costs may be confounded by a variety of endogenous determinants such as firm size, 
age and industry affiliation. Third, since a large number of firms in the Compustat database have no R&D 
cost entries, excluding these firms significantly reduces the sample size and can lead to a selection bias.  
Instead, we use a market-based measure of firm transparency introduced by Berger et al. (2006). Since 
this index relies on market data, it indicates if market participants perceive a firm as being transparent and 
opaque. The method this index is constructed avoids the influence of such confounding determinants as 
firm size, age, or industry affiliation. As the index uses minimal inputs from the Compustat database, the 
loss in sample size from the use of this measure is minimal. Furthermore, it can be argued that higher 
opaqueness (lower transparency) has a stronger logical and intuitive link to the costs of information 
collection and monitoring than R&D expenses.  




information provided by the firm. On the flip side, investors treat a firm as being an average firm in the 
industry if the quality of the firm’s information is poor. Berger et al. (2006) show that an appropriate 
transparency measure can be built as the idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns from the market data, 
divided by volatility of earnings that are reported by a firm. 11  Where 𝛿 ∈ [0 , 1]  is a measure of 
transparency and its higher values indicate that a firm is more transparent.  
Since 𝛿 is by construction between zero and one, we can interpret 1 − 𝛿 as a measure of opaqueness. 
We expect that more opaque firms in countries with stronger creditor rights will use more concentrated 
debt structures, all else held equal, due to higher costs of monitoring and information collection.  
The estimated coefficient for our main variable of interest in this test, the interaction of the opaqueness 
index and the creditor rights index, is reported in the third column of Table 2.11. This interactive variable 
has a negative and highly significant association with debt-type heterogeneity with the inclusion of our 
original set of controls. This result supports the idea that more concentrated debt structures in response to 
higher creditor rights are influenced by monitoring incentives. This is consistent with the literature of 
debt-type heterogeneity, and particularly with the arguments of Colla et al. (2013) and Esty and 
Megginson (2003) that more concentrated debt structures provide better monitoring incentives to 
creditors.  
 
2.6 CONCLUSION  
The importance of debt structure as an integral part capital structure decisions is gaining increasing 
attention in corporate finance studies. In this paper, we provide the first international study for the 
determinants of debt structure. Particularly, we explore the cross-country determinants of corporate debt 
structure by investigating the relationship between the strength of creditor rights and debt-type 
heterogeneity across 46 countries. We argue that stronger creditor rights can lead to more concentrated 
debt-type structures through two mechanisms: first, by making default costlier for equity holders and the 
managers; and second, by reducing monitoring incentives for creditors.  
Consistent with our expectations, we find negative and significant relations between the strength of 
creditor-rights institutions and firm-level debt-type heterogeneities. We find empirical support for the 
expected effect of the two mechanisms by examining the association of stronger creditor rights with debt-
type heterogeneity using cross-sections of firms with different bankruptcy costs and levels of opaqueness. 
From an econometric perspective, we address a long debate in cross-country corporate finance studies 
where time-variant and time-invariant determinants coexist in panel regression models. Using correlated 
                                                     





random effect estimators we are able to obtain consistent and unbiased estimates of the association of 
creditor rights with debt-type structures while consistently estimating both time-varying and time-
invariant controls.  
We account for a variety of possible endogeneity concerns, including omitted variable bias as well as 
possible but much less concerning reverse causalities. We address possibly omitted macro-level and 
institutional determinants by controlling for a variety of related variables from the law and finance 
literature. Moreover, we incorporate instrumental variables to address any possible effects not already 







3 Corporate Credit Spreads and Policy Uncertainty 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Government policy makers set the rules of competition for the private sector, and their roles in financial 
markets have significantly increased in recent years. Policy makers can contribute to economic 
uncertainty when they fail to agree on prospective policy changes dealing with fiscal, monetary or 
regulatory issues. The market reaction to these changes depends on whether the policy outcome is 
predictable, and is higher with higher uncertainty. Interest in the effects of policy-related uncertainties on 
economic, corporate and market activities has increased over time in the academic literature, public 
debates and the various print media.12 Since changes in fiscal, tax, regulatory and monetary policies 
directly influence the bond market, we empirically contribute to this line of research by studying the 
influence of policy uncertainty on corporate credit spreads. This paper aims to investigate whether and 
how policy uncertainty affects the credit spreads of US corporate bonds. This examination is important 
since some observers argue that the recent weak recovery in the U.S. after the financial crisis is to some 
extent due to uncertainty over fiscal policies and regulatory reforms.13 
Policy uncertainty is not directly observable since its impact on financial markets is mostly through its 
impact on the perceptions of investors. Election dates are used as a common proxy to capture the period 
during which such uncertainty is elevated.14  However, Pastor and Veronesi (2012, 2013) argue that 
                                                     
12 Bloom, Baker and Davis (2013) document a marked increase in the frequency of the word “uncertainty” related to 
policy since the recent global financial crisis. For example, using the FOMC’s Beige Book, they show that the 
portion of political uncertainty as a part of overall policy uncertainty (PU) has increased significantly, especially 
after 2008. 
 
13  See, for example, the “Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee,” August 9, 2011, 
http://federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20110809.htm; Becker, G. S., S. J. Davis, and K. M. Murphy. 
(2010). Uncertainty and the slow recovery. Wall Street Journal , sec. Opinion.  
 
14  For instance prior studies examine how national elections across countries impact stock return volatility 
(Boutchkova, Doshi, Durnev, and Molchanov, 2012); how political uncertainty in election years change corporate 
investment sensitivity to stock prices (Durnev, 2010); and how uncertainty about gubernatorial elections affect the 
yields on municipal bonds (Gao and Qi, 2013). Other studies include Leah and Whited (1995), Minton and Schrand 
(1999), Ghosal and Loungani (2000), Bond and Cummins (2004), Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and 





“political uncertainty” should be distinguished from “policy uncertainty”.15 A shortcoming with the use of 
election dates is their low frequency, which means that they fail to effectively account for variations in 
policy uncertainty between election dates. As an alternative, Baker, Bloom and Davis (2015) propose an 
alternative index for policy uncertainty (PUI). The important feature of this index is that it incorporates a 
measure of investor sentiment into the index. By counting the number of “uncertainty” and related word 
references such as “policy”, “legislation” and “regulation” in the most-read US and global newspapers 
such as the Wall Street Journal, this index introduces a daily component of policy uncertainty. Baker, 
Bloom and Davis (2015) find that tax, spending, monetary and regulatory policies have the highest 
number of policy-uncertainty references and therefore their overall PUI index includes monetary, fiscal 
and regulatory uncertainties.16  
We use this PUI index as our main indicator of policy uncertainty throughout the paper. There are various 
reasons for the choice of this index. Primarily, we argue that this index is an appropriate measure of 
economic policy uncertainties. Validation tests are performed in the original work of Baker, Bloom and 
Davis (2015, BBD hereafter) to ascertain the suitability of the index. For example, BBD replace the word 
“uncertainty” with the term “equity price” and show that the new index correlates with the VXO index as 
high as 70%. Moreover, they incorporate human expert analysis and confirm their content analysis 
methodology, as the software results were different only in less than 2% of the cases with those of the 
human experts. BBD also validate that their results are not influenced by the choice of selected 
magazines, by changing the primary source of data and obtaining a very similar index to the original.  Not 
surprisingly, this index is being widely used recently in a variety of policy uncertainty studies including 
Pastor and Veronesi (2013, JFE), Gulen and Ion (2015, RFS) and Francis et al. (2014). 
We use monthly corporate bond transaction data from Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) 
from the 2002 to 2012 period and bond characteristics from the Fixed Income Securities Database 
(FISD) database. We find that the level of policy uncertainty significantly affects corporate credit spreads 
after the inclusion of various firm, bond and macro level controls. We find that a one standard deviation 
increase in policy uncertainty results in 25 basis points (bps) increase in the credit spreads of corporate 
bonds. Comparing the impact of policy uncertainty on a cross-section of investment and speculative grade 
bonds, we show that investment grade bonds are more affected by changes in policy uncertainty. One 
                                                     
15 Pastor and Veronesi (2012, 2013) refer to policy uncertainty as “impact uncertainty”, which corresponds to 
uncertainty about the impact that a new government policy would have on the profitability of the private sector. 
16 The PUI index weights are 0.5 for the broad news-based component and the same 1/6 for the components that 
reflect: (a) uncertainty about the tax-code expiration by the Congressional Budget Office, (b) CPI forecast 
disagreement, and (c) federal/state/local purchases disagreement. The PUI has the ability to effectively capture 
changes in policy uncertainty between election years such as the debate over the debt ceiling, Gulf war, FED’s 




standard deviation increase in PUI increases the investment-grade (speculative-grade) credit spreads by 
24.76 (5.43) bps. Consistent with the theoretical predictions in Pastor and Veronesi (2012), we find that 
the effect of policy uncertainty on credit spreads is much larger during recessions than expansions. We 
also find that all four PUI components have large and significant effects on credit spreads.  
To infer the causal impact of policy uncertainty on corporate credit spreads, we address a variety of 
endogeneity concerns. Primarily, we address the influence of omitted variables on our results. Since 
policy uncertainty surges mostly during bad economic conditions and so do corporate credit spreads, we 
account for such possible effects by controlling for indicators of overall economic conditions. Other 
possible omitted variables are the general indicators of economic uncertainty, since economic uncertainty 
determinants may simultaneously impact policy uncertainty and credit spreads. We address this possible 
effect by controlling for election periods as well as the CBOE’s VXO index and a firm’s idiosyncratic 
volatility. Our results are robust to the inclusions of both of the omitted variables above. 
Another possible source of endogeneity in our tests is that the policy uncertainty index may well capture 
other economic uncertainties that are unrelated to uncertainties about governmental policies. To address 
such possible contamination problem, we note that there is a large impact of US economic status on that 
of Canada, while policy uncertainties across the two countries only partially affect the others. We exploit 
this opportunity by regressing the US policy uncertainty index on the Canadian policy uncertainty index 
and use the regression residuals as the alternative policy uncertainty index. Finally, to rule out further 
concerns about endogeneity we use an instrumental variable analysis. We include three instruments for 
US policy uncertainty including the relative power of the two main US political parties, the level of 
political polarization in the country and finally, the interaction of these two indexes. We conclude that our 
results are not influenced by the above possible endogeneity problems since all of the above alternative 
investigations confirm our primary results on the positive impact of policy uncertainty on credit spreads.  
We investigate possible mechanisms through which policy uncertainty affects corporate credit spreads. 
To do so, we explore the differential effects of increased policy uncertainty on corporate credit spreads 
across different cross-sections of firms. Our test is thus constructed based on the idea that not all firms are 
similarly affected by changes in policy uncertainty. According to the related literature, there are two 
particular channels that can create heterogeneous corporate decision responses in face of increased policy 
uncertainty. These two channels are (a) investment irreversibility (Bernanke, 1983; Rordik 1991) and (b) 
dependence on government spending (Gulen and Ion, 2015). These two variables increase default 
probabilities for the cross section of firms during the periods of elevated policy uncertainty. The former 
channel argues that firms postpone positive NPV projects in response to increased policy uncertainty 
particularly when their investments are highly irreversible. Firms with more irreversible projects are more 




adversely affects a firm’s cash flows, increasing its risk of debt repayments and default probabilities and 
results in higher credit spreads.  
The second mechanism contends that high policy uncertainty creates cross sectional responses across 
firms with different levels of dependence to government spending. The reason is that the cash flow of 
firms with more dependence on government purchases and projects becomes more volatile as government 
policies become more uncertain. This in turn can raise default probabilities.  
An important question in this study is how different components of credit spreads are affected by changes 
in policy uncertainty. Thus, we investigate the reaction of two of the components of credit spreads, i.e. 
default spreads and bond-CDS basis to changes in policy uncertainty. The former measures the 
probability of default, while the latter roughly measures the systematic market risk premium. Using firm-
level CDS data from Markit database, we investigate the response of CDS-spreads as well as Bond-CDS 
basis to changes in policy uncertainty and document that increases in policy uncertainty have positive and 
significant impacts on both of these components. Our result that increased policy uncertainty increases 
default probabilities confirms our proposed mechanism that policy uncertainty affects credit spreads 
through increases in the inability of firms to repay their debt obligations, i.e., through an increase in 
default probabilities. Moreover, our results on bond-CDS basis are consistent with the findings of Pástor 
and Veronesi (2013) that the market requires an extra risk premium in periods of high policy uncertainty. 
Finally, to test the appropriateness of the PUI index, we compare its effect on credit spreads with that of a 
list of other proxies of policy uncertainty from the related literature, including monetary, fiscal and 
government policy uncertainties and show that the effect of PUI is robust to any such controls.  
Our paper makes three important contributions to the existing literature. First, we add to the literature of 
the determinants of credit spreads (Campbell and Taksler, 2003; Ericsson, et al., 2009; Collin-Dufresne et 
al., 2001; Elkamhi et al., 2012; Avramov et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2007) by showing that policy 
uncertainty has a large influence on corporate credit spreads.  Second, this paper contributes to the 
literature dealing with the effects of the political economy and “institutional uncertainty” on financial 
markets (Qi, Roth and Wald, 2010; Roe, 2006; Roe and Siegel, 2011; Keefer, 2008; Acemoglu, Johnson, 
Robinson, and Thaicharoen, 2003) by studying the effects of policy uncertainty on debt markets of a 
“developed economy”. The reason is that, of the four categories17 of “institutional uncertainty” considered 
in this literature (Brunetti and Weder, 1998), only policy uncertainty changes in “developed economies” 
with mature institutional frameworks. Third, we contribute to the literature on the impacts of policy and 
political uncertainty on corporate investment and financing decisions (Gulen and Ion, 2015; Julio and 
Yook, 2011; and Julio and Yook, 2012; Durnev, 2010; Francis et al., 2014; Gao and Qi, 2012; Bradley et 
                                                     




al., 2014; Cao et al., 2013) by providing insights on how corporate credit spreads and cost of capital react 
to elevated policy uncertainty. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the sample and data preparation. 
Section 3.3 reports and interprets some initial empirical findings, and particularly the average effect of 
policy uncertainty on credit spreads. Section 3.4 deals with endogeneity concerns and Section 3.5 
provides evidence for possible mechanisms through which policy uncertainty creates cross sectional 
heterogeneity. Section 3.6 studies the influence of policy uncertainty on different components of credit 
spreads. Section 3.7 investigates the robustness of our results to inclusion of other possible measures of 
policy uncertainty. Some concluding remarks are presented in Section 3.8. 
 
3.2 SAMPLE, DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
3.2.1 Sample and Data 
Our primary source for bond data is the Transaction Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) 
database. This database is provided based on a bond-related regulatory requirement that targets more 
transparency in the secondary bond markets. TRACE provides bond transaction data on a daily basis, and 
includes features such as transaction price, yield to maturity, and bond maturity date.  We focus only on 
completed trades between 2002 and 2012, and therefore exclude trades marked as cancelled, corrected or 
suspended from the sample similar to Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007). If bonds are traded more than 
once in a day, we compute daily bond yields and prices as averages of transactions completed in the same 
day. The data frequency in this paper is monthly, so our monthly measures of bond yields and prices are 
averages over each month of daily yields and bond prices.  
To include bond characteristics we merge the TRACE database with the Fixed Income Securities 
Database (FISD) using the 9-digit issuance (CUSIP) codes that are common to both databases. This adds 
Moody’s ratings and a variety of bond characteristics to our sample, such as coupons, maturities, issuance 
amount (size) and times of issuance. Next, we merge this database with the Compustat North America 
database with quarterly frequencies. We retain all non-financial firms (i.e., those with SIC codes that are 
not between 6000 and 6999) in this merged TRACE-FISD sample that have accounting information in 
COMPUSTAT. We remove bonds with maturities of less than one year, and trim the top and bottom 1% 
of credit spreads to deal with possible outliers. Credit spreads are obtained by subtracting the yield of the 
closest maturity T-Bill rate from the yield of each bond, where the former is obtained from the Federal 




3.2.2 The Policy Uncertainty Index 
The PUI index of Baker, Bloom and Davis (2015) is created mainly using news searches. The authors 
perform a series of tests and validity checks to show that this index appropriately proxies economic policy 
uncertainties. In the first set of examinations, they change the search term “uncertainty” to “equity price”, 
“stock market” or “stock price” in their original search and show that the index created using this method 
has more than a 70% correlation with the VXO index, which is a measure of implied forward-looking 
volatilities across S&P 500 firms. Second, the authors perform human audits of newspaper articles used to 
construct the index. The authors thus find that only in 1.8% of cases that the human inference of the 
direction of policy uncertainty change is different from that of the mechanically constructed index. Third, 
the authors examine the validity of the choice of newspapers as the main source of information. 
Particularly, they test whether the reflection of policy-related news in newspapers is influenced by the 
political positions of newspapers at the times when the ruling party has different political ideologies with 
that of the newspaper, and find no evidence for this hypothesis (Gulen and Ion, 2015). Finally, authors 
change their primary data sources and re-create the index as a test of robustness. For example, using the 
Fed’s Beige Books18 as the alternative source of information, Baker, Bloom and Davis (2015) find that 
the new index has as high as a 80% correlation with the original index. In this paper, we also test this 
index in a variety of ways. Such tests include comparing the index with other monetary, fiscal or 
government policy uncertainty proxies introduced in the literature. Overall, our results suggest that the 
PUI index is a robust and appropriate indicator of economic policy uncertainties. 
 
3.2.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for this study’s main variables. In this table, Panel A reports the 
summary statistics in three sections. The first section reports firm-specific variables for the sample not 
differentiated by credit-rating status (All), while the second and third sections summarize Investment 
Grade and Speculative Grade samples, respectively. As expected, speculative-grade bonds have higher 
credit spreads and coupons, shorter maturities, lower liquidities, and exhibit smaller term spreads. Panel B 
of Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics for the macro-variables and other proxies for policy 
uncertainty that are not firm dependent. It is not surprising to observe considerable variations in the S&P 
                                                     
18 The “Beige Books” are published by the Federal Reserve. Each District Fed collects “anecdotal” evidence on the 
state of the economy through a report. These reports are essentially generated using interviews with bank and branch 
directors, other economists and experts. Then all this information is summarized by District in the Beige Book. 





return over the study period and material variability in all the variables associated with the PUI index or 
its components.  
[Please place Table 3.1 about here.] 
Panel C of Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for the level of Treasury bill yields, credit spreads, and 
maturity-matched credit spreads in low and high policy stability regimes based on whether that period’s 
PUI is respectively below or above the median PUI over our study period. This panel shows that the 
corporate total yield, maturity-matched credit spread (total yield less the closest maturity T-Bill yield) and 
yield-spread with no maturity match (total yield less the 3-month treasury bill yield) and the three month 
treasury rates are higher in high PUI regimes, suggesting a positive relation between policy uncertainty 
and credit spreads. Table 3.2 reports the correlation matrix between the variables used in this study.  
[Please place Table 3.2 about here.] 
 
3.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we empirically investigate the effects of economic policy uncertainty on corporate 
credit spreads. Primarily, we present regression results to estimate the magnitude and direction of the 
effect. We further study effects of policy uncertainty across different rating classes of investment and 
speculative grade bonds. Moreover, we investigate the influence of each of the policy uncertainty 
components on credit spreads.  
Our control variables include firm-level, bond-level and macroeconomic level determinants. These 
control variables are selected from the literature on the determinants of corporate credit spreads including 
Pogue and Soldofsky (1969), Pinches and Mingo (1973), Leland (1998), Blume et al. (1998), Campbell 
(2003), Collin‐Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), Campbell and Taksler (2003), Chen, Lesmond, 
and Wei (2007) and Ericsson, Jacobs and Oveido (2009). 
Firm-level controls include operating income to sales, market leverage, pre-tax interest coverage 
dummies and total debt. These control variables are used widely in the literature of credit spreads 
determinants. High pre-tax interest coverage and operating income to sales indicate that the firm has 
better financial health and thus may have lower credit spreads. Higher market leverage and total debt 
imply highly levered firms and thus may result in higher credit spreads. Since the highest frequency for 
accounting data for variables such as market leverage is quarterly, we obtain a monthly market leverage 
ratio by dividing total debt (short- plus long-term debt) by average firm value where the equity portion is 




Instead of using the interest coverage continuously, we use four interest coverage dummies in our 
regressions. The reason, as argued by Campbell and Taksler (2003) and Blume et al., (1998) is that 
changes in the interest coverage variable have essentially non-linear effects on credit spreads. For 
example, increase in the interest coverage from 4 (BBB- rated bonds) to 6 (A- rated bonds) can result in a 
bond upgrade, while a similar change from 20 to 22 has almost no effect on a bond’s rating. Low pre-tax 
coverage values can therefore be much more informative about the issuer’s risk. The interest coverage 
dummies are constructed corresponding to values less than 5, between 5 and 10, between 10 and 20 and 
finally greater than 20.  
We also control for firm idiosyncratic volatility, measured as the standard deviation of daily excess 
returns relative to the CRSP value-weighted index over the 180 days prior, but not including, the bond 
transaction date. As Campbell and Taksler (2003) show, the standard deviation of daily excess returns has 
a positive impact on credit spreads.  
We use three main macro-level controls including the closest benchmark Treasury rate, the term slope 
and S&P 500 index returns. The term slope is computed as the difference between 10 year and 2 year 
maturity Treasury rates. We expect a negative relationship between the level of treasury rates and credit 
spreads, as discussed by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), since higher interest rates raise the risk-neutral 
drift of the firm value and thus reduce the risk-neutral default probabilities. This should be naturally 
translated into lower credit spreads. We expect that term slopes have mixed impacts on credit spreads, 
since as Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) argue the slope of the term structure can be a measure of economic 
uncertainty (positive impact) as well as an expectation for future short rates (negative impact).  
We include S&P 500 returns as another macro-level variable predominantly to account for general 
market conditions. We expect a negative relationship between S&P 500 index returns and bond yields 
since higher S&P 500 index returns indicate better economic conditions and thus better corporate growth. 
This can in turn push the corporate credit spreads down.  
We also need to control for bond liquidity. There are a variety of methods in the literature for 
estimating bond liquidity. For example, Campbell and Taksler (2003) use bond size (issue amount) to 
proxy for liquidity as the bond issue size has a high correlation with firm value. An important limitation 
of this approach is that not all bonds of the same firm have the same level of liquidity, a fact that calls for 
a more direct liquidity measure. Bond age is another proxy used for bond liquidity (Beim, 1992), however 
there is no straightforward relation between a bond’s age and its liquidity. Guntay and Hackbarth (2010) 
use the number of months a bond is traded prior to the bond’s transaction date. Although this measure is 




bond that is traded in every day of a month will have the same liquidity as a bond which has been traded 
only once in that month, as noted by Kim and Stock (2011).  
To address all of the above limitations, we use the number of transactions per month as our measure 
for bond liquidity. This is a more direct measure than the first two liquidity proxies and at the same time 
does not suffer from the limitation in the third proxy. Constructing this liquidity index is possible in our 
study since we have the daily transaction data from the TRACE database.  
We also need to control for credit ratings since credit ratings directly affect credit spreads. Ederington, 
Yawitz, and Roberts (1987) and others find that credit ratings help explain cross-sectional differences in 
credit spreads after controlling for firm and issue characteristics, and there is a clear positive relationship 
between the deterioration in a bond’s rating quality and surge in its credit spreads. We use Moody’s bond 
rating reports from the FISD database. We convert alphabetical ratings to numerical equivalents similar to 
Lerner, Sorensen, and Stromberg (2011). To do so, we assign numerical equivalents to the bond ratings so 
that each notch difference in alphabetical ratings translates into one unit change in the numerical measure. 
With this method for example, Aaa equals 1, Aa1 equals 2 and C equals 21. As higher numbers indicate 
lower credit ratings, we expect a positive relationship between this numerical equivalent and credit 
spreads.  
We include coupon rates since as Elton et al. (2000) and Campbell and Taksler (2003) argue, bonds 
with higher coupon rates are taxed higher during their life. This leads to less desirability of these bonds 
compared to bonds with lower coupon rates. We also control for other general bond characteristics 
including issue size and maturity and the putability feature. Bond maturity impacts the yield depending on 
the term spread. The issue amount may impact the bond liquidity and thus influence the yield. Finally, 
putable bonds are thought of as less risky investments as the holder has the option to sell the bond back to 
the issuer before the bond matures, and thus may reduce credit spreads.  
We take into consideration the election periods by including an election dummy, as the traditional 
indicator of policy uncertainty in the literature. This binary variable equals 1 for each presidential election 
year, and is zero otherwise. 
Table 3.3 summarizes the expected influence of the above credit-spread determinants as documented 
by three seminal papers in the related literature including Collin- Dufresne et al. (2001), Campbell and 
Taksler (2003) and Ericsson et al. (2009) in columns one to three, respectively. Detailed descriptions of 
the above variables are provided in Appendix 3. 




3.3.1 Impact of Policy Uncertainty on Corporate Credit Spreads 
We begin our empirical investigations by estimating the average impact of policy uncertainty on credit 
spreads. Equation 3.1 shows our primary regression setting. In our regression analysis, we are mainly 
interested in capturing the effect of the PUI index as the independent variable. As discussed above, we 
control for a set of firm-level, bond-level and macroeconomic determinants throughout all our 
specifications. 
In regression models throughout this study we include monthly dummies and account for firm-level 
clustering across the panel. To account for spurious regression results, we use lagged PUI measures to 
deal with changes in other macro variables that simultaneously may affect credit spreads and policy 
uncertainty. To further mitigate the possible unobserved effects of firm-level determinants that are not 
captured in related controls, and to address further concerns about persistence in firm-level determinants 
(Lemmon, Roberts and Zender, 2008), our default specification incorporates firm fixed effect models. 
Our base regression can be expressed as  
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑈𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽2𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
(3.1) 
 
In the above model PUIi,t−1 is the lagged policy uncertainty index, FIRMCTRLi,t is the matrix of firm-
level controls including operating income to sales, market leverage, pre-tax interest coverage dummy and 
total debt. BONDCTRLi,t is the matrix of bond-level characteristics and includes Moody’s credit rating, 
coupon, maturity, bond liquidity, putability feature and issuance amount. Finally 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑡 includes 
macroeconomic variables including term slope, S&P 500 index return, and the maturity-matched T-Bill 
rate. 𝜂𝑖  captures the firm fixed effect and  𝜖𝑖,𝑡 is the regression error. Since the confidence intervals 
become smaller with larger sample sizes, there is a possibility that we reject the null hypothesis when 
sample size is large (Leamer, 1978, Ch. 4; Shanken, 1987; Connolly, 1989). To address this issue, we 
report significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels. To account for a possible heteroskedasticity 
effect, we report results based on heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.  
The above regression results are reported in Table 3.4. Our results are estimated using standardized 
variables to more clearly show how much credit spreads change in basis points in response to a one 
standard deviation change in each of the explanatory variables. Column 1 reports the univariate regression 
results, using the policy uncertainty index of Baker, Bloom and Davis (2015) as the main explanatory 




interest. This column shows that one standard deviation increase in the policy uncertainty index is 
associated with 43.04 bps increase in corporate credit spreads. The adjusted R-squared is also 
interestingly as large as 10%. In the second and third columns, we remove the policy uncertainty index 
and include macroeconomic as well as bond-specific determinants to explain credit spreads. Considering 
all these determinants concurrently produces almost the same goodness of fit as does the policy 
uncertainty index in the univariate regression of Column 1. In Column 3, we include the election dummy 
as the traditional indicator of policy uncertainty. The estimated coefficient for the election dummy is, as 
expected, positive and highly significant. The election dummy estimate indicates that during and up to 
three months to major US elections, corporate credit spreads increase as much as 28 basis points. 
However, inclusion of this variable improves the model’s goodness of fit only marginally, as the adjusted 
R-squared increases merely from 10% to 11%. In Column 4 we add the PUI index to the model and 
observe that the adjusted R-squared improves to 15% while the large and significant effect of the PUI is 
preserved. Columns 7 through 10 report regression results using additional control variables including 
firm-level determinants. Column 10 shows that even after including all firm level, bond-level and macro-
level determinants, policy uncertainty still has a large, positive and significant influence on credit spreads. 
The goodness of fit also improves moving from Column 9 to Column 10, as the adjusted R-squared 
increases from 27% to 29% when we include the PUI index while controlling for all of the above credit 
spread determinants.  
Throughout this table we confirm the predictions in the literature for the direction of effects of firm, 
bond and macro level determinants on credit spreads. As expected by the argument of Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995), the closest Treasury benchmark has a negative influence on credit spreads, while term 
slope positively impacts credit spreads (Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995). Longer maturities and higher 
coupon rates both increase credit spreads. The issuance amount and dummy putable both have negative 
impacts on credit spreads. The effect of the issuance amount is arguably due to higher liquidity associated 
with larger issuances (Campbell and Taksler, 2003). The putability feature, as we discussed before, 
sreduces credit spreads but the effect is either not significant or is only marginally so.  
Deterioration in bond credit rating increases credit spreads. This confirms the expectation that lower 
rated bonds intuitively have higher credit spreads. The table also shows that more liquid bonds have lower 
spreads. A one standard deviation improvement in bond liquidity is associated with almost a 5% 
reduction in credit spreads. Higher S&P returns, as expected, reduce credit spreads while higher market 
leverage is associated with higher credit spreads. Debt capitalization reduces spreads. This effect can be 




1998) all reduce credit spreads. While we have four pre-tax coverage dummies, the fourth dummy is 
dropped due to collinearity.  
 [Please place table 3.4 about here.] 
3.3.2 Policy Uncertainty and the Credit Spreads Across Investment and 
Speculative Credit Ratings  
We now run separate regressions for investment and speculative grade bonds to further investigate 
whether policy uncertainty impacts different rating classes differently. Results are reported in Table 3.5. 
Columns 1 to 4 report results for the investment grade sample and columns 5 through 8 repeat the same 
study for a sample of speculative grade bonds. The investment grade sample includes bonds with 
Moody’s credit classes of Baa3 and higher, where the speculative grade sample includes ratings of Ba1 
and lower.  
Results show that the effect of policy uncertainty on credit ratings is higher across the investment 
grade sample. After controlling for firm, bond and macro level determinants of credit spreads, we observe 
that a one standard deviation increase in policy uncertainty is associated with a 24.76 bps increase in 
investment grade credit spreads while the same increase in policy uncertainty only leads to a 5.43 bps rise 
for the speculative grade sample. The effects of other determinants are largely similar across the two 
samples, and confirm our findings in Table 3.4. However, the election dummy remains only largely 
significant in the investment grade sample. This result indicates that investment grade firms are impacted 
much larger by changes in policy uncertainty than the speculative grade sample.  
[Please place Table 3.5 about here.] 
The reason for this, we argue, can be due to the fact that a much larger portion of speculative grade 
credit spreads is composed of the firm-specific default probability. For example using a wide range of 
structural models, Huang and Huang (2012) conclude that credit risk constitutes merely a small fraction 
of investment grade bond’s credit spreads, whereas it accounts for a much larger portion of high-yield 
bonds’ credit spreads. This can in turn lead to larger effects from market-wide, systematic factors such as 
policy uncertainty on investment grade bonds as documented in Table 3.5. We further study the systemic 





3.3.3 Relative Importance of the Four Components of the PUI   
In this section we examine the impact of each of the four components of the PUI of Baker et al. (2012) 
on credit spreads based on fixed-effects panel regressions. We are primarily interested to investigate how 
each of the policy uncertainty index components affects credit spreads. The four components of this index 
are (1) the news-based component, (2) federal, state, and local government purchases disagreement, (3) 
CPI forecast disagreement across professional forecasters and (4) Uncertainty about tax code expiration.  
Similar to our former regression models, we use fixed effect specifications controlling for firm 
clustering and also include 11 monthly dummies. We run four independent regression models similar to 
the base regression (Equation 3.1) while in each of these models only one of these components is used as 
the main explanatory variable. Based on the results reported in Table 3.6, the coefficient estimates are 
highly significant for all four PUI components, and all have a positive impact on credit spreads except for 
the tax expiration uncertainty component [column (4)].  
This table shows that the news-based component and the CPI forecast disagreement have the largest 
positive impacts on credit spreads. One standard deviation increase in each of these components is 
associated with roughly a 27 bps increase in credit spreads. The purchase disagreement among federal, 
state and local governments has the smallest impact where a standard deviation in this component 
increases credit spreads only as much as 6.14 bps.  
[Please place Table 3.6 about here.] 
3.4 ADDRESSING ENDOGENEITY 
So far, we have established a large and positive association between policy uncertainty and credit 
spreads. In this section, we study the causal relation between these two variables, and specifically address 
whether changes in economic policy uncertainties cause changes in corporate credit spreads. To infer 
causality, we need to sufficiently alleviate any possible endogeneity concerns. 
The endogeneity problems here may stem from three sources. First, there may be omitted variables, 
particularly unobserved economic uncertainty determinants or effects from business cycles, that affect the 
PUI and credit spreads simultaneously, and thus our original regressions may be capturing the effects of 
these omitted variables. Second, we need to make sure that the effect of PUI on credit spreads that we 
capture in our studies is not from economic uncertainties that are unrelated to the PUI. This will result in a 
measurement error bias in our findings. Finally, there may be a simultaneity problem in the form of a 
reinforcing loop between PUI and credit spreads. Specifically, an increase in policy uncertainty might 




indicators of higher policy uncertainty and therefore be reflected in the news. Thus, simultaneity is an 
eminent concern as the main component of this index is news-based and is constructed by counting 
related words in newspapers and journals. This section presents several approaches to mitigate the above 
possible endogeneity problems.  
3.4.1 Omitted Variables  
3.4.1.1 Business Cycles  
It is well documented that credit spreads are counter-cyclical (Gulen and Ion, 2015; Bloom, 2014; 
Baker, Bloom and Davis, 2015). At the same time, policy uncertainty may also escalate during economic 
downturns. Bad economic times induce more incentives among policy makers and politicians to propose 
or seek policy changes, and therefore can lead to higher policy uncertainty. To corroborate this idea, 
Bloom (2014) shows that the PUI index of Baker, Bloom and Davis (2012) is 51% higher during 
recessions19. Moreover, Pastor and Veronesi (2012) conjecture that “Policy uncertainty is more likely to 
occur when the economy is in the downturn and as compensation investors demand higher risk 
premiums.” The simultaneous rise in corporate credit spreads and policy uncertainties during economic 
downturns imposes a certain challenge on causal interpretation of our results, as our regressions may in 
essence be capturing the effects of different economic conditions and particularly business cycles.  
While the use of lagged values can reduce such concerns to some extent, our results could still be 
influenced by the effect of such an omitted variable, i.e. business cycles, that persist over multiple 
periods. In this section, we incorporate two approaches to mitigate these concerns.  
First, we examine whether the impact of policy uncertainty on credit spreads varies with economic 
conditions. We use the NBER measure of recessions as an indicator of economic downturns. Based on 
this data, we split the sample into recession and expansion samples and repeat the estimation of our base 
regression for each of these samples separately. Table 3.7 reports the results. Columns 1 and 2 report the 
regression results using a univariate regression with the PUI index as the main explanatory variable. 
Columns 3 and 4 report the full regression results using additional controls. In these four columns, the 
odd (even) columns use the recession (expansion) samples. Based on the univariate regression results, the 
                                                     
19 In fact, increases in uncertainty during recessions is not limited to policy uncertainties. Bloom (2014) shows that 
all different measures of uncertainty surge during recessions. The same study shows that even at a micro level and 
considering individual firms, plants and industries, that the micro uncertainty increases at every level during 
recessions. Moreover, Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) document that stock return variations across 





effect of policy uncertainty on credit spreads is positive and significant under both economic conditions. 
This effect, however, varies in magnitude across the two samples. As the table shows, a one standard 
deviation increase in policy uncertainty is associated with as much as a 91 bps increase in credit spreads 
during recessions. The same magnitude of change in expansions has a much lower impact on credit 
spreads and is associated with roughly a 23 bps rise in credit spreads. The model’s goodness of fit shows 
similar differences, where it is as large as 52% in recessions and only 10% during expansions. Our results 
are robust after controlling for firm, bond and macro level determinants of credit spread. Across columns 
3 and 4, we confirm our former finding that the influence of policy uncertainty on credit spreads is 
positive and significant across both expansionary and recessionary periods, while the impact is much 
larger during the expansions.  
 [Please place Table 3.7 about here.] 
Next, we include several macroeconomic variables to capture fluctuations in macro-level market and 
economic conditions. We include the expected GDP, expected unemployment and expected one-year 
inflation from the Survey of the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Livingstone Survey. This survey is 
conducted since 1968 by the American Statistical Association and the National Bureau of Economic 
Research and aggregates professional forecaster’s predictions on key economic variables. We also use the 
Michigan Consumer Confidence Index from the University of Michigan20 as another measure of general 
economic conditions.  
As reported in Table 3.8, we include each of these variables separately in columns (1) to (4) and in (6) 
to (9), and together in columns (5) and (10). When we examine the first five columns that report results 
for regressions that do not include the PUI, we observe that all four alternative macro variables as controls 
are highly significant in all five regressions. Next, we include the PUI index in specifications in columns 
5 through 10. These columns show that the effect of the PUI index stays large and significant after all four 
macroeconomic controls are included. In Column 10, we further address the potential concern of high 
correlations between these four macroeconomic control variables and the PUI index by orthogonalizing 
PUI and these variables to measure the incremental explanatory power added to the model upon the 
addition of each new variable using the Gram-Schmidt procedure. The effect of the PUI index remains 
                                                     
20 We obtain similar untabulated results for regressions including the VXO index and the forecast dispersion in GDP 
from the Philadelphia Fed Database but did not include the dispersion of the forecasts of CPI and inflation from the 
same source due to their high correlations with each other and the GDP forecasts. The estimated coefficients of these 
two variables are positive and highly significant in separate regressions and in regressions that included and 
excluded the PUI and whether or not the Gram-Schmidt method is used to orthogonalize these independent 




large and significant in Column 10, confirming that the effects of policy uncertainty on credit spreads is 
robust to the influence of general economic conditions.  
[Please place Table 3.8 about here.] 
 
3.4.1.2 Economic Uncertainties 
Another possible problem in causal interpretation between the PUI and credit spreads is that our 
results may be capturing general changes in the economic uncertainty and not the effects of policy 
uncertainty per se. The reason is that policy uncertainty may respond to changes in factors that influence 
general economic uncertainty. Such increases in economic uncertainty that coincide with rising policy 
uncertainty can be identified using certain events such as wars, elections, and recessions (Baker, Bloom 
and Davis, 2012; Bloom, 2014). Our regression results may therefore be under the influence of such 
omitted variables that influence policy uncertainty and credit spreads at the same time. To account for this 
possible problem, we need to confirm that our results still hold after conditioning on all such possible 
sources of increased economy-wide uncertainty. For this purpose, we control for a variety of economic 
uncertainty indicators, and show that the impact of the PUI on credit spreads is robust to such additional 
controls.   
Our main candidate in this test is the VXO index. The VXO index is a general indicator of the 
economic uncertainties as capture by the implied volatilities of the S&P500 index firms. Moreover, 
Campbell and Taksler (2003) show that corporate credit spreads are largely affected by this index. As an 
additional measure of economic uncertainty, we include a measure of GDP forecast dispersion from the 
Livingstone Survey from the Philadelphia Fed. Higher forecast dispersion about GDP among professional 
forecasters indicates more uncertainty about economic conditions and thus can be used to capture an 
additional aspect of increased economic uncertainty not captured mechanically by VXO.  
Further, according to Campbell and Taksler (2003) that firm-level idiosyncratic volatility highly 
affects its credit spreads and to rule out the possible influence of firm-specific uncertainties, we also 
include a firm’s idiosyncratic return volatility as another control variable. We measure a firm’s return 
volatility as the standard deviation of excess returns on the firm’s stock minus the excess return on the 
CRSP value-weighted index over the previous 180 days.  
Results are reported in Table 3.9. The first three columns report the results without including the 
policy uncertainty variable. In each of these columns we include one of the above measures of economic 




includes the VXO index and the last column controls for the GDP forecast dispersion. Columns 4 through 
6 repeat the same specifications but add the PUI index in the first row. Estimates of the PUI over columns 
4 through 6 indicate that the influence of policy uncertainty on credit spreads is robust to the general 
economic uncertainty controls. When we compare the goodness of fit between 4, 5, and 6 and their 
corresponding columns 1, 2 and 3, we find that the adjusted r-squared increases 1% in all these columns 
after the inclusion of the PUI index. Another important observation based on this table is that all three 
measures of economic uncertainty also increase credit spreads significantly, corroborating the idea that 
increased uncertainty leads to higher credit spreads in general. In the last column, we include all three 
aforementioned measures of economic uncertainty, along with the PUI index. In this column, we have 
orthogonalized the policy uncertainty index to other indicators of uncertainty including idiosyncratic risk, 
VXO and GDP forecast dispersion to address possible collinearity between these determinants. As this 
column shows, the PUI estimate remains largely positive and significant, ruling out the effect of general 
economic uncertainties on our results.  
[Please place Table 3.9 about here.] 
 
3.4.2 Canadian Policy Uncertainty 
One of the important limitations of the PUI index of Baker, Bloom and Davis (2015) is possible 
measurement error. It follows that although this index measures economic policy uncertainty, it may be 
capturing other things as well. For example, the PUI index may be contaminated by economic 
uncertainties or determinants that influence corporate credit spreads and are unrelated to policy 
uncertainty. While controlling for economic uncertainties in the previous section can partially address this 
concern, in this section we introduce a new test to account for any remaining concerns about 
measurement error in the policy uncertainty index, as suggested by Gulen and Ion (2015).   
The idea is that Canada and US have closely related economies and there is a high trade activity 
between the two countries. In fact, US and Canada have the largest trade relationship in the world21. 
Many of the economic shocks that influence one of these countries, may well influence the other. Due to 
the relative size of the US economy, it is more likely that shocks to the US economy impact the Canadian 
economy. At the same time, policy uncertainty shocks are arguably contained more within sovereign 
boundaries.  
                                                     






This provides an opportunity to eliminate the part of the PUI index that is possibly capturing unrelated 
economic uncertainties. For this purpose we regress the US policy uncertainty on its Canadian counterpart 
and use the regression residuals as the alternative policy uncertainty index, after controlling for the series 
of macroeconomic controls. Our regression can be expressed as 
𝑈𝑆𝑃𝑈𝐼𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝐴𝑁𝑃𝑈𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 (3.2) 
 
Here, the 𝑈𝑆𝑃𝑈𝐼𝑡 and 𝐶𝐴𝑁𝑃𝑈𝐼𝑡 are the Baker, Bloom and Davis (2012) US and Canada uncertainty 
indexes, respectively. The 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑡  is a matrix of macroeconomic control variables including 
closest benchmark Treasury rate, S&P 500 index return, and the term slope. We use 𝜖𝑡  as the new policy 
uncertainty index and refer to it as the regression-based PUI (𝑅𝑃𝑈𝐼𝑡). The residual term of this regression 
is a much cleaner version of the original PUI in terms of possible contamination with irrelevant 
components. We use the following regression model to test whether our primary results using the PUI can 
be confirmed using the newly estimated RPUI: 
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑃𝑈𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽3𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑖,𝑡, +𝛽4𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
(3.3) 
 
Results are reported in Table 3.10. Similar to the main specification, we use firm fixed effects with 
monthly dummies and control for firm-level clustering. Based on this table, our results are robust to the 
choice of RPUI, as results across all panels are positive and highly significant. Results with this 
alternative measure are also robust to different controls including firm-level as well as macro level 
controls.  
[Please place Table 3.10 about here.] 
3.4.3 Instrumental Variable Analysis 
In this section, we address any remaining endogeneity concerns that are not addressed in the previous 
sections. We use three different instrumental variables to further address the endogeneity concerns 
between policy uncertainty and corporate credit spreads. This test particularly addresses possible 
shortcomings in the three studies above. A possible limitation to the first study (controls for overall 
macroeconomic conditions) is that there may still be market condition determinants that are specific to 
bonds credit spreads, that are not captured using the above indicators including GDP, unemployment, 
inflation and consumer confidence. Same possible limitation applies to the second study that incorporates 




sources of economic uncertainty that are specific to the relationship between credit spreads and policy 
uncertainty whose effects are not reflected in general indicators of macroeconomic uncertainty including 
VXO and analyst forecast dispersion. Finally, the third study that uses the regression residuals of US PUI 
on Canadian PUI may yet leave some contaminations unaccounted for. The political influences across the 
border can be arguably large and therefore some US policy uncertainties may translate into policy 
uncertainties in Canada as well. Moreover, there are a variety of economic shocks to Canada that are 
unrelated to those of the US.   
To address the above limitations and thus further address any remaining endogeneity concerns, we use 
three instrumental variable specifications. Appropriate instrumental variables in our study should have a 
strong relationship with the PUI, and their influence on credit spreads should pass solely through the PUI. 
We use the wealth of advances in the political science literature about policy settings and the relative 
legislative power of policy makers. Our main instrumental variable is the relative legislative power of the 
two major US political parties in each year. The related data comes from the Duane Swank (2013) 
database Comparative Political Parties Dataset. This database provides the relative legislative strength of 
different political parties across 21 countries between 1950 and 2011. This database categorizes the 
ideological position of parties in every country into Right, Center and Left. In the US, the Democratic and 
Republican parties are categorized as Center and Right leaning, respectively. Our main variable of interest 
here is the percent of legislative seats that are occupied by the each of these parties. The related variable 
for the former and latter are CENTGS and RIGHTGS, respectively. We compute the difference between 
these two variables as our main measure for the difference in power. The difference between these two 
variables, which we call DIFFGS, is therefore an indicator of the difference in the legislative power 
between Republicans and Democrats in every year.  
The idea is that reduction in the relative difference of power of the two major political parties can 
make policy expectations more uncertain by making the resolution of sensitive issues and possible 
gridlocks more difficult, in both the House and Senate (Erikson, Wright, McIver, 1989; Baker, Bloom, 
Canes-Wrone, Davis and Rodden, 2015). In recent years, the control of the Senate and the House have 
switched frequently between the two parties, and presidential election races have tightened, feeding 
higher policy uncertainties in the economy Canes-Wrone and Park (2012). 
On the other hand, there is no reason for expecting that differences in the power of major parties 
directly affects corporate credit spreads, making this measure a suitable candidate as an instrumental 
variable. Since we expect lower values of this index to lead to higher policy uncertainty, we multiply it by 





Our next instrumental variable is the political polarization of the two main parties by Poole and 
Rosenthal (1985). The DW-NOMINATE variable in this database measures the different parties’ 
ideological positions over time. The updated 2015 database has the estimation of the DW-NOMINATE 
variable from the 1st to the 113th Congress as well as the polarizations in the corresponding senates. This 
variable estimates the ideological standing of US legislators based on their voting patterns. The political 
polarization has two dimensions in this database. The first dimension, as the authors argue, can be 
interpreted as the positions of legislators about government intervention in the economy, while the second 
dimension addresses the conflict between North and South on slavery during the related periods (before 
the Civil War), and civil rights for the African Americans (from 1930s to mid-1970s). Currently, almost 
all polarizations can be attributed to the first dimension, as discussed by the authors (Lewis and T. Poole, 
2004; Carool, Lewis, Lo, T. Poole and Rosenthal, 2009). Thus, we use the first dimension as our second 
instrumental variable.  
The final measure is calculated by subtracting the DW-NOMINATE of the Democratic party from that 
of the Republican party. We expect that higher polarization makes policy setting and law making 
particularly difficult. McCarty (2012) argues that with more polarization, building of legislative coalitions 
and resolving gridlocks become more difficult. Thus, all else held equal, one can expect that higher levels 
of political polarization are associated with higher uncertainties about future policies. As argued above, 
there is no direct link between such political polarizations and corporate credit spreads. This theoretically 
validates the choice of the second instrumental variable.  
We create the third instrument as the interaction between the two above variables. This is done to 
mitigate further concerns about how well the other two instruments can impact policy uncertainty. On one 
hand, an increase in political polarization by itself may not necessarily indicate higher policy uncertainty, 
particularly if one party is significantly stronger than the other in a country’s political environment. In this 
scenario, although there is little overlap between the ideological stance of each party’s legislators, the 
party with more legislative power can smoothly pass its desired laws. This in turn diminishes the 
uncertainty about prospective policies, regardless of what types of policies would be decided or 
implemented. On the other hand, the closeness in the legislative power of parties by itself may not be a 
sufficient indicator of higher policy uncertainty, particularly if there is not much real ideological 
difference between the two parties, i.e. if there is low political polarization.  
The interaction of these two variables therefore creates an interesting instrument that combines both 
dimensions. Increases in this third instrument indicate higher levels of political polarization as well as 
closer legislative strength that intuitively necessitates higher and more severe policy uncertainty. With the 
same reasons as above, there is no direct link between this interaction term and credit spreads, validating 




column, the DIFFGS variable is used as the instrumental variable. In the second column both DIFFGS 
and political polarization are the instrumental variables. In the third column, we use the interaction term 
between DIFFGS and the political polarization as the IV. The table confirms the large and significant 
influence of policy uncertainty, using all the different instrumental variables, on credit spreads. The F- 
statistics across all models are large, ruling out the possibility of weak instruments in any of the settings.  
[Please place Table 3.11 about here.] 
3.5 POSSSIBLE MECHANISMS 
In this section, we explore through what mechanisms policy uncertainty can impact corporate credit 
spreads by studying the effects of policy uncertainty on different cross-sections of firms. The related 
literature suggests that changes in policy uncertainty can have heterogeneous impacts on firm cross-
sections. Particularly, our studies in this section shed light on two mechanisms through which policy 
uncertainty affects corporate decisions. The first mechanism, suggested by Bernanke (1983) and Rodrik 
(1991), argues that firms respond to increased policy uncertainties through postponement of positive NPV 
investments when investments are irreversible, until the uncertainty is further resolved. The second 
mechanism, suggested by Gulen and Ion (2015), argues that uncertainty about government policies can 
impact firms through affecting their expected sales to the government sector.  
The primary mechanism argues that if a firm’s investment opportunities are perfectly reversible then 
the firm would have no incentive to postpone them in high policy uncertainty periods since the firm can 
always halt and reverse its investments without incurring costs, in the case of an adverse policy outcome. 
Postponement of profitable projects adversely affects the cash flows of firms, can in turn deteriorate their 
ability to fulfil debt related obligations, and thus increases credit spreads. Whether this mechanism 
explains the influence of policy uncertainty on credit spreads can be tested by exploring whether changes 
in PUI has a larger effect on corporate credit spreads of firms with more irreversible investments.   
The second mechanism can be explored in the cross-section of firms with different dependences on 
government spending. For example, firms in the defence industry have a higher exposure to changes in 
government policies since the largest buyer of their output by far is the government sector. In this regard, 
it is imperative that the sensitivity of a firm’s sales to the government should influence its sensitivity to 





3.5.1 Investment Irreversibility 
When physical capital is required for investment, particularly as capital needs to be moved or 
committed across industries (Rodrik, 1991), capital investment becomes partially irreversible. Of course, 
firms have different levels of investment irreversibility based on their industries and styles of investment 
since allocation or redemption of capital is associated with sunk costs. As Rodrik (1991) and Bernanke 
(1983) argue, managers have incentives to postpone investment decisions when policy uncertainty is high 
to be able to make more informed decisions at more favourable market circumstances.  
These studies argue that, if all else is held equal, higher policy uncertainty ex-ante provides more 
incentives for the postponement of positive NPV projects. Postponing profitable projects hinders firm 
growth, and can thus adversely influence corporate cash flows. From a structural credit risk perspective 
(Leland and Toft, 1996), this will affect a firm’s capacity for debt repayment and hence increase its risk of 
default by adversely influencing the drift, which in turn translates into higher credit spreads. That being 
the case, we expect to observe that the credit spreads of firms with more irreversible projects react more 
positively to increases in policy uncertainty.  
We use four different measures of investment irreversibility to test the above prediction. Frist, we 
construct a capital intensity index, as the ratio of Property Plant and Equipment (PPE) to total assets (AT). 
As argued by Rodrik (1991), the irreversibility of projects increases when more physical investment is 
needed. This assumes that when capital intensity is high, firms need to incur large upfront costs. 
However, as Kessides (1990) argues, this measure may be muddled by the existence of an active market 
for second-hand assets. Thus, we recognize that this measure may not factor in other related determinants 
of the adjustment costs. We use three additional measures to address the shortcomings of this measure. 
We construct a saleability index for each industry, a measure of industry-level cost sunkness, and finally, 
a measure of sales cyclicality.  
For the second measure, we create a saleability index for each industry as proposed by Kim and Kung 
(2013). This index indicates how easily the industry-specific assets can be sold to firms in other 
industries. With easier sales of an industry’s assets to other industries, we expect higher liquidation values 
(Gulen and Ion, 2015). To construct this index, we use the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) capital 
flows data of 1997. These tables contain data on 180 asset classes across 123 industries. Specifically, 
these tables shows the total value of each of these asset classes used in any of the 123 industries, based on 
their NAICS industry classifications.  
To construct the saleability index, we do the following. First, we find what percentage of industries 
use a particular asset. For this purpose, we assign dummies of 1 when the use of an asset class in an 




the total number of industries. This procedure yields the “redeployabiliy” index. After the redeployabiliy 
for each asset class is assigned, we can compute each industry’s redeployabiliy index as the weighted 
average of the redeployabiliy of its assets. The weights used in this calculation are the percentages of the 
dollar amounts an industry invests in each of the 180 assets classes. When asset redeployability is higher 
for an industry, it means that it can liquidate its assets more straightforwardly and thus it suffers less from 
the problem of investment irreversibility.  
Next, we construct an industry-level index of cost-sunkness (Kessides, 1990; Rodrik, 1991; Farinas 
and Ruano, 2005). The reason is that firms that rent higher portions of their physical assets should have 
lower sunk costs and thus a measure of cost-sunkness can be constructed using a firm’s PPE and rent 
expenses. Moreover, the related industrial organization literature argues that firms with rapidly 
depreciating assets, and firms with more liquid second-hand markets have lower sunk costs. For the 
former, we use a firm’s depreciation expenses and for the latter, we use sales of plants, property and 
equipment (PPE) over the past 12 months. Further, we normalize all these measures by the current PPE. 
Then we aggregate these measures for every industry based on the first two digits of the SIC code.  
Finally, following Farinas and Ruano (2005) and Gulen and Ion (2015), we aggregate these three 
measures into one index. This index is constructed as follows: at any period, the index can take three 
values of 2, 1 or 0. The index equals 2 under the condition that all three proxies for an industry are below 
the median. The index equals 0 when an industry has all these proxies above the cross-sectional median. 
An index equal to 1 represents the remaining possibilities.  This indicates that when the index is higher, 
the sunk costs are higher, and thus the related firms have more irreversible investments.  
For the fourth and final measure, we construct a sales cyclicality index. We expect that industries with 
higher sales cyclicality have more irreversible investments. The logic is that firms that belong to highly 
cyclical industries get affected by negative shocks rather simultaneously and therefore distressed asset 
sales become increasingly difficult in such industries (Ericsson and Renault, 2006; Schleifer and Vishny, 
1992). The loss in recovery rates due to the simultaneous influence of negative shocks thus increases the 
investment irreversibility for such firms.  
To construct the measure of sales cyclicality, we do the following. First, we compute the correlation 
between firm sales and GNP over the length of our sample. Then, we take the average of the correlation 
for every industry using the first two digits of the SIC code. Next, we use a dummy indicator that equals 
one if the average correlation for an industry is above the cross-sectional mean and zero otherwise.  
We use the interaction of the above four measures with the policy uncertainty index to test the idea of 
investment irreversibility. Particularly, if the postponement of profitable projects in response to higher 
uncertainty can be explained by investment irreversibility, then we expect a positive sign for all four 





𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑈𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 . 𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
(3.4) 
 
where 𝑃𝑈𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the policy uncertainty index, 𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 represents any of the four measures of irreversibility 
introduced above, 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is the matrix of firm-level control variables, and 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is the 
matrix of macroeconomic controls. 𝜂𝑖  captures the firm fixed effect and 𝜖𝑖,𝑡  is the error term. In our 
results, we run this model once for each of the four proxies above (IR). Results are reported in Table 
3.12.  
 
[Please insert Table 3.12 here] 
 
Columns 1 through 4 in Table 3.12 study the credit-spread effects of saleability, cyclicality, the capital 
intensity index (PPE/AT), and finally, the cost sunkness index. In each of these columns, the estimations 
of these variables and their interactions with PUI are reported. As explained before, we expect positive 
signs on the interaction terms if the irreversibility hypothesis is supported. As the table shows, our 
prediction is supported in all columns, with positive and highly significant estimates especially for 
cyclicality and cost sunkness indexes. These results show that an increase in credit spreads can be 
explained partially by the postponement of profitable projects.  
 
3.5.2 Dependence on Government Spending 
The second mechanism by which policy uncertainty can create a cross-sectional heterogeneous 
response in credit spreads is through a firm’s dependence on government spending. Holding all else 
constant, we expect that the credit spreads of firms with more revenue sensitivity to government spending 
are more sensitive to changes in policy uncertainty. Firms for which revenues largely depend on 
government contracts are of prime importance here, since the same level of increase in policy uncertainty 
deteriorates their future incomes at a larger magnitude compared to other firms. This reduces income 
levels and thus adversely affects their capacity to repay debts. This escalates default probabilities, and 
credit spreads. Thus, we expect an increase in credit spreads in response to higher levels of policy 
uncertainty to be more severe for firms with higher dependences on government spending.  
 To test the above hypothesis, we construct an index to capture such dependence to government 
spending using the method of Belo, Gala and Li (2013). In their method, Belo et al. (2013) quantify an 




States from the Bureau of Economic Analysis website. In our paper, we use the 2014 version of this data 
that adds updates to industry classifications. There are two tables in this dataset. The first table is called 
the “use table”, which contains the dollar amount of sales from every industry to the other, using 15 
NAICS classified industries. The second table is called the “required table”, that depicts the dollar amount 
of input from different industries into any industry to produce one dollar of final output, i.e. the industry’s 
commodity.  
We use Leontief method to compute the final index. To start, we assume that there are I industries in 
our setting. Each industry 𝑖 can produce a certain value of produce, from which 𝑥𝑖𝑗 is used by industry 𝑗 
and the rest is consumed as final use which we denote by 𝑐𝑖. We can rewrite this argument formally as: 
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝑐𝑖
𝐼
𝑗=1




where 𝑥𝑖  is the industry-specific production, and depends on all the inputs to the industry. If we 
assume that the industry-specific output depends linearly on the industry’s input from other industries, we 
can write:  
𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑗 (3.6) 
 
where 𝑏𝑖𝑗  is the matrix of commodity transfers between industries, called the matrix of Leontief 
coefficients. From (5) and (6) we can write: 
𝑥 = (1 − 𝐵)−1𝑐 (3.7) 
 
In (7), 𝑐 is the final use by any entity in the economy. Here we are only interested in the final use by 
the government. From the use table, the government’s final use can be obtained from column F100 that 
includes all final uses by the government including federal, state and local governments. So our 
estimation method follows the following steps. First, we record how much each industry sells to the 
government for the final use. Next, we compute the (1 − 𝐵)−1in the above equation (3.7). Now we have 
the right-hand-side in equation (3.7) and therefore we can estimate 𝑥, that is a vector of outputs required 
by each industry to fulfill the final demand of all governments. If we divide 𝑥 for any respective industry 
by 𝑦  that is the total output of that industry, we obtain the industry’s sensitivity to government 
consumption. We use the following regression model to test the relevance of the sensitivity of credit 





= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑈𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 . 𝐷𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
(3.8) 
 
where 𝐷𝐺𝑆 is the dependence of firm i's industry to government spending. If our hypothesis that more 
reliance on government purchasing leads firms to become more sensitive to policy uncertainty, then we 
expect that the sign of the interaction of PUI and DGS will be positive. Results are presented in the Panel 
B of Table 3.12. As expected for our hypothesis, there is a large, positive and significant estimate both for 
DGS and its interaction with the PUI. Overall, results suggest that the increase in policy uncertainty 
further influences the credit spreads of the firms with more dependence on government spending.  
 
3.6 EFFECTS OF POLICY UNCERTAINTY ON THE COMPONENTS OF CREDIT 
SPREADS: DEFAULT PROBABLITY AND CDS-BOND BASIS 
In this section, we explore how and through what components policy uncertainty affects corporate 
credit spreads. Corporate credit spreads can be roughly categorized into two components: (a) a component 
that captures default spreads and thus can be estimated using credit default swap (CDS) spreads, and (b) 
the difference between credit spreads and the firm-specific default component that is referred to as Bond-
CDS spread in the literature. We are particularly interested in documenting the effects of policy 
uncertainty on the former since it provides an opportunity to test our primary hypotheses that a main 
mechanism by which policy uncertainty influences credit spreads is through elevating corporate default 
probabilities. This increase in default probabilities, as we argued in previous sections, is through reduced 
cash flows from either delayed investments or uncertainty about sales to the government sector. If policy 
uncertainty affects default probabilities, then it provides evidence for our proposed mechanism that an 
increase in corporate credit spreads in response to higher policy uncertainty can be partially explained by 
the deterioration in  firm’s capacity to repay its debts. 
Studying the reaction of Bond-CDS basis determines whether changes in policy uncertainty have any 
systematic effects on credit spreads. This is possible since bonds and CDS’s are not perfect substitutes. In 
other words, we should be able to replicate CDS spreads by shorting a risky floating-rate note and holding 
a default-free bond (Duffie, 1999; Fontana, 2011). Thus, if market frictions are nonexistent, we expect 
that regardless of a bond’s default rate the CDS spread is perfectly connected to the bond spreads (basis). 
In reality, however, this is not the case. The main reason for this difference is that since CDS’s are highly 
liquid assets their prices are almost solely influenced by default probabilities. Corporate bonds, on the 




and funding liquidity risks (Longstaff, Mithal and Neis, 2005). Subtracting the risk-free rate and CDS 
spreads from the total yield eliminates the first two risk factors, leaving mostly liquidity and possibly 
other market-wide risks to influence the remaining spread. Therefore, studying the effect of policy 
uncertainty on Bond-CDS basis captures systemic effects from increases in the PUI on credit spreads.  
A direct way to measure default probabilities is through investigating the micro-level credit default 
swap (CDS) spreads. Since the CDS spreads are by construction influenced by the probability of issuer’s 
default, we can directly interpret higher such spreads as higher default probabilities and vice versa. We 
obtain firm-level CDS spreads at different maturities from the Markit database. Next, we categorize 
spreads for different maturities into 1-year, 3-year, 5-year, 10-year and 20-year to maturity groups. We 
merge the resulting dataset by ticker symbol and company names with our main database. Since our main 
dataset is monthly, we take monthly averages of spreads in each of the maturity groups for each of the 
sample firms in each month. We expect that policy uncertainties will be resolved over the short-run, i.e. in 
less than a year, so our main CDS spreads of interest are the 1-year spreads. We repeat our base 
regressions for 1-year CDS spreads as the dependent variable. The regression model is as follows when 
𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the one-year maturity CDS spread for each firm: 
𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑃𝑈𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (3.9) 
 
We compute the Bond-CDS basis as the difference between bond and CDS spreads. We note that bond 
spreads in this method are merely credit spreads, since they are computed as the difference between bond 
yields and the risk free rate as in Hull, Predescu and White (2004) and Fontana (2011). The related 
regression model for Bond-CDS basis can be expressed as: 
𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑃𝑈𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿i,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (3.10) 
 
We report the results in Table 3.13. This table repeats our base regression with CDS spreads and 
Bond-CDS spreads as its dependent variables in odd and even columns, respectively. The first two 
columns report the univariate regression results using each of the above components at a time, and the 
next two columns add firm, market and macro-level controls. The table shows that in response to an 
increase in policy uncertainty, both default probabilities (CDS spreads) and the liquidity/market risk 
premiums increase significantly. The goodness of fit of the model is better, and the overall effect of the 
PUI variable after different controls is larger with the Bond-CDS spread regressions, suggesting that the 
market-wide risk premiums are influenced more by policy uncertainty. Results indicate that the response 
of credit spreads to policy uncertainty comes from both firm-level default probabilities and market-wide 
risk premiums. 






3.7 ROBUSTNESS TEST: ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF POLICY UNCERTAINTY 
So far, we have shown why the PUI index of Baker, Bloom and Davis (2015) is an appropriate 
measure for policy uncertainty using multiple methods and across different studies. In this section, we add 
one final dimension to the above examinations by performing a comparative study across the PUI of 
Baker, Bloom and Davis (2015) and other possible proxies of policy uncertainty from the literature. The 
purpose of this study is two-fold. The first objective is to confirm whether the effect of the PUI on credit 
spreads is robust to inclusion of other proxies of policy uncertainty. Our second objective is to study how 
well each of the other uncertainty proxies influence credit spreads in comparison to the PUI.  
The related literature suggests policy uncertainty proxies in three broad categories including monetary, 
fiscal and government policies. The monetary proxies include unanticipated consumer credit and M1 
growth (Aizenman and Marion, 1993) and unanticipated inflation (Fischer, 1991; De Gregorio, 1992; 
Edwards and Tabellini, 1990). The fiscal proxies include fluctuations in the terms of trade and surplus-
deficit (Aizenman and Marion, 1993) and government consumption to GDP. The government policy 
proxies include the election indicator used previously, real GDP growth, and public service to GDP.  We 
compute the unexpected component of a variable as the value of the variable minus its expected value 
based on a simple AR(1) estimation, and the uncertainty associated with a variable as the standard 
deviation of the error term from the AR(1) estimation.  
From the single-factor regressions (columns 1 to 10) reported in Table 3.14, we observe that public 
service to GDP, unanticipated consumer credit and unanticipated inflation have decreasing effects on 
credit spreads. An increase by one standard deviation for these independent variables reduces credit 
spreads by more than 11.70, 6.78 and 18.57 bps. Other determinants have positive effects on credit 
spreads, and the largest effect is due to increases in the real GDP variance where a one standard deviation 
increase raises credit spreads by almost 30 basis points. 
[Please place Table 3.14 about here.] 
Interestingly, the effects of the PUI index on credit spreads remain large and highly significant across 
all specifications. One standard deviation increase in the PUI is generally associated with around a 25 bps 
increase in credit spreads across all specifications. Results of the regression setting including all proxies 
as well as the PUI index is reported in column 9.  In this specification, we account for the correlations 
between these alternatives by obtaining estimates after orthogonalizing all variables using the Gram-




uncertainties simultaneously, the estimated coefficients of the PUI remain large and highly significant.  
 
3.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we study the impact of economic policy uncertainty on the credit spreads of corporate 
debt in the US market. Using a comprehensive panel covering the period from 2002 to 2012, we find 
economically large and statistically positive and significant influences from policy uncertainty on credit 
spreads. Our main measure of policy uncertainty is the Baker, Bloom and Davis (2015) index of 
economic policy uncertainty. We find that an increase in policy uncertainty leads to large increases in 
credit spreads. Using data on corporate CDS spreads from the Markit database, we find that policy 
uncertainty affects credit spreads through its impact on firm-specific default probabilities as well as the 
effect of policy uncertainty on market-wide bond risk factors such as market liquidity.  
We shed light on possible mechanisms through which policy uncertainty may impact credit spreads 
and document two possible channels. Using different measures of investment irreversibility, we find that 
the first channel is the postponement of investment decisions in response to escalated uncertainty. Using 
US I-O Accounts from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and based on a Leontief analysis, we show that 
another mechanism acts through the effect of deteriorations in sales prospects to the government sector, 
particularly for industries with higher reliance on government spending.  
To mitigate the effects of possible endogeneity problems, we address possible effects of business 
cycles and other sources of economic uncertainty by including related controls. We set up three different 
instrumental variable settings using: (a) the relative legislative strength of the two main political parties, 
(b) the level of ideological polarization between the two main political parties and (c) the interaction of 
these two proxies, as instruments for policy uncertainty. Our results are also robust to bond market, firm, 
industry and macroeconomic controls as well as alternative controls for economic uncertainties and 
changes in business cycles. Our results are also robust to the inclusion of other proxies of policy 







4 How Large Are the Costs and Benefits of Credit-Rating 
Changes? 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
  Based on survey findings, Graham and Harvey (2001) report that maintaining a good credit rating is 
the second-highest priority when U.S. CFOs make capital structure decisions, just marginally behind the 
interrelated rationale of “financial flexibility”.22 In this paper we argue that such corporate behavior is 
consistent with the conjecture of Kisgen (2006) that every downward credit-rating movement is reflected 
in actual capital structure decisions because it can impose a certain cost on the firm prior to distress or 
bankruptcy. These costs include higher interest costs on new debt, restricted access to other financial 
markets (such as commercial paper), heighted bond disclosure requirements (more stringent for 
speculative-grade bonds), and more stringent bond covenants. This paper aims to measure the costs of 
credit-rating deterioration to the value of the firm’s capital (henceforth CCRD).  
 According to Graham (2000), the classic trade-off theory fails to account for the low leverage ratios 
for the majority of U.S. firms after accounting for distress or bankruptcy costs and the tax benefits of 
debt. One solution to this so-called under-leverage puzzle is to account for the costs of debt prior to the 
point of default and show that these costs accrue to firm value if firms diverge from their optimal capital 
structures (Altman, 1984; Titman, 1984; Opler and Titman, 1994; Elkamhi et al., 2012). This leads to the 
following question: Can costs to the firm-value incurred prior to financial distress or bankruptcy be 
measured using the costs of credit-rating deteriorations? To answer this question, this paper pursues the 
objective of determining if the costs and benefits of credit-rating changes are economically large and 
statistically significant. 
 We use corporate bond-rating changes, and particularly sequential downgrade (upgrade) events to 
measure a series of costs (benefits) associated with debt prior to the point of default. These effects are not 
addressed in the existing capital structure literature most likely because the estimation of such costs to 
firm value prior to default is not straightforward. An argument in the literature (e.g., Andrade and Kaplan, 
1998) maintains that financial and not economic costs need to be accounted for in determining the level of 
                                                     
22 Graham and Harvey (2001) also find that U.S. CFOs assign a very low level of importance to bankruptcy and 
distress costs (the major costs in classic trade-off models) compared to credit ratings. Further, they find that debt 
issuance costs are near the bottom of the list of CFOs. This challenges the assumptions of the dynamic trade-off 
models that firms diverge from their optimal leverages due to financing costs (Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev, 




debt in the capital structure ex-ante. Financial costs are those that firms incur due to more debt such as 
higher interest expenses, probability of distress, and bankruptcy, while economic costs are those that are 
independent of the level of debt such as costs due to changing sales, production, and economic conditions. 
We extend this argument to the case of CCRD, since credit-rating declines and firm defaults can be due to 
both types of costs.  
 We examine mixed “economic” and “financial” credit-events (upgrades or downgrades) combined and 
the latter separately to study the relative size of these costs and benefits. We examine the economic value 
impacts of announcements of credit-rating changes that are not contaminated by confounding events for 
all non-financial firms included in the COMPUSTAT database over the period from the introduction of 
TRACE for bonds in 2002 to 2012.  From this population of non-financial firms in COMPUSTAT, we 
draw two undifferentiated samples of S&P downgrades and S&P upgrades (hereafter all samples) in order 
to compute estimates for the costs (benefits) of credit deteriorations (improvements). To determine if 
credit events with primarily financial causes have different economic-value impacts, we examine samples 
of upgrades and downgrades due primarily to financial causes. These latter two samples consist of those 
firms with loan records in the DealScan database with interest rates in excess of Libor plus 200 bps 
similar to a selection procedure used by Lerner, Sorensen, and Strömberg (2011) (hereafter referred to as 
high-yield loan or HYL samples).  When examining the economic-value impacts of the credit events for 
all four samples, we use market values for not only equity but also bonds unlike previous studies (e.g., 
Andrade and Kaplan, 1998). 
 We find that the impact of credit-rating changes is asymmetric. Deteriorations (upgrades) are 
associated with high (relatively small) and significant costs to a firm’s value. The average costs to firm 
value for a one-notch move to or within the speculative and investment grade credit-rating categories are -
4.1% and -6.5%, respectively, for downgrades, and 3.1% and 4.2%, respectively, for upgrades. We find 
that financially downgraded firms incur higher costs than the undifferentiated sample. The costs also are 
higher for firms in our HYL sample (i.e., firms downgraded primarily due to financial reasons) at -14.8% 
and -7.1% for speculative and investment grade debt, respectively, than those reported for the sample 
undifferentiated by the cause of the downgrade (i.e., economic or financial). Elkamhi, Ericsson, and 
Parsons (2012) suggest that a relatively continuous annual decline in firm value prior to bankruptcy of 
only 1% or 2% should be large enough to resolve the underleverage puzzle. Using a 15% discount rate, a 
1% continuous annual decline in value over a 10- and over a 20-year period is equivalent to a present day 
decline of 5.0% and 6.3%, respectively. 
 Since credit-rating changes may be anticipated by the market and incorporated into firm values prior to 
their announcements, we quantify prior anticipations about changes in credit quality using a model-




more muted decreases (increases) in firm financial performances and values. Assuming that our model is 
appropriate, these smaller in magnitude costs prior to actual credit-event announcements suggest that such 
announcements are only partially anticipated by market participants, and hence that their “value effects” 
are concentrated more at the time of an actual credit-rating change.23   
 Finally, we use an event study methodology to measure the financial costs of single- and multiple 
credit-rating changes more rigorously. We first use a propensity score matching method (Dehejia and 
Wahba, 2002) based on the propensities of firms to obtain a high yield loan (HYL). We then use the 
matched non-HYL sample as the control group and the HYL sample as the treatment based on the 
conjecture that total risk consists of more financial than business risk for the former sample and vice versa 
for the latter group. We find that the cumulative costs (benefits) of credit-rating deteriorations 
(improvements) can be as large as 15.1% (5.8%) to firm value.  
 Thus, this paper makes a number of important contributions to the capital structure and credit-rating 
literature. First, we are able to provide supportive evidence for the relative importance of credit ratings for 
CFOs documented by Graham and Harvey (2001) by measuring the costs and benefits of credit-rating 
changes on firm values. Second, we revisit the cost of default examination of Andrade and Kaplan (1998) 
by incorporating the market value of debt instead of its book value to measure the cost of credit-rating 
downgrades (CCRD). Our much larger high-yield loan (HYL) sample compared to the 31 LBOs studied 
by Andrade and Kaplan (1998) should alleviate to some extent the downward selection bias attributed by 
Davydenko, Strebulaev, and Zhao (2012) to the findings of Andrade and Kaplan (1998). The bias occurs 
because these firms may have become highly leveraged due to their expectations and those of their 
lenders that the likelihood of default was abnormally low. By comparing the relative costs for our HYL 
sample which proxies for the financial cost of CCRD with the “all” sample which proxies for the mixed 
financial/economic costs of pre-default downgrades, we are able to address this downward bias.  
 Third, we provide the underlying basis for using CCRD as a reference point for measuring the pre-
default costs of debt. Specifically, we show that CCRD appear to be large enough to help explain the 
underleverage puzzle. Our results explain the variation in leverage ratios in a cross-section of firms where 
larger, more profitable firms have lower leverage ratios (Graham and Leary, 2011). Our results also 
contribute to the zero-leverage argument of Strebulaev and Yang (2013) by adding substantially to the 
empirical costs of debt prior to default. Both studies report that larger, more profitable, and better rated 
firms tend to have lower (or zero) leverages. We conjecture that these firms face a longer expected 
                                                     
23 Since the number of model-implied credit events is much larger than the number initiated by the credit agencies, 
the lower magnitude of CCRDs may be the result of a dispersion of the deterioration costs across multiple model-




sequence of CCRD instances prior to uncertain default or no sequence at all because they generally have 
higher initial credit-rating quality that maintain greater stability over time.  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 briefly reviews the related literature 
on the market effects of credit ratings and their changes. Section 4.3 describes the samples, data, summary 
statistics and the computations of debt and equity values. Section 4.4 examines the efficacy of our high-
yield loan (HYL) samples as proxies for “pure” financial distress. Section 4.5 examines the economic 
value effects of S&P credit-rating changes. Section 4.6 reports some robustness tests using a model-
implied credit change identification, and for tests that control for the effects of business-risk and other 
firm-specific variables. Section 4.7 concludes our paper. 
 
4.2 EFFECTS OF CREDIT- RAING CHNAGES ON CAPITAL STRUCTURES AND FIRM 
VALUES 
4.2.1 Credit-Rating Changes and Capital Structures 
 This section briefly reviews the effect of credit-rating changes on debt and equity prices and shows 
how announcements of credit-rating changes can affect a firm’s capital structure and firm value. Some 
studies examine how credit ratings influence firm values, capital structure decisions and corporate 
financing behavior. Credit-rating downgrades increase bond yields (Wansley, Glascock, and Clauretie, 
1992), and have a greater effect on speculative versus investment grade bonds and compared to upgrades 
(Hite and Warga, 1997; Steiner and Heinke, 2001, for Eurobonds).  Firms issue less debt and more equity 
near credit-rating announcements (Kisgen, 2006). Fallen angels choose lower debt levels after 
downgrades, and exhibit no significant debt-structure changes prior to such events (Ruah and Sufi, 2010).  
 Several studies examine the informational value of credit ratings. West (1973) finds that credit ratings 
can predict bond yields even beyond the information contained in general financial variables.  Klinger and 
Sarig (2000) conclude that unexpected rating changes have information content for investors. Elton et al. 
(2001) conclude that ratings have real information content based on an examination of bond prices across 
different rating categories. Caton and Goh (2003) find that the reduction of earnings expectations for a 
downgraded firm and its competitors depends on the initial credit rating and the magnitude of the change. 
The information content of rating changes is mainly attributed to the amount of resources, expertise and 
access to non-public information that are used by rating agencies when they make credit-rating changes 
(Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits, 2006).   
 Credit-rating downgrades are more relevant than upgrades in terms of the relative magnitudes of their 




(Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich, 1992b; Goh and Ederington, 1993).  Markets (do not) react to 
anticipated (upgrades) downgrades (Grier and Katz, 1976) or react faster to downgrades than upgrades 
(Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich, 1992b; Goh and Ederington, 1993).  
 Some studies conclude that information about a firm’s credit quality is incorporated into market prices 
prior to rating-change announcements. These findings not only reduce the expected significance of credit-
rating events but they also suggest that there may be other points in time for determining the costs 
associated with credit-rating changes other than on these event days. For example, Weinstein (1977) finds 
that asset prices change between 18 and 7 months prior to rating announcements. Matolcsy and Lianto 
(1995) find that some credit-quality information is reflected in prices prior to rating announcements and 
that announcements of rating downgrades (unlike upgrades) contain new information.   
 
4.2.2 Credit Rating Changes and the Underleverage Puzzle 
 To provide a basis for our conjecture that our study has implications for providing a possible 
explanation of the underleverage puzzle, we first discuss the challenges encountered in measuring the 
costs of debt (at or before distress) and then show how our approach helps fill this void in the relevant 
literature. We begin with a discussion of three influential papers that provide estimates of the costs of 
acute financial distress or bankruptcy. Based on a small sample of 31 leveraged buyout (LBO) firms that 
subsequently became financially distressed, Andrade and Kaplan (1998) report that the ex-post 
capitalized costs of distress range from 10% to 23% (median of 16.5%) of total value just prior to the 
onset of distress.  
 The two papers that examine ex-ante estimates arrive at seemingly conflicting conclusions about 
whether the magnitudes of these costs are sufficiently large to explain the under-leverage puzzle. Using a 
risk-neutral distribution from bond yields to discount the Almeida and Kaplan’s 16.5% ex-post distress 
costs, Almeida and Philippon (2007) conclude that the ex-ante cost estimates of 4% to 6% of firm value at 
the present point in time (even if it is not close to the onset of distress) are sufficient enough to offset the 
tax benefits of debt. In contrast, Elkamhi, Ericsson, and Parsons (2012) find that the ex-ante distress costs 
for a sample of bankrupt firms at the time of default do not exceed 1% of current firm value and thus are 
too small to cancel out the tax benefits of debt.  
 Thus, a potential approach to further address the under-leverage puzzle is to measure debt costs before 
default from changes in credit quality. Some pre-default costs identified in the literature include damaged 
relationships with stakeholders, loss of market share (Zingales, 1998; Opler and Titman, 1994), supplier 
frictions (Titman, 1984; Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim, 2008), predation by competitors (Bolton and 




However, it is difficult to link these costs to the trade-off model due to difficulties in their measurement 
(Altman, 1984), timing, and predictability, and heterogeneity across firms. 
 These difficulties suggest the need for a more precise measure of “pre-default” costs. We propose that 
the credit deterioration thresholds associated with the costs of credit-rating downgrades (CCRD) serve 
this purpose. The CCRD provide a well-ordered and empirically tractable measure of the costs of debt in 
the capital structure prior to default and can help reconcile the long-standing debates discussed above 
about the underleverage puzzle.  The timing of credit-rating changes by the credit-rating agencies is 
known, discrete and not subject to debate. The measurement of their impact on a firm’s value can be 
measured using the market prices for a firm’s traded financial instruments. Credit-rating changes between 
announcements can be predicted using various structural models.  Finally, the measures capture firm 
heterogeneity due to firm-specific differences in the probabilities and costs associated with financial 
distress.  A practical side benefit is that these costs can provide an appropriate measure for CFOs and 
investors to understand how bond markets react to credit-rating changes.  
 
4.3 SAMPLE, DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
4.3.1 Sample and Data 
 To test the static trade-off theory, one needs a reliable approximation of the costs associated with debt 
that are incurred purely due to financial reasons. A major concern in the related literature (Almeida and 
Kaplan, 1998; Davydenko, Strebulaev, and Zhao, 2012; Elkamhi, Ericsson, and Parsons, 2012) is that the 
“pure” financial costs of debt are difficult to identify empirically since financial distress (inability to meet 
required debt payments) typically occurs simultaneously with economic distress (deteriorating economic 
fundamentals).  To disentangle these two determinants of distress, Andrade and Kaplan (1998) examine a 
sample of leveraged-buyout (LBO) firms that eventually defaulted. They argue that, since these firms 
represent a sample whose default is primarily due to financial reasons, their default costs can proxy for 
the financial costs associated with debt.24 Nevertheless, they note that this approach may yield downward-
biased estimates of debt costs; mainly because these firms may have chosen to become highly leveraged 
due to the abnormally low expectations of their default. Davydenko, Strebulaev, and Zhao (2012) posit 
that this bias can be accounted for by not unbundling the two costs. While this approach yields higher 
estimates of the costs of debt, the firm-value costs associated with changes in economic and financial 
factors both jointly and separately would better capture the decision-making process of corporate 
                                                     




managers when making capital structure decisions. In turn, this should improve the tests of the efficacy of 
the trade-off model, for example, in explaining deviations from target leverages. 
 Thus, we still need to obtain an estimate of the financial costs associated with debt, particularly “prior” 
to an actual default event. To this end, we initially draw two samples of non-financial firms (i.e., those 
without SIC codes between 6111 and 6999). The first (“all”) sample drawn from all remaining Compustat 
firms is used to compute our estimates for the costs (benefits) of credit deteriorations (improvements) 
undifferentiated by whether the cause of the downgrades (upgrades) is due to changes in the likelihood of 
more pure financial or mixed financial/economic distress. We use a second sample of firms with high-
yield loans (HYL sample hereafter) as a proxy for firms with relatively higher “financial distress” costs of 
debt.25 Using a selection procedure similar to Lerner, Sorensen, and Strömberg (2011), these firms are 
drawn from the DealScan database if they have loans carrying interest rates that exceed Libor plus 200 
bps based on the “AllInDrawn” variable.  
 All the corporate credit-rating data available in the S&P database at WRDS from 2002 to 2012 is split 
into upgraded and downgraded samples. The credit ratings are changed to numerical ratings as in Lerner, 
Sorensen, and Stromberg (2011) by assigning 1 to the highest rated category (AAA), 2 for AA+, and so 
forth and ending with 24 for D (default). Thus, the magnitude of each credit-rating change is obtained by 
subtracting the number before from the number after the credit event. We also retain beginning and 
ending ratings for each credit event because a change of -4, for example, for a firm downgraded from AA 
to A- may have different CCRD effects than one downgraded from BBB to BB-. We aggregate credit-
rating changes on a quarterly basis and measure their costs over two year periods. In the robustness 
section, we also split the “all” and “HYL” samples into upgrades and downgrades based on the results of 
our structural distance-to-default model.  
 To ensure that the CCRD estimates are the result of credit deteriorations and not unduly influenced by 
other corporate events, we obtain “clean” samples by eliminating rating-change events that have various 
confounding announcements over the one year period up to and including the credit-rating change event 
using the CAPITALIQ Events database. Such events are: Dividend increases and decreases (categories 46 
and 47, respectively) as in Davydenko, Strebulaev, and Zhao (2012); Stock splits & significant stock 
dividends (category 53); Special dividends (category 94); M&A transactions and cancellations (categories 
80 and 82, respectively); Lawsuits & legal issues (category 25); IPOs (category 85); Earnings (category 
28); and Exchange Changes (category 57). 
 We obtain quarterly corporate financial information associated with cash flows, capital expenditures 
and total capital for our sample firms from COMPUSTAT (see appendix 5 for a complete listing of the 
                                                     




variables examined herein). Since quarterly EBITDA is not provided in COMPUSTAT, we estimate it 
using the method in Fabozzi and Markowitz (2002) as sales (SALEQ) less costs of goods sold (COGSQ) 
less Selling, General and Administrative Expenses (XSGAQ). Industry variables are calculated as the 
averages for all the firms in the same first two digits SIC code.  Daily stock returns and their volatilities, 
and quarterly and daily weighted-average indexes of NYSE, NASDQ and AMEX stocks are drawn from 
the CRSP database. Risk-free rates (3 month, 1 year and 5 years) are obtained from the Federal Reserve 
Data Download Program (DDP) website.  
 Unlike much of the literature, we calculate the market value of debt using daily corporate bond prices 
obtained from the TRACE database from 2002. 26 For firm-days without bond prices, we use the price 
from the closest available day. The annual marginal corporate tax rate for each firm is obtained from John 
Graham’s website (Graham and Mills, 2008).  
 
4.3.2 Descriptive Sample Statistics 
 The summary descriptive statistics reported in Table 4.1 display major differences between credit-
rating upgrades and downgrades depending upon whether the classification is based on S&P rating 
changes or our model-implied credit events. Based on Panel A of Table 4.1, about one-third of all S&P 
downgrades occur during the recent 2007-2009 financial crisis and nearly one-half of all S&P upgrades 
occur during the three-year period 2010-2012. The peak years in terms of relative frequency are 2009 
(16.38%) for downgrades and 2011 (17.77%) for upgrades. We observe somewhat similar values for the 
financially downgraded and upgraded firms with a little less than one-third of all downgrades occurring 
during the recent 2007-2009 financial crisis and over one-half of all upgrades occurring during the three-
year period 2010-2012. However, financial downgrades at nearly one-third of this sample are not only 
still higher during the most recent three-year period of 2010-2012 but they peak at 14.69% in 2011.  
[Please place Table 4.1 about here] 
 
 Based on Panel B of Table 4.1, we find quite different patterns for model-implied (point-in-time) 
upgrades and downgrades. We observe that only about 17% of the market-implied downgrades occur 
during the recent 2007-2009 financial crisis and over one-half occur during the prior three-year period 
2004-2007 with the peak of 34.5% occurring in 2005. In contrast, over 57.2% of the market-implied 
upgrades occur in the three-year period of 2004-2007 and only 19.5% occur in the three-year period 
                                                     
26 Davydenko, Strebulaev and Zhao (2012) examine the market value of debt using bond trading data from Merrill 
Lynch just before and after default. In contrast, we use the market value of debt to capture variations in the value of 




2007-2009. We observe that only about 16.0% of the market-implied financial downgrades occur during 
the recent 2007-2009 financial crisis and about 24.1% occur during the prior three-year period 2004-2007 
with the peak of about 23.4% occurring in 2012. Similarly, over 39.8% of the market-implied financial 
upgrades occur in the three-year period of 2004-2007 and only about 21.3% occur in the three-year period 
2007-2009. This observation can be attributed either to more subjective assignment of through-the-cycle 
ratings during the period by S&P, or to a structural shift in the way that S&P analyzed the credit quality 
of their customers. 
 Table 4.2 reports the distributions of the number of firms that experience various one-notch down- 
(up-) grades ending in different credit-rating categories. Panels A and B report the numbers of firms for 
downgrades and upgrades, respectively. There is a significant concentration of downgrades into the B-
rated categories (501 and 847 S&P and model-implied downgrades, respectively, for the all sample in 
Panel A). Most downgrades (upgrades) are one-notch events, so our results are more skewed towards the 
one-notch samples, and there is a decreasing trend in downgrade (upgrade) occurrences as the magnitude 
(number of notches) of credit-rating changes increases.  We find that the number of credit-event 
occurrences is almost twice as large for the HYL versus All samples. This suggests that actual ratings are 
likely to be of greater materiality because they occur less frequently. It also suggests that credit-rating 
agencies not only account for more factors than the general quantitative-rating models but use a through-
the-cycle perspective when making credit-rating decisions. This is consistent with the findings of 
Hovakimian, Kayhan, and Titman (2009) that credit-rating agencies have the tendency to assign relatively 
stable ratings to their clients. 
 [Please place Table 4.2 about here.] 
 
4.3.3 Measures of Debt and Total Firm Capital 
 Using the book value of debt as in Andrade and Kaplan (1998) cannot effectively capture the costs that 
firms incur from a credit event since the effect on bond yields of such an event is quickly reflected in the 
secondary market. A firm captures these costs mostly at rollover points of its existing debt by incurring 
higher financing costs (Leland and Toft, 1996; He and Xiong, 2012;  Elkamhi, Ericsson, and Parsons, 
2012).  
 We use two methods to estimate the market value of debt. The first method estimates the market value 
of debt using a structural Merton-like model (Merton, 1974) by simultaneously estimating the value of the 
firm and its volatility (as is more fully discussed in Appendix 4). This model needs an estimate of a 
default boundary that refers to the value of the firm when it exogenously decides not to service its debt 




half of long-term debt. Since this method is known to highly underestimate the value of debt, our second 
method calculates the market value of debt using the price changes of corporate bonds as reported in 
TRACE. We assume that such changes are good proxies of the changes in the overall value of a firm’s 
total debt. Thus, we calculate the market value of debt by multiplying the book value of debt at the 
beginning of a quarter by the change in the value of public debt over that quarter. When this market value 
of debt is added to the firm’s total equity value, we obtain a market-value estimate of the firm.  
 Since public information is no longer available when a firm becomes bankrupt or privatized (as a 
result of a LBO deal), Kaplan (1989, 1994) and Andrade and Kaplan (1998) are only able to obtain 
estimates of the costs to value by first multiply a firm’s cash flow margins by the ratio of its total capital 
to cash flows and then increase this value by 3% to account for direct bankruptcy costs. We expect the 
estimates of Andrade and Kaplan (1998) to be quite noisy since the magnitudes of the fluctuations in cash 
flow margins may exceed fluctuations in capitalized costs (Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein, 1994; 
Davydenko, Strebulaev, and Zhao, 2012). In contrast, our method should significantly reduce this high-
volatility problem since we calculate the total capital of the firm as the sum of total assets in each quarter 
(ATQ), less total book liabilities (DLTTQ + DLCQ) and total market liabilities. This is possible because 
all accounting information is still available for publicly traded firms after credit-rating changes prior to 
bankruptcy. 
 
4.4 DOES THE HIGH- YIELD SAMPLE MESURES THE “FINANCIAL” COST OF 
CREDIT- RATING CHANGES? 
 In previous sections, we argued that our sample of firms with high-yield loans (HYL) is a better proxy 
for the CCRD associated with relatively “pure” financial distress than the LBO sample examined by 
Andrade and Kaplan (1998) both in terms of its relative pureness and representativeness. In this section, 
we test this conjecture for our two HYL samples using the methodology of Andrade and Kaplan (1998).  
 
4.4.1 Impact of High-Yield Loan Originations 
 If financial costs are the primary contributors to credit deteriorations in the HYL sample, we expect 
that the deterioration in “financial-health” ratios to be larger in this sample. To test this conjecture, we 
select two important ratios: first, the ratio of the book leverage (book value of total debt to total capital); 
and second, the interest coverage ratio (EBITDA to Interest Expenses). We measure these ratios in the 
year before and also during the year of the high-yield loan (HYL) deal. Based on the results summarized 




magnitude of this deterioration varies with the issuer’s credit rating. For a typical B-rated firm, the decline 
in interest coverage ranges between 0.49 and 0.60 from a year before to one year after the HYL deal. The 
increase in the leverage of the issuers is not homogenous across different credit-rating categories. For 
example, the median ratio of book leverage for A-rated issuers decreases only slightly from 0.37 in the 
year prior to the year of the loan to 0.29 in the year of the loan. The corresponding changes in the same 
ratio for the higher risk categories C (D) is from 0.57 to 0.95 (from 0.79 to 0.99).  This highlights the 
differential impact of high-yield loans on an issuer’s capital structure and leverage across different credit-
rating categories. 
[Please place Table 4.3 about here.] 
4.4.2 Contributors to Financial-ratio Costs of Credit-rating Deteriorations (CCRD) 
 Using a methodology similar to that of Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994), we measure the 
contribution of industry, firm and leverage to the financial-ratio costs of CCRD after a credit event.27  The 
industry’s contribution to CCRD is estimated by comparing what would have been the change in the 
interest coverage ratio if the issuer had the same relative performance as its industry median in the year 
before the deal. The estimate of the effect of issuer performance on CCRD is obtained by using the 
issuer’s cash flows as if it had maintained its pre-loan deal performance post-loan deal. In the final step, 
we estimate the role of the issuer’s leverage by measuring what would have happened if the interest-
coverage ratio was equal to the median of this ratio for the issuer’s industry.  
 The estimated contributions of each of these three factors to the CCRD from a downgrade are reported 
in Table 4.4 for two categories (investment grade or IG and speculative grade or SPEC), the specific 
credit-rating classes of A, B, C and D, and the undifferentiated sample of credit-rating downgrades 
(All).28 Based on the medians, we observe that the contribution is highest for the leverage effect followed 
successively by the issuer performance effect and a nil industry effect for the SPEC sample, and is highest 
for the issuer performance effect followed successively by the leverage and industry effects for the IG 
sample. 29  When we examine the median contributions for the four specific credit-rating categories 
individually and collectively, we find that the industry effect is most pronounced with little issuer and 
                                                     
27 Many recent studies use various accounting variables or their ratios to examine the real or operating performance 
effects of events such the appointment of CEOs as outside directors (Fahlenbrach, Low and Stulz, 2010), private-
equity ownership (Acharya et al., 2013), SEO firm overinvestment (Fu, 2010), and short-selling constraints 
(Grullon, Michenaud and Weston, 2015). 
28 Table 4.4 only includes the results for the HYL sample because we are testing the conjecture that the primary 
source of CCRD for these HYL issuers is financial. Investment Grade (IG) category includes issuers with bond 
ratings of BBB or higher, and speculative (SPEC) includes issuers with bond ratings of BB to D, inclusive. 





leverage effects for the A-rated deals. In contrast and as expected, the leverage effect followed by the 
issuer performance effect contributes most to CCRD for the other three credit-rating categories. These 
findings are consistent with those reported by Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) and Andrade and 
Kaplan (1998). 
 [Please place Table 4.4 about here] 
 
4.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.5.1 Changes in Credit Ratings and Firm Value  
 In this section, we examine the mean and median changes in the market- and industry-adjusted total 
capital values (TCV) in millions of dollars associated with credit-rating downgrades and upgrades from a 
year prior to the change to t = 0 (the year of the change) and to t = 1 (the year after the change). This 
examination is undertaken for various credit-rating groupings of: IG (investment grade, at least a BBB 
rating), SPEC (speculative grade, below a BBB rating), and A, B, C and D (default) ratings where A, B 
and C capture their plus and minus notches.  
 The market-adjusted changes in TCV (M∆TCVt) are obtained by subtracting the market-adjusted 
measure of total capital at t = 0 (𝑇𝐶𝑉𝑡) from the total capital for the preceding year (𝑇𝐶𝑉−1), and then 
dividing this value by (𝑇𝐶𝑉−1). More precisely: 
Madj∆TCV−1,0 =  (𝑇𝐶𝑉−1 − Madj∆TCV𝑡) 𝑇𝐶𝑉−1⁄   (35) 
 
where the TCV for each of the years after t=1 are first discounted back to the year prior to the year of the 
credit-rating change (t = -1) using the quarterly CRSP value-weighted index (Andrade and Kaplan, 1998; 
Korajczyk and Levy, 2003) of all NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX listed stocks. The industry-adjusted 
changes in TCV (Iadj∆TCVt) are obtained using a similar method and the returns of an equally-weighted 
portfolio of the stocks (Andrade and Kaplan, 1998) in the same two-digit SIC industry category.  
Specifically: 
Iadj∆TCV−1,0 =  (𝑇𝐶𝑉−1 − Iadj∆TCV𝑡) 𝑇𝐶𝑉−1 ⁄  (36) 
  
The significances of the means and medians are determined using a student t-test and Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney U test, respectively. Since the distributions of the changes in capital values associated with 
credit-rating changes diverge from normality, non-parametric tests (such as the Wilcoxon and Wilcoxon-




 Panels A and B of Table 4.5 report the mean and median changes in the market- and industry-adjusted 
total capital values (TCV) in millions of dollars associated with credit-rating downgrades and upgrades, 
respectively, from a year prior to the change to t = 0 (the year of the change) and to t = 1 (the year after 
the change). The most important result in Panel A of Table 4.5 is the large and highly significant CCRD 
associated with credit-rating deteriorations for all rating categories during the year of the credit-rating 
deteriorations (t = 0), which are consistent with the general predictions and findings reported in the 
literature that rating downgrades negatively affect stock and bond prices (Klinger and Sarig, 2000; Elton 
et al., 2001). The absolute values of the CCRD generally increase as the credit-rating declines. The first 
four rows report the CCRD when firms are downgraded into “investment grade” or “speculative” 
categories. As expected, the median market-adjusted (industry-adjusted) CCRD in the year after a 
downgrade is a significant -14.8% (-16.7%) when firms are downgraded into a speculative rating, and -
7.2% (2.3%) when they are downgraded from a higher to a lower investment grade category.  
[Please place Table 4.5 here] 
 
 The next eight rows report the CCRD when firms are downgraded into A, B, C and D rating 
categories. Once again, we observe significantly larger CCRD in absolute value terms for firms that are 
downgraded into any of these rating categories. For example, the median industry-adjusted CCRD when 
measured from t=-1 to t=1 becomes monotonically more negative as the credit ratings associated with the 
downgrades move from A to D. For this finer delineation of credit ratings, we observe that the market-
adjusted CCRD of -8.5%, -15.6% and -35.8% for credit-rating categories of B, C and D, respectively, are 
larger in magnitude than their industry-adjusted counterparts. If found to be subsequently robust, these 
changes appear to be sufficient to satisfy the hurdle set by Elkamhi, Ericsson, and Parsons (2012) that a 
relatively continuous annual decline in firm value prior to bankruptcy of only 1% or 2% should be enough 
to resolve the underleverage puzzle. 
 The positive and significant (median-only) industry-adjusted CCRD of 4.9% and 3.3% for downgrades 
within our highest rating category of A for periods [-1:0] and [-1:1] are an obvious exception, which 
could mean that the downgrades were less than anticipated or were due to an increase in the conservatism 
of credit-rating agencies during the studied period (Baghaei, Servaez, Yamao, 2013). The right-most four 
columns report normalized CCRD that are obtained by dividing the respective values by the weighted-
average number of notches of downgrades in each category to obtain the normalized cost that a firm 
incurs, on average, from a one-notch change in its credit rating. We find that in the immediate year after a 
credit-rating deterioration to or within the speculative and investment grade categories, a median firm 
incurs a -9.1% and -5.9% cost for each notch, respectively. Thus, normalized costs exhibit the same 




associated with larger costs than a one-notch downgrade to or within an investment grade category. The 
same pattern applies for downgrades to or within the A, B, C and D categories.   
 Panel B of Table 4.5 supports the finding that firms benefit from credit-rating improvements in terms 
of capitalized benefits. However, these benefits are smaller in absolute values than their counterparts for 
credit-rating deteriorations. This asymmetric effect is consistent with the findings of Hand et al. (1992), 
Goh and Ederington (1993) and Grier and Katz (1976). Unlike their market-adjusted median counterparts, 
all of the industry-adjusted median BCRU are at least marginally significant for upgrades to or within the 
investment (IG) and speculative (SPEC) grade categories. Unlike their market-adjusted mean counterparts 
for the speculative category, the market-adjusted means of 4.2% and 4.6% for t [-1:0] and [-1:1] for 
upgrades to or within the investment (IG) category are highly significant. Among upgrades to or within 
the three investment grade categories, the benefits and their significance decrease with movement from 
upgrades to or within A to those to or within C. While none of the market-adjusted median BCRU are 
significant, the industry-adjusted median BCRU are significant for upgrades to or within the A and to or 
within the B categories.  All four of the mean BCRU are significant (and positive) once again only for 
upgrades to or within the A and to or within the B categories. To illustrate, the mean market-adjusted 
BCRU for t [-1:0] are a significant 8.7%, and marginally significant 6.4% and an insignificant 2.5% for 
upgrades to or within the A, B and C categories, respectively. The last two rows report the BCRU not 
differentiated by final credit-rating category. All of the BCRU are positive with at least marginally 
significant medians and highly significant means. The median market- and industry-adjusted medians are 
5.0% and 9.3% for t [-1:0] and the corresponding means are 4.9% and 18.4%, respectively. As credit 
ratings improve from C to A both the not normalized and normalized BCRU increase in magnitude. A 
one-notch improvement in credit rating that ends in the C, B or A category results in market-adjusted 
BCRU of -2.8%, -1.3%, and 4.5% (2.3%, 4.6% and 6% when industry-adjusted), respectively, one year 
after the credit upgrade.  
 Panel C of Table 4.5 reports the CCRD for our HYL sample for the year before entering into the high-
yield loan contract (DealYear, t=-1), the year of credit-rating deterioration (t=0) and the year after the 
credit-rating deterioration (t=1). It also reports the changes in the CCRD from t=-1 to both t=0 and t=1 
(i.e., [-1:0] and [-1:1]). If we compare the relative changes in the industry- and market-adjusted CCRD 
between Panels A and C of Table 4.5, we find that the values reported in Panel C for the HYL sample 
generally are larger in magnitude, which is consistent with the results reported in Davydenko, Strebulaev, 
and Zhao (2012). This non-homogeneity across time and rating classes may be due, at least partly, to non-
alignment in the timing of the downgrades for these two samples. The results also suggest that downgrade 




 Panel D of Table 4.5 reports the BCRU for our HYL sample for the year before entering into the high-
yield loan deal (DealYear, t=-1), the year of credit-rating deterioration (t=0) and the year after the credit-
rating deterioration (t=1). It also reports the changes in the BCRU from t=-1 to both t=0 and t=1 (i.e., [-
1:0] and [-1:1]). All but one of the BCRU changes is either insignificant or only marginally significant.  
In general, the BCRU changes are lower for this HYL sample compared to those reported earlier in Panel 
B of Table 4.5 for the All sample. Consistent with earlier results for the All sample, the BCRU changes 
are generally more significant and larger in magnitude for an upgrade to or within the A category in 
comparison to upgrades to or within the B or C categories, and for an upgrade to or within the investment 
grade (IG) category compared to an upgrade within the speculative category.  
 These results help us understand the concern among U.S. CFOs about maintaining the current credit 
rating. Even if upgrades and downgrades occur with the same probability, the ex-ante costs of a credit-
rating change is essentially negative due to the larger magnitudes of the costs associated with a credit-
rating downgrade compared to the benefits of a credit-rating upgrade. While Davydenko, Strebulaev, and 
Zhao (2012) surmise that the empirical results of Andrade and Kaplan (1998) are downward biased 
because many LBOs have low costs of distress when deciding to become highly leveraged, we find that 
downgrade costs are higher (but generally less significant) for our HYL sample. We attribute these 
seemingly contradictory results to different samples. Unlike Davydenko, Strebulaev, and Zhao (2012), we 
find that firms of low (not high) quality incur the largest costs. We attribute this seemingly contradictory 
difference to our choice of the post-migration credit ratings as the reference points versus their choice of 
pre-migration credit ratings.30   
 
5.2 CCRD and BCRU Determinants  
 We now investigate what are the determinants of the magnitudes of costs (and benefits) of credit-
rating deteriorations (and improvements) using a regression model with classic capital structure variables 
(Parsons and Titman, 2009; Graham and Leary, 2011) and the number of notches of credit-rating (CR) 
deteriorations or improvements. Specifically: 
(𝐶𝐶𝑅𝐷 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝐶𝑅𝑈)𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 +𝛽3𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4 log(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐹𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽9𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(37) 
 
                                                     
30 Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) report the average default and nondefault components of the yield spread for 




where Notches is the number of notches by which a firm has been downgraded (upgraded), MktLev is 
market leverage, MtB is the market to book value, Log(Sales) is the natural logarithm of sales, Profit is 
the profitability ratio, Tang is tangibility, DivPayer is the dividend payer dummy, TaxRate is the 
corporate tax rate, and IdioVol is the idiosyncratic volatility. Construction of these variables is explained 
in Appendix 5. Equation (37) is estimated for samples of downgraded and upgraded firms whose credit-
rating changes are primarily attributed to economic factors (Economic) and to financial factors 
(Financial). The economic samples consist of sample firms without high-yield loans (HYL) and the 
financial samples consist of sample firms with high-yield loans. 
 Based on the results summarized in Table 4.6, we find that the most important determinant is the 
magnitude of the changes in credit ratings. After two years, a one-notch downgrade is associated with a 
6.41% (10.41%) cost to the firm value in the economic (financial) sample. The second highest contributor 
to CCRD and BCRU is the cash flow volatility with a 9.22% (14.22%) cost to value after two years to the 
economic (financial) sample. Other important factors are market leverage, tangibility and idiosyncratic 
volatility. The regression results also confirm the asymmetric effect of credit events on firm value, since 
equal-notch downgrades are associated with much higher absolute CCRD costs (6.41% to 10.41%) than 
equal-notch upgrades (2.23% to 5.8%). The finding that the magnitudes of the credit-rating change 
variable in number of notches stays highly significant after accounting for other firm-specific variables 
suggests that the CCRD (BCRU) associated with credit-rating changes provide material information 
about the costs from changes in financial distress in addition to those that occur at bankruptcy or acute 
financial distress.   
[Please place Table 4.6 here] 
 
4.5.2 Changes in Credit Ratings and Firm Return Impacts Based on an Event 
Study 
In this section, we examine the effect of credit-rating deteriorations (improvements) on firm value 
estimated using a formal event study methodology. We begin by employing a propensity matching 
strategy (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) based on a firm’s propensity to receive a high yield loan (HYL) to 
obtain a sample of actual HYL firms (treatment) and a matched control sample (control) that contains 
firms without HYL acting as the benchmark. One implicit assumption in this method is that assignment to 
treatment is based only on observable pre-treatment variables. We invoke the ignorable treatment 
assumption (Heckman and Robb, 1985; Holland, 1986; Rubin, 1974; Rubin, 1977; Rubin, 1978) that 
Dehejia and Wahba (2002) show has only a marginal effect on results. The set of observables used to 




to book ratio, tangibility, profitability, size, cash flow volatility, credit ratings and investment grade 
dummy. Firms previously sorted based on their DW propensity scores are grouped into strata so that the 
propensity scores, 𝑝(𝑥), of firms in each strata are not significantly different from one another. If 
significant differences exist in the propensity scores in any of the strata, a finer grid is defined so that new 
strata are formed to encompass previously not significantly different 𝑝(𝑥)  estimates (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2005). All unmatched firms are removed from further consideration. 
We calculate the difference between the changes in the firm values for the treatment and control 
samples (Campbell et al., 1997). Since observations from different time periods can be matched using the 
PSM procedure, we limit the control sample in each stratum to those from the same year as the treatment 
observation to which it is matched. We then compute the control-adjusted value changes or returns (CAR) 
for each treatment firm for each of the 25 quarters centered on each credit upgrade or downgrade (i.e., 
event quarters q = 0), their cross-sectional averages (ACAR) and their cumulated ACAR (i.e., CACAR).  
Table 4.7 reports the ACAR and CACAR results in the left (right) panel for the downgraded 
(upgraded) samples. The ACAR and CACAR are reported in the second and third columns, respectively, 
for the sample of all credit-rating changes, and in the fourth and fifth columns, respectively, for firms with 
credit-rating changes greater than one notch. Based on the Table 4.7 results for all credit-rating changes 
(columns 2 and 3 in both panels), we observe an average change in total firm value of -5.5% during a 
credit deterioration quarter and 3.2% during a credit upgrade quarter (i.e. relative event quarter 0). The 
negative and positive cumulative benchmark-adjusted (CACAR) reactions to credit-rating deteriorations 
and upgrades, respectively, continue to increase in absolute magnitude for a number of quarters beyond 
the credit-event quarters. For example, the CACAR of the treatment firms peak in quarter 7 after credit 
downgrades and quarter 12 after credit upgrades (-15.1% and 5.8%, respectively). We observe even 
greater firm-value effects for the samples of downgrades and upgrades that are greater than a one-notch 
change (columns 4 and 5 in both panels). Specifically, we observe event-quarter changes of -7.5% and 
7.2% for samples of more than one notch downgrades and upgrades, respectively. The ACAR (dashed 
lines) and CACAR (solid lines) for the matched samples of downgrades and upgrades are depicted in the 
upper and lower panels, respectively, for the at least one-notch samples in Figure 4.1 and for the more 
than one-notch samples in Figure 4.2. 
[Please place Table 4.7 and Figures 4.1 and 4.2 here] 
 
We now study the determinants of the cumulative costs to firm value (CAR) over the first eight 
quarters after credit rating downgrades (upgrades) for the economically- and financially-driven samples of 
credit-rating changes. Equation (37) includes determinants derived from the capital structure literature 




33 and 9 report the regression results for credit-rating downgrades and upgrades, respectively, in odd 
numbered columns for all changes and in the even numbered columns for credit-rating changes of more 
than one notch. 
[Please place Tables 4.8 and 4.9 about here] 
 
Based on Table 4.8, the costs associated with credit-rating downgrades are highly related, as expected, 
with the magnitude (number of notches) of the downgrade. In the primarily financially-driven samples 
(left panel), a one-notch downgrade is associated with a 6.41% (5.58%) costs to value for the at least 
(more than) one notch sample. For the primarily economically-driven samples (the right panel), the costs 
to value from downgrades are smaller. Specifically, a one-notch credit-rating downgrade increases the 
costs to value by 1.58% (2.92%) in the at least (more than) one notch sample. The costs to value from a 
one-notch credit-rating downgrade are significantly higher with higher market-to-book ratios and 
idiosyncratic volatilities for all four samples. The costs to value from a one-notch credit-rating downgrade 
are lower with greater tangibility and profitability and significant for three of the four samples. The costs 
to value for these two samples of credit-rating downgrades are not significantly related with the inflation 
rate or GDP growth. 
Based on Table 4.9, the magnitude of the association of credit-rating upgrades with the benefits to 
value is reduced, and is now confined to the two samples with more than a one-notch upgrade. The value 
benefits of each notch to the primarily financially- (economically-) driven, multi-notch upgrade sample is 
a significant 2.89% (0.26%). The benefits to value from a one-notch credit-rating upgrade are 
significantly higher with higher profitability and higher GDP growth for all four samples. The benefits to 
value from a one-notch credit-rating upgrade are higher with higher market leverage and Log(Sales), and 
significant for three of the four samples.   
 
4.6 TESTS OF ROBUSTNESS 
4.6.1 Model-driven Credit-rating Changes 
 If markets fully anticipate and reflect the information contained in credit-rating changes prior to their 
occurrence, then their announcement should not have any capitalized value effects. To further address this 
possibility, we measure changes in a firm’s credit quality before their actual default. We use a measure of 
the distance-to-default (DTD) on a quarterly basis using a structural approach similar to Moody’s KMV 
model. Using DTD changes as a proxy for changes in the implied credit quality, we re-estimate the firm 




changes in DTD have similar directional effects but with lower magnitudes and less statistical 
significance than changes in S&P credit ratings.   
 The set up and estimation of the model are explained in detail in Appendix 4. After computing the 
DTD for all firms in our samples for every quarter from 2002 to 2012, we group firms into 24 categories 
based on each firm’s relative DTD to other firms. Interpreting the changes in each DTD group as a 
change in a firm’s credit quality, we perform the same empirics with the model-generated credit ratings as 
done previously using the S&P credit ratings. In other words, actual S&P credit-rating deterioration 
(improvement) events are replaced with model-generated credit-change events.  
 We then examine the mean and median changes in the market- and industry-adjusted total capital 
values (TCV) associated with the credit-rating changes implied by our DTD model. We observe that the 
CCRD and BCRU reported in the four panels of Table 4.10 are generally smaller in magnitude with a 
lower frequency of being significant than those reported earlier for the S&P credit-rating changes. This is 
consistent with the findings reported in the literature that ratings have some information content beyond 
what is known by the market (West, 1973), and that credit-rating agencies (CRAs) are important as 
information-gathering and processing entities (Millon and Thakor, 1985;  Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits, 
2006).  
[Please place Table 4.10 here] 
 
 When we examine the CCRD for the downgrades to the final destination IG and SPEC categories in 
Panels A and C of Table 4.10, we observe highly and weakly significant negative market- and industry-
adjusted CCRD when measured from the year prior to the implied credit-rating change to the year of the 
change for both the All (Panel A) and HYL (Panel C) samples. We also observe a significant median 
market-adjusted (industry-adjusted) CCRD of -23.4% (-14.1%) when measured from the year prior to the 
implied credit-rating downgrade to the year after the year of the downgrade (Panel C). The strongest 
results for the implied downgrades ending (or remaining) in the C or Default category are for the All 
sample as their four median CCRD are negative and at least weakly significant, and in the Default 
category for the HYL sample where three of the four median CCRD are negative and at least weakly 
significant.  
 When we examine the BCRU for the upgrades to the final destination IG and SPEC categories in 
Panels B and D of Table 4.10, we observe some weakly significant industry-adjusted medians from the 
year prior to the implied credit-rating change to the year of the change (and also to the year after the year 
of the change) for both the All (Panel B) and HYL (Panel D) samples. However, the industry-adjusted 




at -3.4%. The sets of four median (and mean) BCRU are not consistent in sign or significance when the 
upgrade ends in the A, B or C categories. 
  
4.6.2 Control for Business Risk 
 We further test the results from the high-yield loan (HYL) sample. This is due to the possibility that 
firms in this sample may have higher business risk (Aivazian, Booth, and Cleary, 2003; Caglayan and 
Rashid, 2013). If this is the case, then the HYL results would demonstrate higher costs not due to a higher 
financial burden but simply due to higher business risk. So we test whether our results are robust when we 
examine a sub-sample consisting of those HYL firms with low business risk, measured by the standard 
deviation of its return on investment, as in Aivazian, Booth, and Cleary (2003). For this purpose, we split 
the HYL sample into the sub-sample of high and low business risk. The split is performed using the 
relative measure of the business risk variable.  
 Table 4.11 reports the value cost estimates for a sample of HYL firms downgraded by S&P with 
relatively high business risk in columns 9 to 12 and relatively low business risk in columns 13 to 16. The 
last four columns measure the differences between these value costs for the high minus low business risk 
samples.  Table 4.3 suggests that our results are robust to controlling for business risk since the same 
pattern of costs emerge for both the relatively low and relatively high business risk firms and the 
differences are only highly significant at the point of default. This pattern is also similar to that for the 
undifferentiated HYL sample reported earlier in Table 4.5, panel A. The magnitude of costs and their 
significance levels increase as the credit ratings of the sample decline.  
[Please place Table 4.11 here] 
 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
 Based on a sample of all non-financial firms from COMPUSTAT for the 2002-2012 period, we 
measured the costs of credit-rating deteriorations (CCRD) and benefits of credit-rating upgrades (BCRU) 
for samples of firms with mixed “economic” and “financial” credit-rating changes and primarily 
“financial” credit-rating changes. We document that changes in credit ratings are associated with 
economically and statistically significant capitalized (value) costs or benefits. Costs and benefits 
associated with credit-rating changes for our mixed economic/financial (All) sample are asymmetric in 
that the costs of credit-rating deteriorations are much larger than the benefits of credit-rating 





 Our findings help to address the shortcomings of other pre-default explanations for the under-leverage 
puzzle, such as undetermined timing, estimation difficulties, unpredictability and heterogeneity across 
firms. We contribute to this literature by showing that CCRD is an empirically identifiable and 
quantifiable measure of pre-default costs that can be measured. It also provides a plausible explanation for 
the under-leverage puzzle and for why U.S. CFO’s consider the maintenance of good and stable credit-
ratings to be so important.  
      Finally, we contribute to the literature concerning the information content of credit ratings. We find 
that deteriorations (improvements) in the implied credit-ratings from a distance-to-default model result in 
tangible, but smaller and less significant value changes, compared to those resulting from credit changes 
by S&P. This is consistent with the conjecture that credit-ratings emanating from credit-rating agencies 






    Chapter 5: 
5 Conclusion 
In this thesis, we study three aspects of corporate debt and explore their implications for corporate 
financing decisions. These three aspects include (1) debt-type structures, (2) credit spreads and (3) costs 
associated with downgrades in credit ratings. In the first study, we explore how the strength of creditor 
rights across 46 countries influences the structure of different debt types in corporate capital structures.  
We show that stronger creditor protection leads to more concentrated debt structures. We identify that 
stronger creditor rights impact debt-type structure concentration by (a) making default costlier for 
creditors and (b) decreasing monitoring incentives for creditors. To account for possible unobserved 
cross-country heterogeneities, we introduce a new econometric specification called correlated random 
effect specification (CRE) that enables us to estimate time-varying (time-invariant) regressors with fixed 
effects (random effects).  
In the second essay, we study credit spreads. Specifically, we investigate how changes in the level of 
economic policy uncertainty impacts corporate credit spreads. As our main proxy for policy uncertainty, 
we use the recently introduced index of Baker, Bloom and Davis (2015) and find that there are 
economically large and statistically significant influences from policy uncertainty on credit spreads. We 
show that increased policy uncertainty increases both the default probabilities captured by the rise in CDS 
spreads, and also increases the overall economic risk premium captured by the bond-CDS basis. We show 
that there are two distinct channels through which policy uncertainty impacts credit spreads. The first 
channel is the postponement of corporate investments in response to escalated uncertainties and the 
second is the dependence on government spending.  
In the last essay, we show that changes in credit ratings are associated with large costs or benefits to 
firm value. We are able to disentangle financial from economic costs (benefits) of credit rating 
deterioration (improvement) by comparing changes in firm value in response to credit rating changes in 
samples with and without leveraged loans. As result of this study, we document that (a) the financial costs 
are considerably higher than economic costs and (b) that the costs to the firm value due to rating 
downgrades are significantly larger than the benefits of credit rating upgrades. Our results contribute to 
the literature of optimal capital structure by documenting that there are additional costs of debt not so far 
documented in the literature. These costs can materialize continuously prior to the point of default and 
have the potential to explain why a large number of firms have leverage ratios below that predicted by the 
trade-off theory, i.e. the underleverage puzzle (Graham, 2000). Our findings are consistent with those of 
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APPENDIX 1: DESCRIPTIONS OF VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES FOR CHAPTER 2 
Compustat refers to Compustat Global and Compustat North American databases. 
 
Variable Description Source 
Book leverage 
 
Book leverage is the total debt (the sum of long term debt and debt in current 
liabilities) divided by total assets 
 
Compustat  
Cash flow volatility CF Volatility is the Standard deviation over past five years of the normalized 
operating income, that is operating income divided by total assets 
Compustat  
Country status (Developed/ 
Developing) 
The measure for developed vs. developing country comes from the World 
Bank's per capita GNI definition as in Qian and Strahan (2007). In this 
measure, countries with per capita GNI of more than $12,276 are considered 
rich and those between $3,976 and $12,275 are considered as middle income. 
Our dataset does not contain poor countries due to unavailability of 
information.  





Creditor rights index is the sum of four distinct dummy variables. The first 
dummy variable equals one if restrictions are in place in case a debtor needs 
to file for reorganization. The second dummy becomes one when in the case 
of reorganization, the secured creditors are able to seize collateral. The third 
dummy concerns the priority over liquidation proceedings and becomes one 
if secured lenders are given priority. The fourth dummy concerns the 
continuation of management activities during the reorganization process. This 
dummy becomes one if management cannot continue in this scenario.  
 
 
Djankov et al. (2007) 
CR1 The first component of creditor rights concerns whether the consent of 
creditors is required for firm decisions particularly when the borrowers files 






CR2 The second component addresses whether secured creditors are able to seize 
collateral after approval of the reorganization petition.  
 
 
CR3 The third component addresses whether secured creditors have priority on 
liquidation proceeds.   
 
CR4 This component addresses whether the incumbent manager is replaced by an 





Inflation, according to the World Bank data definition, is the annual rate of 
growth of the implicit deflators of the GDP, computed as the GDP in terms of 
current currency to the GDP in the same local currency in 2003.  
 
 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
Legal origins Four different legal origins are considered including English, French, German 
and Nordic. A dummy variable is assigned to each of these legal origins.  
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) and 
the  
CIA Factbook (2003). 
 
Log of GDP per cap. Log of GDP per cap. is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. 
 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
 
Log of size Is the natural logarithm of size, measured by a firm's total book assets 
(COMPUSTAT Item 6) 
Compustat  
 
Market to book Is the market value of equity + total debt + preferred stock liquidating value 
less preferred taxes and investment tax credit, all divided by  total book assets  
Securities Daily, Compustat 
 
Profitability Is earnings before interest and taxes given by operating income before 
depreciation divided by total book  assets  
 
Compustat  
Sovereign ratings Sovereign rating captures the risk of government default and is interpreted as 
a general indicator of systematic risk. Fitch rating agency's sovereign rating is 
used.  
Fitch Rating Agency 
SP90 Dummy variable that equals one if more than 90% of a firm's structure type is 
from only one debt type and zero otherwise.   
 




Heterogeneity This measure is a Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) normalized to a 








 Capital IQ database 
Tangibility Tangibility is computed as the net property, plant and equipment (PPE) 
divided by total book assets 
Compustat  






Religion is used as a proxy for culture similar to Stulz and Williamson 
(2003). Six distinct religions are recognized, including Atheist, Buddhist, 
Catholic, Hindu, Muslim and Orthodox. A dummy variable for each of these 
religions equals one if the majority in a country practice that religion. 
 
Stulz and Williamson (2003);  





Property rights index 
 
Considers the effectiveness of laws and institutions of a country to maintain 
and enforce the ownership of private owners of their assets.  
 
Heritage Foundation’s database 
 
Bureaucratic quality  
 
Higher bureaucratic quality index indicates that laws cannot be changed 
easily with the change of political power and hence such well-functioning 
institutions can act as shock absorbents to power transitions.  
 





Measures the risk of unilateral contract cancellations or modifications, as 
well as confiscation of foreign assets. Higher index levels indicate better 
contract viability.  
  
 
International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) database 
Corruption Index between 0 and 6 with 0 showing the highest level of corruption. 
Increased political corruption has adverse effects on the business and 
financial environment and increases the risk of foreign investments. This 
measure implies that power is transferred in other measures than ability and 
therefore can lead to long term destabilizing consequences. Corruption in our 
study is an index between 0 and 6 with 0 showing the highest level of 
corruption. 
  
International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) database 
GDP per capita growth Average yearly rate of growth of per capita GDP 
  






Law and order Index between 0 and 10 with 0 showing the lowest levels of law and order in 
a country. Measure shows the traditional strength of law and order where 
according to Knack and Keefer (1995), increases in this measure can be 
interpreted as reliable political institutions, smoother and ordered transition of 
political power, and a better functioning legal system.  
 
International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) database 
Liquid liabilities to GDP Liquid liabilities, also known as M3, is the sum of currency plus deposits in 
the country's central bank (M0), plus the value of electronic money and cash 
deposits in the banking system (M1), plus term deposits and savings, and 
certificates of deposits and purchase agreements (M2); plus time deposits in 
foreign currencies, travelers checks, commercial papers and all shares of 
mutual funds that citizens own. This measure shows an economy's level of 
financial depth. 
 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
Stocks traded to GDP Total value of stocks traded in a given year normalized by that year's GDP. 
This captures the annual liquidity of the stock market.  
  
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
Efficiency Developed by Djankov et al. (2007), this index measures the country-specific 
efficiency of debt enforcement.  
Djankov (2008) 
Contract enforcement time, 
contract enforcement cost 
The average of the number of days it takes to enforce a contract and the 
associated costs of enforcement.  
 World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
 
Depth of credit information 
index 
 
Indicates the accessibility, reliability and coverage of credit related 
information in a given country.  
 
 
World Bank Doing Business 
database 
Strength of legal rights index This measure captures the extent to which the rights of both lenders and 
borrowers are preserved by the legal system, and includes eight "collateral 
law" aspects as well as two "bankruptcy law" aspects.  
World Bank Doing Business 
database 
   
Information Sharing Information sharing is a dummy variable that equals one if either public or 
private registries exist in a country and zero otherwise. Public and private 
registry variables are the percent of firms and adults that are covered by 
public and private registries, respectively, in every country on an annual 
basis.  
World Bank Doing Business 
database 







This index measures the ethno-linguistic fractionalization for each country, 
using an updated data and method compared to the traditional index of Atlas, 
Narodov and Mira (1964). 
Alesina, Dewleeschauwer, 
Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg 
(2003) 




APPENDIX 2: THE MEASURE OF FIRM TRANSPARENCY 
 
We briefly describe the logic and method by which we construct the transparency index based on Berger 
et al. (2006). Denote ?̃?𝑗,𝑡, 𝐸𝑗,𝑡 and 𝐸𝐼,𝑡 as firm j’s permanent earnings in every year perceived by investors, 
firm j’s actual reported earnings and average earnings for the relevant industry, respectively. In the first 

















Now, let us denote the log-growth rate of the above variables as ?̃?𝑗,𝑡, 𝑒𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑒𝐼,𝑡. Assuming that a firm’s 
share of assets in the industry stays constant over time, we obtain  
?̃?𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛿𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑒𝐼,𝑡 (A2) 
 
An assumption here is that the following relationship holds between firm 𝑟𝑗,𝑡and industry (𝑟𝐼,𝑡) returns 
𝑟𝑗,𝑡 =  ?̃?𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑟𝐼,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗,𝑡
𝑟  (A3) 
 
 
A similar relationship can also hold for earnings 
𝑒𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑒𝐼,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗,𝑡
𝑒  (A4) 
 
 









𝑒)⁄  (A6) 
 
The method of Bajlum and Larsen (2009) is followed to compute the index. For industry affiliations, we 
categorize firms into 48 Fama and French industry classes using their SIC codes. Earnings growth rates 




not be meaningful and therefore we drop such the observations. We compute the market and industry 
growth rates in earnings for each of the countries as the value-weighted growth of firms in that market 
(industry).  
APPENDIX 3: DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES FOR CHAPTER 3 
 Amount is the amount of debt issued from TRACE database. 
 Analyst forecast dispersion for GDP is obtained from the Survey of Professional Forecasters in the 
Philadelphia Fed Database; 
 Bond-CDS basis: Is computed by subtracting Markit CDS spreads from bond credit spreads.  
 Book value of Debt (BVD) is the Sum of short- and long term debt (Compustat: DLTTQ + DLCQ); 
 Capital intensity: Is measured as Plant, Property and Equipment (PPE) divided by firm’s total assets 
(AT).  
 Cost-sunkness: We construct this index following Kessides (1990) using firms PPE, rent and 
depreciation expenses.Coupon: is the coupon amount from TRACE database.  
 CreditSpread: is the difference between the yield of a corporate bond less the yield of the closest 
maturity Treasury Bills.  
 Cyclicality: First, we estimate the correlation between a firm’s sales and GNP. Next, we take average 
in each industry, of the estimated correlations using the first two SIC classification codes. Cyclicality 
is therefore defined as a dummy that equals one if the time-series average of industry correlations is 
above the overall correlation mean, and zero otherwise.  
 DummyPutable: is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bond is putable (obtained from the FISD 
database), and zero otherwise; 
 ElectionDummy: is a dummy variable equal to 1 for every presidential election year and zero 
otherwise; 
 Liquidity: is the number of trades for a bond in a given month; 
 Long-term Debt: to Assets is equal to Total Long-term Debt (Compustat: DLTTQ) divided by Total 
Assets (Compustat:  ATQ); 
 Macro controls: are Expected GDP, Expected unemployment, Consumer confidence, and expected 
one year inflation. Except for the consumer confidence index which is obtained from University of 
Michigan database, the three other variables come from the Philadelphia Fed website;  
 Market to Book: is equal to the Market Value of Equity (MVE) plus the Book Value of Debt plus the 
value of Preferred Shares (Compustat:   BVDP) less Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax Credit 




 Market value of equity (MVE): is the Number of shares outstanding from Compustat multiplied by the 
market price of each share at the end of the quarter (Compustat:  SHROUT * PRC); 
 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣  (Market Leverage): is equal to the Book value of debt (BVD), divided by the sum of the 
market value of equity and the book value of debt (Compustat:  BVD); 
 OITSales (Operating Income To Sales): is Operating Income Before Depreciation (Compustat:  
OIBDPQ) divided by Net Sales/Turnover (Compustat:  SALEY); 
 PICDummy (Pretax Interest Coverage Dummy): is Operating Income after Depreciation plus Total 
Interest and Related Expense (Compustat:   OIADPQ + XINTQ), divided by Total Interest and 
Related Expense (Compustat: XINTQ). The four interest coverage dummies are as in Blume, Lim, 
and MacKinlay (1998), which are for interest coverage categories of 0 to 25%, 26% to 50%, 51% to 
75% and 76% to 100%; 
 Profitability: is Operating Income Before Depreciation (Compustat: OIBDPQ) divided by Total 
Assets (Compustat: ATQ);  
 PUI (Policy Uncertainty Index): is obtained from the website of Baker, Bloom, and Davis that is 
available at: http://www.policyuncertainty.com; 
 S&P 500 return is the return of the S&P 500 index for the month, obtained by compounding the daily 
returns;  
 S&PRating: Is the credit rating from S&P credit rating agency. 
 Saleability: is measured using the method of Kim and Kung (2013), and indicates how easily an 
industry’s assets can be sold to firms in other industries by computing the weighted average of 
redeployabiliy of each asset.   
 Std. dev. of daily excess returns is the volatility of each firm’s daily stock return over that of the 
CRSP value-weighted index over the past 180 days;  
 TBill: is yield of 3 month treasury bills from the Federal Reserve Data Download Program. 
 TermSpread: is obtained as the difference in the yields of 10- and 2-year treasuries;  
 Total Debt Capitalization is equal to Total short- and long-term debt (Compustat: DLTTQ + DLCQ)  
 Uncertainty controls: include the Std. dev. of daily excess returns for each firm (from CRSP), VXO 
Index (from CBOE indexes in the WRDS database), Firm return volatility, which is computed 
according to Campbell and Taksler (2003) as the standard deviation of daily excess returns over the 
preceding 180 days, and analyst forecast dispersion (from Philadelphia Fed database). 







APPENDIX 4: KMV- LIKED DISTANCE TO DEFAULT ESTIMATION  
Model Development 
 Merton’s distance to default provides a measure for the probability of default that can be applied to all 
firms in our samples with the highest possible frequency (quarterly). The idea behind the model is simple 
in that it assumes that firm value (sum of the equity and debt values) will grow at drift rate 𝜇 for n periods 
to determine the next value of the firm. After subtracting the value of the default boundary from this new 
firm value, we divide by the volatility of the firm value to obtain a z-score value which is generally 
known as distance to default (DTD). Although the default boundary can be obtained in various ways, we 
use a measure of the default boundary proposed by Leland (1994) due to its realistic features that firms 
indeed default below the conventional default boundary. More details on our implementation of the model 
follow.  
 According to Merton (1974), a firm’s value is assumed to follow an Ito process given by: 
 𝑑𝑉 = (𝜇 − 𝛿)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑣𝑑𝑊 (A4.1) 
In (A1), V refers to the value of the firm, 𝜇 is the drift, and 𝛿 is the payout rate (the dividend rate herein). 
 𝜎𝑣 is the volatility of the firm value and W is a Brownian motion. Since this model assumes that the 
value of equity 𝑉𝐸 and its volatility 𝜎𝐸 are observable, we need to estimate two unobservable variables, 
value of assets 𝑉𝐴 and its volatility 𝜎𝐴. 
 The first of our two formulations of the default boundary, which is based on a rule of thumb, is: 
 𝐵 = 𝑆𝑇𝐷 + 0.5 𝐿𝑇𝐷 (A4.2) 
where STD and LTD refer to short-term and long-term debt. The second formulation is the Leland (1994) 
default boundary, which is obtained using: 
 𝐵 = [(1 − 𝜏)𝐶] (𝑟 + 0.5 𝜎2)⁄  (A4.3) 
where C is the coupon, r is the risk-free rate, and 𝜏  is the marginal tax rate obtained from John Graham’s 
website. A comparison of the estimates for these two models shows that the Leland model yields a lower 
default boundary. As expected, firms default in the Leland (1994) model when firm value reaches a 
default boundary given by between 60% and 70% of the current market value of its debt. In this case, 
firms actually wait before entering default even if their value goes below the current level of debt because 




 Since a Leland-type structural model does not account for the heterogeneity of debt, an empirical 
challenge when using C is that the firm may not pay coupons on all its debts. This tends to underestimate 
the value of the coupon compared to the total value of the debt. We use the empirical solution to this 
problem suggested by Elkamhi, Ericsson, and Parsons (2012), which is to multiply the current debt value 
by the risk-free rate to obtain the coupon which yields a more empirically reliable measure of the 
dividend rate used herein. 
 In a Leland-type model, a firm’s total capital is the sum of the value of its debt [𝑉𝐷(𝑡)]  and equity 
[𝑉𝐸(𝑡)] or: 
 𝑉𝐴(𝑡)  =  𝑉𝐷(𝑡)  +  𝑉𝐸(𝑡) (A4.4) 
where  𝑉𝐸(𝑡) = 𝑉𝐴 𝑒
−𝛿𝑇𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐹 𝑒
−𝑟𝑇𝑁(𝑑2) − (1 − 𝑒
−𝛿𝑇)𝑉𝐴 (A4.5) 
Since the value of debt is the residual value, it is obtained by subtracting 𝑉𝐸 from 𝑉𝐴 to obtain with the 
time variable suppressed: 
 𝑉𝐷 = 𝑉𝐴 𝑁(−𝑑1) + 𝐹 𝑒
−𝑟𝑇𝑁(𝑑2)  (A4.6) 






















 To estimate the unobservable 𝑉𝐴 and 𝜎𝐴, we set up a system of simultaneous equations whose solution 
is found numerically using the Newton optimization technique for a maximum of 50 iterations at each 
point, or until the absolute value of the difference between the two adjacent estimated 𝜎𝑉 falls to below 
0.001. More formally, the system is: 
 
𝐸 = 𝑉𝐴 𝑒
−𝛿𝑇𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐹 𝑒
−𝑟𝑇𝑁(𝑑2) + (1 − 𝑒
−𝛿𝑇)𝑉𝐴 





  (A4.8) 
where the initial value of 𝑉𝐴 is 𝑉𝐸  and the initial value for 𝜎𝑉 is obtained by: 
 𝜎𝑉 = 𝜎𝐸  (𝑉𝐸 (𝑉𝐸 + 𝑉𝐷)⁄ ) (A4.9) 
 To calculate the distance to default, we assume that 𝜇  is the firm’s rate of growth. This drift is 
estimated empirically by considering changes in firm value and dividend payments over the interval of 
interest: 
 𝜇(𝑡) = max  {
(𝑉(𝑡)+ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑− 𝑉(𝑡−1))
𝑉(𝑡−1)




Thus, we now have all the variables to estimate the distance to default using: 
 𝐷𝑇𝐷 = (𝑉𝐴 − 𝐵) (𝑉𝐴 𝜎𝐴)⁄ = (ln (
𝑉𝐴
𝑉𝐵




) 𝑇) (𝜎𝐴√𝑇)⁄  (A4.11) 
A.2 Estimates of Distance to Default 
 Summary statistics for our distance to default (DTD) estimates grouped into quintiles are reported in 
Table A4.1. We observe that the value of debt increases as the DTD deteriorates, and the ratio of the 
market value of debt to total capital increases from 8% to above 133%. This is mostly due to the negative 
“estimated” market values from the Merton model, when equity volatility and leverage is extremely high, 
and return falls negative. Asset volatility and equity volatility are also increasing and average stock 
returns become negative in the lowest DTD sample. As this sample does not exclude defaulted firms, 






Table B.1. Summary statistics for the quintiles of the inputs to the distance-to-default (DTD) estimates 
 
This table reports the summary distributional statistics for the inputs into the DTD estimations for quintiles over the 
period from 2002 to 2012. 𝐹𝑉𝐷 is the face value of debt in each quarter, which is obtained by adding short-term 
debt (STD) and half of the long-term debt (LTD). 𝑉𝐸 is the market value of equity obtained by multiplying number 
of common shares outstanding by the closing market price in each quarter obtained from COMPUSTAT Quarterly 
database. 𝑉𝐴 is the estimated total value of the firm obtained from the DTD model. MVD/Value is the ratio of the 
market value of debt to the total value of the firm. The market value of debt is estimated by multiplying the bond-
price changes in each quarter for bonds included in the TRACE database by the total value of debt at the beginning 
of each quarter. 𝜎𝑣 is the asset volatility, which is obtained using the DTD’s simultaneous estimation of 𝑉𝐴 and 𝜎𝑣 
given 𝑉𝐸 and 𝜎𝑒(volatility of firm’s equity based on daily CRSP prices over a year prior to the price observation). 
The Newton Iteration method is used until the difference between two adjacent 𝜎𝑣 falls below 0.001. Stock Return is 
the return of the firm’s equity in each period (quarter) as drawn from the COMPUSTAT database. 
Variable Mean STD Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
𝐹𝑉𝐷 21451.02 116132.8 30705.61 22030.15 15554.1 20628.26 65173.04 
𝑉𝐸 11070.71 27142.36 45383.37 19492.82 8369.9 4744.75 8479.36 
𝑉𝐴 22295.94 89863.42 71424.84 38035.43 17065.5 12260.56 19881.88 
𝑀𝑉𝐷/𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 0.356977 2.973138 0.082529 0.100348 0.180287 0.836759 1.339733 
𝜎𝑉 0.609743 15.00024 0.135176 0.164429 0.289604 0.705876 4.58991 
𝜎𝑒 0.790126 14.99721 0.285019 0.302854 0.506586 0.841355 4.76486 




APPENDIX 5: DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES FOR CHAPTER 4 
 Book leverage: is the total book value of debt (Compustat: DLTTQ + DLCQ) divided by total assets 
(Compustat: ATQ). 
 Cash flow volatility (CFVolatility) is defined as in Kryzanowski and Mohsni (2013) as the volatility of CFi,t =
Ei,t − Ai,t over the past six years where Ei,t is Income before extraordinary items (Compustat item #18), Ai,t is 
the change in working capital (or ∆WC) minus Depreciation and Amortization (Compustat item #14).  
 Daily stock returns: is the weighted-average index of NYSE, NASDQ and AMEX stocks from CRSP database. 
 EBITDA (quarterly): is sales (SALEQ) less costs of goods sold (COGSQ) less Selling, General and 
Administrative Expenses (XSGAQ). 
 High-yield loans: are loans with interest rates of over 200 bps above the Libor rate; the interest paid on the loan 
is the variable AllInDrawn in DEALSCAN database. 
 Industry market-leverage: is the average market leverage in any given industry consisting of firms with the 
same first two digits of their SIC codes.  
 Investment Grade: is a dummy that equals one if a firm has a rating of BBB+ or better, and zero otherwise. 
 Magnitude of credit rating change: is the number of notches a firm is downgraded or upgraded due to a credit 
event by a credit rating agency. 
 Market leverage: is the value of market debt (explained in this appendix), divided by total assets (“Compustat 
item: ATQ” less total debt “Compustat: DLTTQ + DLCQ” plus “market value of debt”).  
 Market to Book (MtB) is defined as (market equity + total debt + preferred stock liquidating value (Compustat 
item #10) – deferred taxes and investment tax credits (Compustat item #35)) / book assets.  
 Market value of debt: is the (total debt at the beginning of the period) times (one plus the change in the bond 
price during the period from TRACE). 
 Maturity: for firm i at time t is defined as the ratio of long term debt to the total debt, according to Fan et al. 
(2012). The longest maturity index is obtained when all debt is long term, and vice versa. Mathematically: 
Maturityi,t = (LongtermDebti,t TotalDebti,t⁄ ) 
 Profitability (Profit) is defined as earnings before interest and taxes given by operating income before 
depreciation (Compustat item #13), divided by the book value of assets.   
 Rating: is the actual S&P rating for the long-term bond (Compustat rating item: SPLTICRM).  
 Size: is the logarithm of a firm’s total assets (Assets, Total, Compustat item: ATQ). 
 Tangibility: is defined as net PPE divided by book assets, where PPE is Property, Plant, and Equipment 
(Compustat item #8).  








Table 2.1. Summary statistics for the two debt-type heterogeneity measures and possible determinants 
This table reports the summary statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, 5th and 95th percentiles) for the two measures of debt-type 
heterogeneity and their possible determinants for all firms across all our sample countries. Heterogeneity is a measure between 0 and 1 with 1 indicating the 
highest heterogeneity level. SP90 is a dummy that equals one if a debt type constitutes more than 90% of a firm’s debt structure and zero otherwise. The creditor 
rights index is a measure between 0 and 4 with 4 indicating the strongest creditor rights status. Private and public registries show the total number of these 
institutions divided by the number of adults in a country. Profitability is earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total book assets.  Tangibility is net 
property, plant and equipment divided by total book assets. Cash flow volatility is the standard deviation over the past five years of operating income divided by 
total assets. A more detailed description of the variables and their construction is provided in Appendix 1. The sample size is 138,801. 
 




Heterogeneity 0.71 0.72 0.09 1.00 0.30 1.00 0.26 
SP90 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 
Creditor rights index 1.94 2.00 0.00 4.00 1.00 4.00 0.94 
Log of GDP per cap. 9.83 10.56 6.09 11.51 7.05 10.87 1.28 
Inflation 2.87 2.65 -1.35 26.24 -0.70 8.86 2.71 
Sovereign rating 3.84 2.00 1.00 16.00 1.00 10.50 3.53 
law and order 4.70 5.00 1.00 6.00 2.50 6.00 0.93 
Log of size 5.47 5.41 -1.67 11.94 2.18 8.99 2.06 
Market to book ratio 1.03 0.64 -0.83 124.26 0.04 2.79 2.98 
Profitability 0.07 0.09 -2.58 2.00 -0.17 0.25 0.19 
Tangibility 0.33 0.29 -0.07 1.00 0.02 0.79 0.24 
Cash flow volatility 0.06 0.03 0.00 2.13 0.00 0.20 0.11 
Book leverage 0.25 0.22 -0.05 0.85 0.01 0.59 0.18 






Table 2.2. Country-specific variables  
This table summarizes the main features of interest for each country in our sample. The columns report the number of firms (N. of firms); number of firm-year 
observation (N. of firm-years); average portion (decimal) of each of the seven debt types in each country; the average debt-type heterogeneity (Heterogeneity) 
and single debt type Heterogeneity (SP90) index values; creditor rights (CR) index; log of GDP per capita; inflation; sovereign ratings from Fitch agency 
(Sovereign ratings); developed country dummy according to the level of GNI per capita using the World Bank definition; number of public and private registries 




































Argentina 64 476 0.00 0.02 0.67 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.64 1 9.07 N/A 23.26    0 28.61 96.89 1.00 
Australia 1362 6534 0.00 0.43 0.36 0.14 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.56 3 10.65 2.82 1.81 1 0.00 99.47 1.00 
Austria 78 543 0.00 0.07 0.65 0.27 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.39 3 10.66 2.07 1.00 1 1.32 42.11 1.00 
Belgium 115 795 0.00 0.21 0.71 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.45 2 10.61 2.29 2.36 1 58.10 0.00 1.00 
Brazil 288 1573 0.00 0.22 0.50 0.27 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.37 1 9.05 5.57 10.41 0 21.77 53.90 1.00 
Canada 1569 7002 0.00 0.44 0.34 0.19 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.43 1 10.63 1.97 1.09 1 0.00 100.00 1.00 
Chile 133 894 0.00 0.01 0.52 0.46 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.42 2 9.16 2.57 6.02 1 29.73 26.59 1.00 
China 2102 9957 0.00 0.07 0.83 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.63 2 8.30 3.46 5.10 0 13.83 0.00 1.00 
Colombia 30 139 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.02 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.39 0 8.57 4.32 10.88 0 0.00 52.51 1.00 
Croatia 28 128 0.00 0.05 0.92 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.81 0.65 3 9.48 2.83 10.00 1 0.00 63.21 0.00 
Denmark 131 819 0.00 0.37 0.56 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.57 3 10.87 2.09 1.00 1 0.00 7.55 1.00 
Finland 128 985 0.00 0.02 0.89 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.50 1 10.66 1.80 1.00 1 0.00 15.51 1.00 
France 694 4601 0.00 0.10 0.77 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.42 0 10.54 1.75 1.00 1 21.04 0.00 1.00 
Germany 684 4271 0.00 0.06 0.72 0.17 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.58 3 10.55 1.63 1.00 1 0.77 95.24 1.00 
Greece 219 1227 0.00 0.03 0.70 0.26 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.47 1 10.14 3.11 9.23 1 0.00 44.13 1.00 
Hungary 22 124 0.00 0.04 0.77 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.70 1 9.36 5.12 8.50 1 0.00 8.26 1.00 
India 1979 9423 0.00 0.21 0.66 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.32 2 7.03 8.46 10.16 0 0.00 8.90 0.00 
Indonesia 274 1415 0.00 0.14 0.77 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.34 2 7.71 6.72 11.92 0 19.56 0.05 1.00 
Ireland 94 516 0.00 0.38 0.27 0.27 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.73 0.50 1 10.81 1.90 3.14 1 0.00 100.00 1.00 
Italy 266 1946 0.00 0.18 0.46 0.29 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.44 2 10.43 2.20 3.87 1 12.27 73.70 1.00 
Japan 3190 18718 0.00 0.12 0.78 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.55 2 10.59 -0.12 3.25 1 0.00 74.20 1.00 
Kenya 24 104 0.02 0.12 0.71 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.53 4 6.61 11.44 14.00 0 0.00 2.13 1.00 




Mexico 102 704 0.00 0.10 0.59 0.29 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.40 0 9.05 4.28 9.04 1 0.00 67.63 1.00 
Morocco 46 150 0.00 0.34 0.49 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.57 1 7.83 1.66 10.00 0 1.04 5.93 1.00 
Netherland 170 1065 0.00 0.16 0.24 0.56 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.38 3 10.68 1.75 1.00 1 0.00 79.00 1.00 
New 
Zealand 
116 711 0.01 0.32 0.56 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.79 0.61 4 10.31 2.65 2.21 1 0.00 0.00 99.26 
Norway 233 1190 0.00 0.06 0.62 0.29 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.42 2 11.28 1.86 1.00 1 0.00 100.00 1.00 
Pakistan 221 1142 0.00 0.32 0.56 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.36 1 6.88 11.48            N/A 0 4.19 1.37 1.00 
Panama 3 16 0.00 0.36 0.15 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.44 4 8.83 3.63 10.06 1 0.00 44.40 1.00 
Peru 78 457 0.00 0.08 0.80 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.35 0 8.32 2.95 10.40 0 22.08 31.89 1.00 
Philippine 144 882 0.00 0.04 0.75 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.79 0.60 1 7.43 4.61 11.78 0 0.00 5.66 1.00 
Poland 377 1814 0.00 0.32 0.57 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.46 1 9.37 3.32 7.14 1 0.00 61.96 1.00 
Portugal 53 391 0.16 0.08 0.34 0.40 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.21 1 9.91 2.31 4.47 1 72.39 13.05 1.00 
Romania 25 71 0.00 0.65 0.32 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.44 2 9.04 6.00 10.15 1 6.76 24.29 1.00 
Singapore 662 4330 0.00 0.29 0.63 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.43 3 10.55 2.65 1.00 1 0.00 44.76 1.00 
South Africa 280 1682 0.00 0.31 0.54 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.41 3 8.66 6.18 8.21 0 0.00 0.00 57.18 
Spain 129 959 0.00 0.14 0.79 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.44 2 10.26 2.66 1.99 1 46.56 8.33 1.00 
Sri Lanka 170 722 0.01 0.20 0.71 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.61 0.30 2 7.72 8.21 13.48 0 0.00 0.00 14.36 
Sweden 395 2109 0.00 0.33 0.59 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.42 1 10.76 1.47 1.08 1 0.00 99.81 1.00 
Switzerland 216 1532 0.00 0.19 0.60 0.08 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.47 1 11.03 0.68 1.00 1 0.00 23.67 1.00 
Thailand 438 3038 0.00 0.09 0.46 0.35 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.72 0.47 2 8.23 3.10 8.59 0 0.00 28.55 1.00 
Turkey 141 722 0.00 0.05 0.77 0.01 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.91 0.83 2 9.14 8.56 12.11 1 12.07 34.97 1.00 
United King 1692 8402 0.09 0.16 0.40 0.25 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.72 0.47 4 10.57 2.58 1.00 1 0.00 0.00 89.66 
United 
States 
5587 27990 0.00 0.34 0.27 0.37 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.37 1 10.74 2.51 1.00 1 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Zimbabwe 23 61 0.00 0.15 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.81 0.66 4 6.40 3.37            N/A 0 0.00 1.87 0.00 





Table 2.3. Correlations 
This table reports the Pearson correlations between the variables (dependent and main regressors). Heterogeneity is a measure between 0 and 1 with 1 indicating 
the maximum Heterogeneity. SP90 is a dummy variable that equals one if more than 90% of a firm’s debt consists of one debt type. Log GDP per cap. is the 
natural logarithm of per capita annual GDP. Inflation is the annual change in the CPI from the World Bank database. Sovereign rating is an annualized numerical 
equivalent for the Fitch sovereign rating. Public and private registry variables count the number of such credit registries in any given country per number of 
adults in the population. Information sharing is a dummy variable that equals one if a country has either public or private registries. Log of size is the natural 
logarithm of total book assets. Market to book is market value of equity divided by total book value of assets. Profitability is earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) divided by total book assets.  Tangibility is net property, plant and equipment divided by total book assets. Cash flow volatility is the standard deviation 
over past five years of operating income divided by total assets. Book leverage is the sum of short and long term debt divided by total assets. Asterisks signify 
0.01 percent significance levels. More detailed variable descriptions of the variables and their construction are available in Appendix 1.  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Heterogeneity 1 
            2 SP90 0.89* 1 
           3 Creditor rights 0.06* 0.05* 1 
          4 Log of GDP per cap. 0.02* 0.03* -0.1* 1 
         5 Inflation -0.06* -0.06* 0.04* -0.62* 1 
        6 Sovereign rating -0.02* -0.02* 0.06* -0.89* 0.56* 1 
       7 law and order 0.02* 0.02* 0.07* 0.72* -0.44* -0.81* 1 
      8 Log of size -0.16* -0.14* -0.14* 0.12* -0.13* -0.1* 0.01* 1 
     9 Market to book 0.05* 0.04* 0.08* -0.12* 0.08* 0.13* -0.1* -0.07* 1 
    10 Profitability -0.08* -0.07* 0.01* -0.11* 0.06* 0.12* -0.1* 0.34* -0.01 1 
   11 Tangibility -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.11* 0.06* 0.11* -0.07* 0.13* -0.01 0.08* 1 
  12 Cash flow volatility 0.06* 0.05* 0.00 0.08* 0.01* -0.1* 0.09* -0.33* 0.04* -0.43* -0.08* 1 
 13 Book leverage -0.2* -0.18*  -0.06* -0.09* 0.09* 0.07*  -0.05* 0.13* 0.00 -0.05* 0.24* -0.04* 1 







Table 2.4. Effect of creditor rights on debt-type heterogeneity: Pooled OLS and random-
effects regressions  
This table reports summary results for the HHI debt-type Heterogeneity index in columns (1) – (3) for a pooled OLS 
regression specification and in columns (4) – (6) for a random-effects specification.  *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 5, 1 and 0.1 percent levels, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are student t statistics using 
standard errors clustered at the firm level and using year dummies. The explanatory variables are as defined in 
Appendix 1.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Creditor rights -0.06*** -0.02*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.06*** 
 (-9.38) (-3.91) (-10.03) (-9.29) (-5.23) (-11.11) 
Log Size  0.10*** 0.17***  0.11*** 0.17*** 
  (16.05) (26.72)  (19.04) (27.95) 
Market to book  -0.03*** -0.01**  -0.02*** -0.01*** 
  (-8.32) (-3.20)  (-5.53) (-3.40) 
Profitability  0.04*** 0.02***  0.02*** 0.02*** 
  (9.28) (6.10)  (7.32) (5.73) 
Book leverage  0.17*** 0.16***  0.13*** 0.13*** 
  (32.80) (32.25)  (29.30) (28.30) 
Maturity  0.07*** 0.01*  0.03*** 0.00 
  (14.62) (2.24)  (6.69) (1.11) 
Law and order   -0.02*   0.06*** 
   (-2.03)   (5.92) 
Log of GDP per cap.   -0.13***   -0.14*** 
   (-6.96)   (-8.46) 
Inflation   -0.02***   -0.03*** 
   (-3.68)   (-5.09) 
Sovereign ratings   0.03   0.04*** 
   (1.74)   (3.37) 
Developed country   0.32***   0.21*** 
   (10.90)   (8.58) 
English legal origin   0.05   0.11*** 
   (1.37)   (3.75) 
French legal origin   -0.27***   -0.13** 
   (-5.90)   (-3.10) 
German legal origin   -0.44***   -0.40*** 
   (-12.59)   (-12.67) 
Constant -0.61*** 0.12 -0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.36*** 
 (-3.69) (0.00) (-0.00) (0.08) (0.26) (-4.76) 
Observations 138801 138801 138801 138801 138801 138801 
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.075 0.114    
Within  R2    0.01 0.01 0.01 
Between R2    0.03 0.12 0.16 
Overall R2    0.02 0.07 0.11 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 2.5. Effect of creditor rights on debt-type heterogeneity: Correlated random-effects 
regression results 
This table reports summary results for the HHI debt-type Heterogeneity index for a correlated random effects (CRE) 
specification.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5, 1 and 0.1 percent levels, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses are student t statistics using standard errors clustered at the firm level and using year dummies. Within, 
between, overall and pseudo r-square values are reported in the last rows of the table. The explanatory variables are 
defined in Appendix 1.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Creditor rights -0.05*** -0.02** -0.06***     
 (-9.29) (-3.21) (-9.97)     
CR1    -0.12***    
    (-8.15)    
CR2     -0.12***   
     (-8.48)   
CR3      -0.22***  
      (-7.98)  
CR4       -0.03* 
       (-2.40) 
Log Size  0.17*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 
  (9.51) (9.83) (9.97) (9.75) (9.83) (9.68) 
Market to book  -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01* -0.01** -0.01** 
  (-2.87) (-2.61) (-2.64) (-2.55) (-2.58) (-2.60) 
Profitability  0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 
  (2.30) (2.25) (2.21) (2.27) (2.23) (2.29) 
Book leverage  0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
  (14.15) (14.28) (14.24) (14.27) (14.25) (14.27) 
Maturity  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.16) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
Law and order   0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 
   (5.42) (4.62) (5.17) (4.74) (4.30) 
Log of GDP per cap.   -0.13*** -0.18*** -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.12*** 
   (-8.26) (-10.12) (-8.00) (-8.97) (-7.28) 
Inflation   -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
   (-5.23) (-4.48) (-5.21) (-5.58) (-5.08) 
Sovereign ratings   0.04** 0.01 0.03** 0.00 0.03 
   (2.92) (0.91) (2.58) (0.05) (1.90) 
Developed country   0.21*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 
   (8.61) (8.32) (9.38) (7.59) (8.26) 
English legal origin   0.11*** 0.07* 0.12*** 0.09** 0.10** 
   (3.82) (2.29) (3.99) (3.12) (3.18) 
French legal origin   -0.11** -0.16*** -0.03 -0.17*** -0.07 
   (-2.62) (-3.73) (-0.71) (-3.86) (-1.69) 
German legal origin   -0.37*** -0.40*** -0.39*** -0.37*** -0.36*** 
   (-11.72) (-12.35) (-12.33) (-11.71) (-11.15) 
Constant 0.00 0.02 -0.35*** -0.20** -0.33*** -0.07 -0.27*** 
 (0.08) (0.43) (-4.55) (-2.70) (-4.30) (-0.84) (-3.61) 
Observations  138801 138801 138801 138801 138801 138801 138801 
Within R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Between R2 0.03 0.12 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.17 
Overall R2 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 2.6. Alternative dependent variable 
This table reports results for the an alternative debt-type heterogeneity index, called SP90, which is a binary variable 
that equals one if 90% of a firm’s debt structure consists of only one debt type. Since this dependent variable is 
binary, we use a Probit specification with industry and year effects.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5, 1 
and 0.1 percent levels, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are student t statistics using standard errors clustered at 
the firm level and using year dummies. Within, between, overall and pseudo r-square values are reported in the last 
rows of the table. The explanatory variables are defined in Appendix 1.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 SP90 SP90 SP90 SP90 SP90 SP90 SP90 
Creditor rights 0.09*** 0.03* 0.10***     
 (8.12) (2.27) (8.89)     
CR1    0.25***    
    (7.93)    
CR2     0.22***   
     (7.51)   
CR3      0.41***  
      (7.11)  
CR4       0.04 
       (1.55) 
Log Size  -0.31*** -0.32*** -0.33*** -0.32*** -0.32*** -0.32*** 
  (-8.35) (-8.69) (-8.83) (-8.62) (-8.69) (-8.55) 
Market to book  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (1.64) (1.37) (1.40) (1.30) (1.36) (1.35) 
Profitability  -0.02* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02* 
  (-1.98) (-1.93) (-1.89) (-1.95) (-1.92) (-1.97) 
Book leverage  -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** 
  (-12.63) (-12.72) (-12.68) (-12.71) (-12.70) (-12.71) 
Maturity  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (-1.24) (-1.16) (-1.17) (-1.16) (-1.18) (-1.17) 
Law and order   -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.07*** 
   (-4.65) (-3.98) (-4.39) (-3.97) (-3.53) 
Log of GDP per cap.   0.31*** 0.40*** 0.30*** 0.33*** 0.29*** 
   (8.85) (10.66) (8.69) (9.47) (8.05) 
Inflation   0.03** 0.03* 0.03** 0.04*** 0.03** 
   (3.10) (2.37) (3.07) (3.50) (2.92) 
Sovereign ratings   -0.05 0.00 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 
   (-1.78) (0.08) (-1.45) (0.75) (-0.76) 
Developed country   -0.44*** -0.43*** -0.49*** -0.39*** -0.43*** 
   (-8.52) (-8.34) (-9.24) (-7.57) (-8.23) 
English legal origin   -0.17** -0.08 -0.18** -0.13* -0.13* 
   (-2.68) (-1.26) (-2.81) (-2.02) (-2.00) 
French legal origin   0.31*** 0.42*** 0.16 0.42*** 0.24** 
   (3.56) (4.65) (1.88) (4.63) (2.78) 
German legal origin   0.74*** 0.79*** 0.78*** 0.75*** 0.72*** 
   (11.16) (11.74) (11.68) (11.18) (10.74) 
Constant -0.20 -0.26* 0.41* 0.14 0.37* -0.12 0.26 
 (-1.76) (-2.29) (2.51) (0.84) (2.29) (-0.72) (1.59) 
Observations 138801 138801 138801 138801 138801 138801 138801 
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 2.7. Additional institutional controls 
This table reports CRE regression results for the relation between creditor rights and debt-type heterogeneity with additional 
country-level variables as controls. The institutional variables of interest here are mostly concerned with the strength and quality 
of property rights in each country. Due to the correlation between these additional variables, they are included separately in 
columns (2) through (11) and together in column (1). All regressions include standard errors clustered at the firm-level and year 
dummies. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent levels, respectively. Descriptions of the explanatory 
variables and their computations are provided in Appendix 1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Creditor rights -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.09*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.09*** -0.07*** 
 (-10.87) (-11.66) (-11.60) (-11.11) (-8.78) (-13.83) (-9.61) (-9.77) (-12.47) (-11.20) 
Corruption 0.05***          
 (4.93)          
Bureaucracy quality  0.28***         
 (8.81)         
Efficiency   0.07***        
   (4.42)        
Property rights    0.08***       
    (4.48)       
Contract viability     0.11***      
     (9.49)      
Enforcement cost      0.06***     
      (8.90)     
Enforcement time       0.11***    
       (7.43)    
Depth of creditor 
index 
       0.05***   
       (5.37)   
Strength of legal 
rights 
        0.05***  
        (5.09)  
Information sharing          0.29* 
         (2.02) 
Log Size 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 
 (8.77) (9.52) (8.95) (9.05) (9.19) (8.71) (8.52) (8.68) (8.65) (8.72) 
Market to book -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (-1.53) (-1.87) (-1.70) (-1.68) (-1.80) (-1.70) (-1.68) (-1.74) (-1.80) (-1.68) 
Profitability 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (1.88) (1.67) (1.83) (1.83) (1.82) (1.89) (1.92) (1.92) (1.92) (1.90) 
Book leverage 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (11.20) (11.13) (11.20) (11.12) (11.04) (11.22) (11.22) (11.25) (11.26) (11.23) 
Maturity 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (1.77) (1.82) (1.82) (1.78) (1.62) (1.84) (1.83) (1.88) (1.77) (1.82) 
Law and order 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
 (4.87) (3.50) (6.42) (6.15) (5.58) (6.99) (7.48) (7.70) (8.18) (7.71) 
Log of GDP per cap. -0.23*** -0.38*** -0.24*** -0.28*** -0.24*** -0.19*** -0.17*** -0.22*** -0.21*** -0.19*** 
(-11.36) (-12.20) (-10.16) (-9.85) (-12.39) (-10.13) (-9.08) (-11.27) (-11.15) (-10.00) 
Inflation -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (-1.26) (-0.23) (-0.73) (-1.05) (-0.62) (-0.82) (-1.51) (-0.79) (-0.95) (-1.18) 
Sovereign ratings 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.03* 0.07*** 0.04** 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (4.17) (4.71) (5.19) (4.05) (2.16) (5.18) (2.62) (3.35) (5.26) (5.30) 
Developed country 0.24*** 0.15*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.22*** 
 (9.76) (5.74) (9.08) (9.15) (7.13) (9.14) (8.47) (8.49) (7.64) (9.22) 
English legal origin 0.10** 0.02 0.07* 0.07* 0.05 0.10** 0.10** 0.01 0.05 0.09** 
 (2.98) (0.48) (2.01) (2.06) (1.60) (2.99) (3.19) (0.15) (1.37) (2.90) 
French legal origin -0.19*** -0.20*** -0.16*** -0.20*** -0.19*** -0.35*** -0.15** -0.24*** -0.16*** -0.19*** 
 (-4.21) (-4.28) (-3.40) (-4.32) (-4.17) (-6.91) (-3.18) (-5.04) (-3.51) (-4.06) 
German legal origin -0.39*** -0.49*** -0.46*** -0.39*** -0.43*** -0.44*** -0.39*** -0.49*** -0.43*** -0.43*** 
(-11.19) (-13.88) (-13.06) (-10.90) (-12.42) (-12.73) (-11.27) (-13.54) (-12.34) (-12.38) 
Constant -0.35*** -1.04*** -0.36*** -0.35*** -0.64*** -0.41*** -0.43*** -0.38*** -0.45*** -0.76*** 
 (-3.94) (-9.58) (-3.92) (-3.94) (-7.07) (-4.65) (-4.91) (-4.29) (-5.09) (-4.48) 
Observations 91650 91650 91650 91650 91650 91650 91650 91650 91650 91650 
Within  R2 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Between R2 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.14 
Overall R2 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.09 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 2.8. Additional macro level variables and culture  
This table reports the results for Heterogeneity as the dependent variable. Culture is proxied by various religions as 
the additional control variable in column 2. All regressions include standard errors clustered at the firm-level and 
year dummies. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent levels, respectively. Descriptions of the 
variables and their computations are provided in Appendix 1. Column one control for the number of debt types that 
a system of credit in a country can provide.  Column 2 control for more macro level variables and column 3 controls 
for culture.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Creditor rights -0.06*** -0.09** -0.06*** 
 (-10.44) (-2.88) (-8.64) 
Log Size 0.18*** 0.24*** 0.19*** 
 (9.90) (8.10) (10.52) 
Market to book -0.01** -0.01 -0.01** 
 (-2.60) (-1.19) (-2.93) 
Profitability 0.01* 0.01 0.01* 
 (2.22) (1.20) (2.02) 
 Book leverage 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 
 (14.34) (10.94) (14.19) 
Maturity 0.00 0.02* 0.00 
 (0.01) (2.36) (0.13) 
Law and order 0.05*** 0.02 0.07*** 
 (5.09) (0.85) (6.51) 
Log of GDP per cap. -0.13*** -0.13** -0.30*** 
 (-7.68) (-2.67) (-12.39) 
Inflation -0.03*** 0.01 -0.01* 
 (-5.41) (0.56) (-2.47) 
Sovereign ratings 0.03* -0.09*** -0.05** 
 (2.27) (-3.58) (-3.17) 
Developed country 0.20*** -0.15*** 0.09*** 
 (8.23) (-3.87) (3.41) 
English legal origin 0.15*** 0.17* 0.09** 
 (4.72) (2.56) (3.10) 
French legal origin -0.09* 0.02 -0.28*** 
 (-2.12) (0.20) (-6.33) 
German legal origin -0.35*** 0.04 -0.20*** 
 (-10.89) (1.29) (-5.27) 
N. of debt type in country -0.02***   
 (-3.46)   
Domestic cred. to GDP  0.05  
  (1.46)  
Stocks traded to GDP  -0.02*  
  (-2.38)  
Gdp growth  0.04***  
  (4.11)  
Liquid asset to GDP  -0.02  
  (-0.56)  
Religion=Athiest   -0.56*** 
   (-11.96) 
Religion= Buddhist   -0.07** 
   (-3.29) 
Religion= Catholic   0.03 
   (1.36) 
Religion= Hindu   -0.45*** 
   (-9.31) 
Religion= Muslim   0.04 
   (1.23) 
Religion= Orthodox   0.19 




Constant -0.36*** 0.10 -0.25** 
 (-4.69) (0.97) (-3.12) 
Observations 138801 58592 138801 
Within  R2 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Between R2 0.17 0.18 0.17 
Overall R2 0.11 0.13 0.11 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 






Table 2.9.  Instrumental variables estimation: Debt-type heterogeneity and creditor rights 
This table provides the second-stage results based on a two stage least square (2SLS) specification using English 
legal origins and ethnic fractionalization as the instrument variables. *, ** and *** signify significance at the 5%, 
1% and 0.1% levels, respectively, based on t-values reported in the parentheses. Clustered standard errors are at the 
firm-level. The description of all variables and their computations are provided in Appendix 1.   
 
 (1) (2) 
 HHI SP90 
Creditor rights -0.03*** 0.01** 
 (-3.39) (2.76) 
Log Size 0.14*** -0.06*** 
 (21.06) (-20.53) 
Market to book -0.02*** 0.01*** 
 (-4.96) (4.19) 
Profitability 0.03*** -0.01*** 
 (7.86) (-7.31) 
Book leverage 0.17*** -0.08*** 
 (32.66) (-31.62) 
Maturity 0.04*** -0.02*** 
 (8.17) (-7.49) 
Law and order -0.11*** 0.04*** 
 (-10.45) (9.01) 
Log of GDP per cap. -0.36*** 0.17*** 
 (-20.19) (20.14) 
Inflation 0.06*** -0.03*** 
 (9.09) (-8.32) 
Sovereign ratings -0.23*** 0.11*** 
 (-17.91) (16.76) 
Developed country 0.68*** -0.30*** 
 (23.86) (-22.71) 
Constant 0.07 0.44*** 
 (0.93) (12.85) 
Observations 138801 138801 
Adjusted R2 0.098 0.081 
Industry effects Yes Yes 






Table 2.10. Sample composition and Tobit regressions 
This table reports the results for Heterogeneity as the dependent variable for subsamples that exclude U.S. firms in 
column (1), exclude Japanese firms in column (2) and exclude both U.S. and Japanese firms in columns (3). The last 
column reports the Tobit regression results for Heterogeneity as the dependent variable.  All regressions include 
standard errors clustered at the firm-level and year dummies. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 5, 1 and 0.1 
percent levels, respectively. Descriptions of the variables and their computations are provided in Appendix 1. 
 









     
Creditor rights -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.07*** 
 (-9.45) (-9.97) (-9.45) (-10.01) 
Log Size 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 
 (9.78) (9.83) (9.78) (26.56) 
Market to book -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 
 (-2.58) (-2.61) (-2.58) (-3.03) 
Profitability 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.03*** 
 (2.26) (2.25) (2.26) (6.00) 
Book leverage 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.17*** 
 (14.28) (14.28) (14.28) (32.03) 
Maturity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01* 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (2.23) 
Law and order 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.07*** -0.03* 
 (6.64) (5.42) (6.64) (-2.31) 
Log of GDP per cap. -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.14*** 
 (-8.12) (-8.26) (-8.12) (-7.05) 
Inflation -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03*** 
 (-3.81) (-5.23) (-3.81) (-3.97) 
Sovereign ratings 0.05*** 0.04** 0.05*** 0.03 
 (4.06) (2.92) (4.06) (1.60) 
Developed country 0.25*** 0.21*** 0.25*** 0.35*** 
 (9.81) (8.61) (9.81) (11.05) 
English legal origin 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.06 
 (3.96) (3.82) (3.96) (1.61) 
French legal origin 0.02 -0.11** 0.02 -0.28*** 
 (0.39) (-2.62) (0.39) (-5.83) 
German legal origin -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.46*** 
 (-11.72) (-11.72) (-11.72) (-12.56) 
Constant -0.44*** -0.35*** -0.44*** 0.03 
 (-5.69) (-4.55) (-5.69) (0.34) 
Observations 110811 120083 92093 138801 
Within  R2 0.01 0.01 0.01  
Between R2 0.17 0.16 0.16  
Overall R2 0.11 0.11 0.11  
Pseudo R2    0.03 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Table 2.11. Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity 
This table studies the effects of creditor rights on the cross-section of firms with different levels of asset 
intangibility, cash flow volatility and opaqueness. The estimates of interest in this table are the interactions of the 
above variables with the creditor rights index (CR). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5, 1 and 0.1 percent 
levels, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are student t statistics using standard errors clustered at the firm level 
and using year dummies. Within, between, overall and pseudo r-square values are reported in the last rows of the 
table. The explanatory variables are defined in Appendix 1.   
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intangibility      0.07***   
 (7.50)   
Intangibility * CR      -0.07***   
 (-8.82)   
Cash flow vol.       0.01  
  (1.32)  
Cash flow vol. *CR  -0.02**  
  (-2.68)  
Opaqueness   2.91*** 
   (4.04) 
Opaqueness *CR        -3.29*** 
   (-3.85) 
Log Size 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.14*** 
 (9.79) (9.72) (5.35) 
Market to book -0.01** -0.01** -0.01* 
 (-2.60) (-2.59) (-2.47) 
Profitability 0.01* 0.01* 0.01 
 (2.26) (2.27) (0.72) 
Book leverage 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 
 (14.27) (14.26) (8.24) 
Maturity 0.00 0.00 -0.02** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (-3.03) 
Law and order 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04** 
 (4.83) (4.30) (3.05) 
Log Gdp per cap. -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.14*** 
 (-8.21) (-8.30) (-6.53) 
Inflation -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (-5.07) (-4.98) (-5.65) 
Sovereign ratings 0.03* 0.02 0.05* 
 (2.46) (1.47) (2.25) 
Developed country 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 
 (8.59) (8.31) (8.48) 
English legal origin 0.09** 0.09** -0.00 
 (3.04) (3.08) (-0.04) 
French legal origin -0.12** -0.07 -0.17*** 
 (-2.94) (-1.77) (-3.52) 
German legal origin -0.39*** -0.37*** -0.49*** 
 (-12.16) (-11.59) (-11.78) 
Constant -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.32** 
 (-3.87) (-3.67) (-3.16) 
Observations 138801 138801 56304 
Within R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Between R2 0.15 0.15 0.14 
Overall R2 0.08 0.07 0.08 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 




Table 3.1. Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for the main variables used in our analyses and are described in appendix 1. The data are monthly from January 2002 to 
December 2012. The means, medians and standard deviations for the firm-specific variables over the entire sample period are reported in panel A. Panel B 
reports the summary statistics for the macroeconomic variables and other proxies for uncertainty which are more systemic than firm-specific. The summary 
statistics for credit spreads, credit spreads and 3-month T-Bill rates that are reported in panel C are calculated separately for periods of high or low policy 
uncertainty (PU) based on the time series medians of the Baker, Bloom and Davis (2012) policy uncertainty index (PUI). The Student’s t test and the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney U test are used to examine the significance of the differences in the means and medians, respectively, for three variables differentiated between 
low and high PU. Their respective statistics are reported in the parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, 
based on the traditional critical t-values.  d and e indicate significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 level based on the sample-size-adjusted critical t-values reported in 
appendix 2. Obs. refers to observations. 
Panel A: Summary statistics for various firm-specific variables 
  All Investment Grade Speculative Grade 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean   Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. Median 
Credit spread (%) 4.95 120.46 1.68 4.16 124.02 1.26 5.69 24.07 3.84 
Liquidity 11.81 6.61 12.00 12.38 6.73 13.00 10.99 6.27 11.00 
Operating income to sales -0.86 67.33 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.26 0.07 
Market leverage 0.33 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.16 0.23 0.46 0.37 0.44 
Total debt capitalization 0.60 22.91 0.51 0.47 0.15 0.46 0.94 48.13 0.60 
Closest benchmark treasury rate (%) 2.97 1.53 3.18 3.00 1.53 3.21 3.02 1.49 3.21 
Coupon (%) 5.73 2.17 5.88 5.45 1.67 5.63 7.07 2.19 7.25 
Years to maturity 9.85 8.70 6.76 10.72 9.57 7.34 7.73 6.09 6.29 
Amount ($) 367,215 464,148 250,000 470,124 531,960 350,000 187,992 261,807 46,528 
Std. dev. of daily excess returns 0.03 0.33 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.37 0.03 





Table 1.  Cont’d 
Panel B: Summary statistics for macro variables and uncertainty proxies 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median 
Term slope 2.05 0.96 2.01 
Policy uncertainty 127.96 44.10 136.60 
S&P return * 100 0.03 0.21 0.05 
Expected GDP ($) 1547.27 1296.67 1395.00 
Expected unemployment (%) 7.24 1.88 7.80 
Consumer confidence 75.76 10.87 74.30 
Expected one year inflation (%) 2.39 2.82 2.61 
VXO 21.46 10.37 18.86 
News-based component of PU 121.56 49.37 111.49 
FedStateLocal - disagreement 93.49 38.34 102.94 
CPI dispersion 108.07 29.61 105.01 
Uncertainty of tax expiration 784.29 561.13 771.24 







Table 1.  Cont’d 
 
 
Panel C: Summary statistics for three variables differentiated by low and high PU 
  
 Variable 
High PU (Obs. = 101,799) Low PU (Obs. = 74,319) High PU -  Low PU 








Credit spread (maturity matched) 
6.90 185.96 1.43 3.97 
 




Credit spread (unmatched) 




Three month  treasury rate 








Table 3.2. Correlations 
This table reports the correlations between the various variables used in this paper that are described in appendix 1. 




























putable D1 D2 D3 D4 
Credit Spread 1.00 
                 PUI 0.05 1.00 
                Investment grade 
dummy 
-0.01 -0.05 1.00 
               Liquidity -0.02 0.03 0.00 1.00 
              S&P returns -0.11 -0.02 0.00 0.06 1.00 
             Operating income 
to sales 
-0.09 -0.11 0.01 0.03 -0.01 1.00 
            Market leverage 0.39 0.10 0.02 0.07 -0.02 -0.10 1.00 
           Total debt 
capitalization 
0.11 0.00 0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.51 1.00 
          Pretax Coverage 
D1 
0.06 0.00 -0.30 0.02 0.01 -0.12 0.15 0.11 1.00 
         Pretax Coverage 
D2 
-0.02 -0.01 0.11 -0.01 0.00 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.56 1.00 
        Pretax Coverage 
D3 
-0.03 0.02 0.17 0.00 -0.01 0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.44 -0.31 1.00 
       Pretax Coverage 
D4 
-0.02 0.00 0.11 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.11 -0.10 -0.26 -0.18 -0.14 1.00 
      Closest benchmark 
treasury rate 
-0.22 -0.40 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.18 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 1.00 
     Term spread 0.16 0.14 -0.03 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.23 1.00 
    Coupon 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 1.00 
   Maturity 
remaining 
-0.10 -0.44 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.08 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.47 -0.06 -0.06 1.00 
  Amount 
outstanding 
0.02 0.24 -0.04 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.19 0.11 -0.03 0.08 1.00 
 Dummy putable -0.01 -0.03 -0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.27 -0.02 -0.13 0.07 -0.07 1.00 




Table 3.3. The expected signs of the explanatory variables 
This table reports the predicted estimated signs of the explanatory variables (in the last column) according to three 
influential studies (columns 1 to 3). The first set of 12 variables in rows 1 to 12 are general and firm-specific, the 
second set of 4 variables in rows 13 to 16 are macro-variables, the third set of six variables in rows 17 to 22 are 
policy uncertainty variables, and the fourth set in rows 23 and 24 are rating dummies. The methods to calculate 










(2009) This Paper 
1 Liquidity       - 
2 S&P Return -   - - 
3 Operating income to sales   -   - 
4 Market Leverage + +/- + + 
5 Total debt capitalization       + 
6 3-month T-Bill rate (or closest benchmark) - -   + 
7 Term Spread (slope) or 10 year yield - - - - 
8 Coupon   +   + 
9 Maturity   +   + 
10 Putability        + 
11 Amount or Issue size   -   - 
12 Pre-Tax coverage    -   - 
13 Expected GDP       - 
14 Expected unemployment       + 
15 Consumer Confidence       - 
16 Expected one-year inflation       + 
17 Std. dev. of daily excess returns   + + + 
18 VIX or VXO +     + 
19 Election indicator       - 
20 Analyst forecast dispersion       + 
21 PUI       - 
22 STD. of PUI       + 
23 Investment Grade   +   - 









Table 3.4. Policy uncertainty and credit spreads 
This table reports bond fixed-effects panel regression results with firm clustered standard errors for corporate bond 
credit spreads and various regressors for the period 2002-2012. A detailed description of the variables is given in 
appendix 1. The election dummy is equal to 1 for the presidential election years. Macroeconomic determinants 
include: 3-month T-Bill rate and the Term slope. Bond-specific determinants include: Amount outstanding 
(Amount), Coupon, Years-to-maturity (number of years to the bond’s maturity), Liquidity (number of monthly 
transactions for each bond) and Putability (Putable dummy).  S&P return is the return of the S&P 500 index over the 
same quarter as the bond. Firm-specific accounting determinants include: Pre-tax interest coverage dummies D1 to 
D4, Operating income to sales, Market leverage, and Total debt to capitalization. Eleven monthly dummies are 
included in the regressions to control for seasonality but are not tabulated. OLS t-statistics appear in the parentheses.  
+, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, based on the traditional 
critical t-values.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8) (9) (10) 














         
Policy uncertainty 43.04***   35.44***  26.16***  24.99*** 
 (60.09)   (45.45)  (35.42)  (29.33) 
Rating       24.08*** 27.10*** 
       (5.68) (6.53) 
Liquidity       -4.89*** -4.56*** 
       (-7.79) (-7.28) 
S&P return       -12.25*** -11.82*** 
       (-28.49) (-27.83) 
Operating income to 
sales 
    -6.14*** -5.84*** -6.84*** -6.46*** 
     (-11.16) (-10.91) (-11.02) (-10.70) 
Market leverage     45.36*** 41.47*** 46.63*** 42.70*** 
     (43.63) (39.70) (39.35) (35.76) 
Total debt 
capitalization 
    -13.20*** -11.98*** -14.22*** -13.33*** 
     (-14.65) (-13.53) (-13.64) (-13.04) 
Pre-Tax coverage D1     -15.84** -12.69* -14.01* -11.14+ 
     (-3.16) (-2.56) (-2.34) (-1.88) 
Pre-Tax coverage D2     -18.32*** -16.32*** -16.72** -14.71* 
     (-3.77) (-3.38) (-2.88) (-2.56) 
Pre-Tax coverage D3     -17.92*** -17.21*** -20.03*** -19.14*** 
     (-4.02) (-3.89) (-3.73) (-3.61) 
Closest treasury rate  -43.46*** -39.67*** -23.44*** -28.68*** -17.61*** -32.23*** -21.10*** 
  (-40.56) (-36.40) (-20.55) (-27.34) (-16.03) (-26.84) (-17.02) 
Term Slope  7.04*** 10.29*** 3.75*** 6.25*** 1.73** 5.14*** 1.07 
  (9.51) (13.66) (5.55) (8.73) (2.63) (5.92) (1.33) 
Coupon  6.74*** 6.72*** 6.37** 5.81** 5.60** 2.28 1.83 




Years to maturity  21.37*** 21.41*** 24.19*** 16.67*** 19.10*** 20.16*** 21.88*** 
  (15.15) (15.19) (16.78) (12.41) (14.00) (13.18) (14.06) 
Amount  -24.35*** -25.54*** -33.48*** -21.18*** -27.37*** -15.26*** -20.38*** 
  (-10.71) (-11.22) (-13.99) (-9.90) (-12.31) (-5.50) (-7.08) 
Dummy putable  2.97 -3.29 -27.78+ -1.73 -19.93 7.57 -10.09 
  (0.19) (-0.21) (-1.70) (-0.11) (-1.27) (0.35) (-0.45) 
Election   28.39*** 27.49*** 27.86*** 27.26*** 17.43*** 17.17*** 
   (19.73) (19.20) (19.43) (19.16) (10.63) (10.43) 
Constant 12.75*** 140.93*** 123.05*** 76.66*** 101.40*** 67.98*** 116.48*** 82.80*** 
 (19.46) (38.05) (32.24) (19.75) (18.32) (12.18) (18.18) (13.02) 
Observations 164,541 164,541 164,541 164,541 164,541 164,541 111,573 111,573 
Adjusted R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.29 
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Monthly Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 




Table 3.5. Policy uncertainty and corporate credit spreads across investment and 
speculative credit ratings 
This table reports bond fixed-effects panel regression results with firm clustered standard errors for investment and 
speculative grade corporate bond credit spreads and various regressors for the period 2002-2012. A detailed 
description of the variables is given in appendix 1. The election dummy is equal to 1 for the presidential election 
years. Macroeconomic determinants include: 3-month T-Bill rate and the Term slope. Bond-specific determinants 
include: Amount outstanding (Amount), Coupon, Years-to-maturity (number of years to the bond’s maturity), 
Liquidity (number of monthly transactions for each bond) and Putability (Putable dummy).  S&P return is the return 
of the S&P 500 index over the same quarter as the bond. Firm-specific accounting determinants include: Pre-tax 
interest coverage dummies D1 to D3 (D4 excluded by STATA due to collinearity), Operating income to sales, 
Market leverage, and Total debt to capitalization. Eleven monthly dummies are included in the regressions to control 
for seasonality but are not tabulated. OLS t-statistics appear in the parentheses.  +, *, ** and *** indicate significance 
at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, based on the traditional critical t-values. 
 Investment grades Speculative grades 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES         
Policy uncertainty  33.29***  24.76***  8.11***  5.43*** 
  (29.39)  (22.79)  (25.81)  (19.67) 
Liquidity -3.36*** -3.06*** -4.41*** -4.09*** -0.65** -0.58* -1.15*** -1.07*** 
 (-3.87) (-3.55) (-5.36) (-4.98) (-2.85) (-2.56) (-5.84) (-5.44) 
S&P return -16.00*** -15.51*** -14.81*** -14.56*** -1.83*** -1.55*** -1.49*** -1.33*** 
 (-26.59) (-26.40) (-25.50) (-25.49) (-14.49) (-12.36) (-13.34) (-11.95) 
Operating income to sales   -4.74*** -4.48***   -1.93*** -1.78*** 
   (-6.26) (-6.06)   (-9.28) (-8.85) 
Market leverage   44.31*** 40.51***   11.00*** 10.18*** 
   (28.80) (26.16)   (28.24) (26.22) 
Total debt capitalization   -15.09*** -14.35***   -2.28*** -2.05*** 
   (-10.78) (-10.49)   (-7.15) (-6.57) 
Pre-Tax coverage D1   -2.80 -0.51   -6.82** -5.86* 
   (-0.41) (-0.08)   (-2.60) (-2.17) 
Pre-Tax coverage D2   -7.45 -5.29   -5.22* -4.73+ 
   (-1.15) (-0.83)   (-1.99) (-1.75) 
Pre-Tax coverage D3   -17.13** -16.08**   -2.25 -2.05 
   (-2.90) (-2.77)   (-0.86) (-0.77) 
Closest treasury rate -44.54*** -27.90*** -32.99*** -21.65*** -9.75*** -5.97*** -6.83*** -4.51*** 
 (-28.42) (-17.08) (-21.74) (-13.81) (-24.23) (-14.43) (-18.66) (-12.03) 
Term Slope 3.28** -2.33* 0.41 -3.46*** 3.02*** 1.62*** 1.97*** 1.10*** 
 (2.79) (-2.24) (0.37) (-3.43) (8.87) (5.12) (6.40) (3.76) 
coupon 7.69* 6.88* 7.55* 6.91* -0.73 -0.75 -0.75 -0.76 
 (2.25) (2.05) (2.34) (2.18) (-0.99) (-0.97) (-1.16) (-1.14) 
Years to maturity 31.73*** 33.13*** 26.32*** 27.86*** 3.66*** 4.12*** 2.63*** 3.02*** 
 (14.97) (15.34) (12.94) (13.51) (7.45) (8.38) (5.95) (6.82) 
Amount -16.17*** -23.76*** -14.37*** -20.15*** -5.52*** -6.66*** -4.13*** -4.99*** 
 (-3.98) (-5.53) (-3.65) (-4.88) (-7.29) (-8.25) (-6.11) (-7.16) 
Dummy putable 36.50 11.24 35.65 16.75 -4.41 -10.16* -4.72 -8.52+ 
 (1.10) (0.32) (1.06) (0.47) (-0.99) (-2.17) (-1.00) (-1.79) 
Election dummy 19.69*** 20.15*** 22.69*** 22.82*** 1.47* 1.02+ 1.32* 1.04+ 
 (9.53) (9.55) (11.13) (11.06) (2.50) (1.77) (2.35) (1.88) 
Constant 144.22*** 95.66*** 111.79*** 77.42*** 31.99*** 21.39*** 27.82*** 20.66*** 
 (29.82) (19.30) (15.64) (10.91) (24.25) (16.25) (9.85) (7.10) 
Observations 74,383 74,383 74,383 74,383 37,190 37,190 37,190 37,190 
Adjusted R-squared 0.16 0.19 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.28 0.39 0.41 
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Monthly Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 3.6. How important is each components of the PUI? 
The table shows bond fixed effect regression estimates of credit spreads on the components of the policy uncertainty index (PUI), 
firm controls, bond characteristics and election dummies with firm clustered standard errors for the period 2002-2012. A detailed 
description of the variables is given in appendix 1. The election dummy is equal to 1 for the presidential election years. 
Macroeconomic determinants include: 3-month T-Bill rate and the Term slope. Bond-specific determinants include: Amount 
outstanding (Amount), Coupon, Years-to-maturity (number of years to the bond’s maturity), Liquidity (number of monthly 
transactions for each bond) and Putability (Putable dummy).  S&P return is the return of the S&P 500 index over the same 
quarter as the bond. Firm-specific accounting determinants include: Pre-tax interest coverage dummies D1 to D3 (D4 excluded 
by STATA due to collinearity), Operating income to sales, Market leverage, and Total debt to capitalization. Eleven monthly 
dummies are included in the regressions to control for seasonality but are not tabulated. OLS t-statistics appear in the 
parentheses. +, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, based on the traditional 
critical t-values. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
News-Based component of PUI 27.76***    
 (39.43)    
FedStateLocal-Ex-disagreement  6.14***   
  (7.92)   
CPI dispersion   27.81***  
   (47.68)  
Uncertainty of tax expiration    -57.46*** 
    (-41.14) 
Rating 28.67*** 24.02*** 23.35*** 27.76*** 
 (6.96) (5.68) (5.79) (6.51) 
Liquidity -4.00*** -5.01*** -5.00*** -2.93*** 
 (-6.46) (-7.96) (-8.33) (-4.99) 
S&P return -9.70*** -12.85*** -13.54*** -7.81*** 
 (-23.68) (-30.51) (-32.29) (-20.46) 
Operating income to sales -6.07*** -6.98*** -6.43*** -5.29*** 
 (-10.27) (-11.25) (-10.57) (-8.97) 
Market leverage 41.32*** 45.99*** 45.13*** 42.85*** 
 (35.02) (38.64) (39.76) (39.33) 
Total debt capitalization -12.93*** -14.16*** -13.38*** -12.70*** 
 (-12.85) (-13.66) (-13.65) (-13.29) 
Pre-Tax coverage D1 -10.75+ -14.30* -9.99+ -9.02+ 
 (-1.85) (-2.40) (-1.75) (-1.65) 
Pre-Tax coverage D2 -14.31* -16.86** -13.54* -10.55* 
 (-2.54) (-2.91) (-2.45) (-1.99) 
Pre-Tax coverage D3 -18.17*** -20.17*** -17.83*** -11.53* 
 (-3.49) (-3.77) (-3.50) (-2.35) 
Closest benchmark treasury rate -21.04*** -30.19*** -30.06*** -52.22*** 
 (-17.12) (-25.32) (-25.90) (-43.84) 
Term Slope 2.75*** 3.62*** -6.20*** 10.40*** 
 (3.37) (4.15) (-7.64) (11.70) 
Coupon 2.04 2.18 2.30 3.94 
 (0.91) (0.96) (1.06) (1.59) 
Years to maturity 18.89*** 20.92*** 21.89*** -0.32 
 (12.43) (13.63) (15.26) (-0.23) 
Amount -17.91*** -16.73*** -18.00*** 8.57** 
 (-6.43) (-5.93) (-6.51) (3.15) 
Dummy putable -5.56 4.25 4.20 68.54*** 
 (-0.25) (0.20) (0.19) (3.40) 
Election dummy 13.53*** 19.95*** 15.30*** 25.81*** 
 (8.50) (11.89) (9.79) (17.40) 
Constant 81.89*** 111.36*** 104.40*** 151.92*** 
 (13.05) (17.51) (17.04) (25.98) 
Observations 111,573 111,573 111,573 111,573 
Adjusted R-squared 0.30 0.27 0.31 0.36 
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Monthly Dummies YES YES YES YES 




Table 3.7. Policy uncertainty and corporate credit spreads in different economic conditions  
The table reports our baseline regression estimates controlling for the impacts of different economic conditions with firm fixed 
effects and clustered standard errors for the period 2002-2012. A detailed description of the variables is given in appendix 1. The 
election dummy is equal to 1 for the presidential election years. Macroeconomic determinants include: 3-month T-Bill rate and 
the Term slope. Bond-specific determinants include: Amount outstanding (Amount), Coupon, Years-to-maturity (number of 
years to the bond’s maturity), Liquidity (number of monthly transactions for each bond) and Putability (Putable dummy).  S&P 
return is the return of the S&P 500 index over the same quarter as the bond. Firm-specific accounting determinants include: Pre-
tax interest coverage dummies D1 to D3 (D4 excluded by STATA due to collinearity), Operating income to sales, Market 
leverage, and Total debt to capitalization. Eleven monthly dummies are included in the regressions to control for seasonality but 
are not tabulated. OLS t-statistics appear in the parentheses. +, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
levels, respectively, based on the traditional critical t-values. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Recession Expansion Recession Expansion 
Policy uncertainty 93.12*** 23.53*** 30.65*** 5.04*** 
 (81.98) (37.94) (7.24) (6.86) 
Ratings   52.76*** 30.73*** 
   (6.03) (8.20) 
Liquidity   -4.71*** 0.53 
   (-5.22) (1.03) 
S&P return   -21.55*** 4.46*** 
   (-13.38) (13.52) 
Operating income to sales   -5.42*** -1.50** 
   (-5.11) (-2.97) 
Market leverage   22.26*** 22.18*** 
   (11.73) (21.92) 
Total debt capitalization   -2.40 -6.00*** 
   (-1.60) (-7.56) 
Pre-Tax coverage D1   -3.40 -3.04 
   (-0.48) (-0.69) 
Pre-Tax coverage D2   -9.88 -4.01 
   (-1.36) (-0.95) 
Pre-Tax coverage D3   -5.73 -6.38+ 
   (-0.85) (-1.65) 
Closest benchmark treasury rate   -45.98*** -26.98*** 
   (-9.44) (-26.59) 
Term Slope   -25.89*** -7.79*** 
   (-7.73) (-10.56) 
coupon   4.61 2.21 
   (0.79) (1.20) 
Years to maturity   2.64 8.68*** 
   (0.45) (7.40) 
Amount   4.26 -1.26 
   (0.43) (-0.59) 
Dummy putable   127.64 19.65 
   (1.58) (1.03) 
Election dummy   -80.07*** -41.07*** 
   (-7.14) (-23.11) 
Constant 100.81*** -25.16*** 473.09*** 73.09*** 
 (306.16) (-636.13) (31.06) (14.83) 
Observations 28,239 136,302 19,106 92,467 
Adjusted R-squared 0.52 0.10 0.74 0.26 
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Monthly Dummies YES YES YES YES 







Table 3.8. Omitted variables: Business cycles 
The table reports our baseline regression estimates controlling for the omitted business cycles variables with firm fixed effects 
and clustered standard errors for the period 2002-2012. Our business cycle controls are expected GDP, expected unemployment 
rate and expected one year inflation calculated quarterly from the survey of professional forecasters from the Philadelphia 
Federal Reserve Bank, and the Michigan Confidence Index developed by the University of Michigan. A detailed description of 
the variables is given in appendix 1. The election dummy is equal to 1 for the presidential election years. Macroeconomic 
determinants include: 3-month T-Bill rate and the Term slope. Bond-specific determinants include: Amount outstanding 
(Amount), Coupon, Years-to-maturity (number of years to the bond’s maturity), Liquidity (number of monthly transactions for 
each bond) and Putability (Putable dummy).  S&P return is the return of the S&P 500 index over the same quarter as the bond. 
Firm-specific accounting determinants include: Pre-tax interest coverage dummies D1 to D3 (D4 excluded by STATA due to 
collinearity), Operating income to sales, Market leverage, and Total debt to capitalization. Eleven monthly dummies are included 
in the regressions to control for seasonality but are not tabulated. OLS t-statistics appear in the parentheses. +, *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, based on the traditional critical t-values. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Policy uncertainty     24.56*** 18.27*** 27.55*** 23.89*** 30.79*** 
     (31.46) (23.44) (35.98) (28.99) (31.68) 
Ratings 15.51*** 21.59*** 24.61*** 24.62*** 18.52*** 24.01*** 24.53*** 27.46*** 20.27*** 
 (3.76) (5.43) (6.98) (5.88) (4.61) (6.07) (6.96) (6.67) (5.76) 
Liquidity -5.95*** -5.29*** -2.52*** -4.77*** -5.61*** -5.01*** -2.52*** -4.46*** -3.24*** 
 (-10.12) (-8.94) (-4.75) (-7.74) (-9.62) (-8.40) (-4.75) (-7.23) (-6.29) 
S&P return -9.52*** -12.38*** -3.42*** -13.79*** -9.12*** -12.06*** -3.40*** -13.25*** -4.20*** 
 (-23.70) (-30.23) (-10.34) (-32.69) (-23.08) (-29.58) (-10.29) (-31.98) (-13.00) 
Operating income to sales -6.21*** -6.19*** -4.67*** -6.45*** -5.84*** -5.97*** -4.67*** -6.12*** -4.16*** 
 (-10.54) (-10.68) (-8.88) (-10.81) (-10.15) (-10.39) (-8.88) (-10.46) (-8.16) 
Market leverage 39.15*** 38.59*** 34.86*** 44.19*** 35.33*** 36.43*** 34.93*** 40.64*** 29.37*** 
 (35.21) (33.66) (34.39) (37.85) (31.58) (31.41) (34.41) (34.39) (29.59) 
Total debt capitalization -10.80*** -12.11*** -9.27*** -13.83*** -9.95*** -11.65*** -9.27*** -13.02*** -7.45*** 
 (-11.28) (-12.70) (-11.18) (-13.59) (-10.62) (-12.26) (-11.18) (-12.99) (-9.47) 
Pre-Tax coverage D1 -6.48 -10.75+ 0.16 -16.11** -3.70 -8.94 0.14 -13.18* 1.15 
 (-1.14) (-1.91) (0.03) (-2.73) (-0.66) (-1.59) (0.03) (-2.26) (0.24) 
Pre-Tax coverage D2 -10.38+ -14.02* -5.94 -18.04** -8.43 -12.79* -5.95 -16.00** -4.59 
 (-1.88) (-2.55) (-1.26) (-3.15) (-1.54) (-2.33) (-1.27) (-2.82) (-0.99) 
Pre-Tax coverage D3 -17.69*** -19.47*** -11.09* -20.28*** -16.83*** -18.87*** -11.08* -19.41*** -10.89* 
 (-3.45) (-3.81) (-2.55) (-3.83) (-3.32) (-3.70) (-2.55) (-3.70) (-2.54) 
Closest treasury rate -29.83*** -16.27*** -19.36*** -28.44*** -18.90*** -9.55*** -19.62*** -18.13*** -15.20*** 
 (-26.43) (-13.53) (-17.84) (-23.64) (-16.23) (-7.67) (-17.99) (-14.56) (-13.44) 
Term Slope -4.33*** -21.04*** -7.00*** 6.85*** -8.27*** -21.69*** -6.94*** 2.82*** -10.36*** 
 (-5.09) (-23.65) (-10.01) (7.72) (-10.41) (-24.27) (-10.05) (3.39) (-11.85) 
coupon 1.00 1.54 2.45 2.24 0.56 1.28 2.46 1.81 1.65 
 (0.48) (0.72) (1.24) (1.00) (0.27) (0.59) (1.24) (0.81) (0.87) 
Years to maturity 13.67*** 14.36*** 19.40*** 18.84*** 15.39*** 16.12*** 19.35*** 20.60*** 14.53*** 
 (9.96) (9.97) (16.24) (12.58) (11.13) (10.86) (16.11) (13.50) (12.58) 
Amount -12.00*** -20.09*** -21.54*** -14.80*** -17.05*** -23.41*** -21.42*** -19.73*** -18.91*** 
 (-4.51) (-7.19) (-8.15) (-5.39) (-6.18) (-8.04) (-8.04) (-6.92) (-7.14) 
Dummy putable 17.81 3.60 -2.69 6.07 0.39 -8.97 -2.24 -10.69 2.23 
 (0.84) (0.16) (-0.12) (0.28) (0.02) (-0.39) (-0.10) (-0.48) (0.10) 
Election dummy 18.90*** 47.75*** 26.11*** 23.07*** 18.64*** 44.87*** 26.15*** 22.33*** 32.10*** 
 (12.11) (25.66) (18.74) (12.89) (11.85) (24.20) (18.77) (12.52) (18.99) 
Expected GDP -31.72***    -31.55***    13.28*** 
 (-37.74)    (-38.29)    (14.42) 
Expected unemployment  47.45***    43.25***   -46.34*** 
  (36.91)    (34.91)   (-70.85) 
Consumer confidence   -53.81***    -45.27***  -13.42*** 
   (-70.65)    (-69.43)  (-17.73) 
Expected one year inflation    -13.84***    -12.65*** -11.84*** 





67.25*** 36.50*** 75.67*** 78.45*** 61.85*** 
 (16.39) (9.01) (14.02) (17.36) (11.05) (5.85) (14.28) (12.43) (11.54) 
Observations 111,573 111,573 111,573 111,573 111,573 111,573 111,573 111,573 111,573 
Adjusted R-squared 0.33 0.32 0.41 0.28 0.35 0.33 0.41 0.30 0.44 
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Monthly Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 3.9. Omitted variables:  Economic uncertainty 
The table reports our baseline regression estimates controlling for the omitted economic uncertainty variables with firm fixed 
effects and clustered standard errors for the period 2002-2012. Our controls for economic uncertainty are the std. dev. of a firm’s 
daily returns over those of the CRSP value-weighted index in percent over the preceding 180 days, dispersion of forecasted GDP 
calculated quarterly from the survey of professional forecasters available from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank, and the 
monthly VXO implied volatility index from the CBOE. A detailed description of the variables is given in appendix 1. The 
election dummy is equal to 1 for the presidential election years. Macroeconomic determinants include: 3-month T-Bill rate and 
the Term slope. Bond-specific determinants include: Amount outstanding (Amount), Coupon, Years-to-maturity (number of 
years to the bond’s maturity), Liquidity (number of monthly transactions for each bond) and Putability (Putable dummy).  S&P 
return is the return of the S&P 500 index over the same quarter as the bond. Firm-specific accounting determinants include: Pre-
tax interest coverage dummies D1 to D3 (D4 excluded by STATA due to collinearity), Operating income to sales, Market 
leverage, and Total debt to capitalization. Eleven monthly dummies are included in the regressions to control for seasonality but 
are not tabulated. OLS t-statistics appear in the parentheses. +, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
levels, respectively, based on the traditional critical t-values. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Policy uncertainty    22.17*** 22.68*** 16.79*** 25.12*** 
    (27.22) (30.84) (22.30) (34.41) 
Ratings 12.02** 35.91*** 24.75*** 14.98*** 34.90*** 26.75*** 28.57*** 
 (3.01) (10.23) (6.99) (3.84) (9.93) (7.62) (8.36) 
Liquidity -4.35*** 0.28 -2.44*** -4.06*** 0.48 -2.30*** 0.54 
 (-7.68) (0.56) (-4.70) (-7.19) (0.96) (-4.40) (1.15) 
S&P return -14.40*** 12.61*** -14.08*** -13.98*** 14.32*** -13.73*** 7.55*** 
 (-35.88) (34.45) (-35.79) (-35.27) (40.76) (-35.41) (22.53) 
Operating income to sales -5.36*** -3.33*** -4.69*** -5.06*** -3.30*** -4.50*** -2.64*** 
 (-9.47) (-6.74) (-8.75) (-9.12) (-6.72) (-8.49) (-5.52) 
Market leverage 35.39*** 21.87*** 35.61*** 32.17*** 22.44*** 33.35*** 18.83*** 
 (31.46) (22.34) (35.51) (28.50) (23.29) (32.91) (20.76) 
Total debt capitalization -11.69*** -7.22*** -10.17*** -10.96*** -7.24*** -9.71*** -6.15*** 
 (-12.60) (-9.63) (-12.46) (-12.05) (-9.77) (-11.97) (-8.88) 
Pre-Tax coverage D1 -5.60 -4.78 -17.46*** -3.25 -5.90 -15.41** -5.57 
 (-1.07) (-1.09) (-3.61) (-0.63) (-1.37) (-3.19) (-1.39) 
Pre-Tax coverage D2 -7.36 -7.60+ -15.72*** -5.79 -8.18* -14.40** -5.95 
 (-1.44) (-1.80) (-3.36) (-1.15) (-1.98) (-3.08) (-1.55) 
Pre-Tax coverage D3 -12.19* -11.00** -16.16*** -11.58* -10.86** -15.69*** -8.28* 
 (-2.57) (-2.80) (-3.75) (-2.47) (-2.81) (-3.64) (-2.32) 
Closest treasury rate -28.27*** -12.13*** -26.40*** -18.49*** -17.74*** -19.12*** -16.64*** 
 (-25.72) (-12.37) (-25.44) (-16.54) (-19.00) (-18.17) (-18.55) 
Term Slope -0.34 -9.08*** -3.55*** -3.82*** -7.58*** -5.98*** -10.45*** 
 (-0.41) (-13.39) (-5.02) (-4.92) (-11.53) (-8.61) (-16.16) 
coupon 2.48 3.17+ 2.66 2.07 3.53+ 2.34 3.48+ 
 (1.17) (1.69) (1.36) (0.99) (1.86) (1.18) (1.91) 
Years to maturity 13.79*** 2.47* 20.36*** 15.45*** -0.05 21.51*** 1.72 
 (10.10) (2.14) (17.02) (11.12) (-0.04) (17.47) (1.58) 
Amount -7.98** -5.10* -17.54*** -12.69*** -0.97 -20.91*** -2.10 
 (-3.16) (-2.28) (-6.86) (-4.88) (-0.43) (-7.85) (-0.95) 
Dummy putable 6.29 9.98 2.08 -9.35 21.62 -9.60 15.78 
 (0.29) (0.46) (0.09) (-0.42) (1.01) (-0.42) (0.72) 
Election dummy 14.68*** 19.61*** 27.12*** 14.52*** 19.95*** 26.61*** 22.03*** 
 (9.40) (14.18) (18.80) (9.30) (14.76) (18.30) (16.78) 
Idiosyncratic risk 38.17***   37.28***   68.57*** 
 (42.71)   (42.27)   (87.89) 
VXO  74.98***     19.99*** 
  (81.22)   69.99***  (40.39) 
GDP forecast dispersion   49.04***  (83.52) 47.35*** 12.27*** 
   (68.79)   (67.74) (19.98) 
Constant 98.32*** 47.41*** 94.60*** 68.86*** 63.77*** 72.73*** 58.29*** 
 (17.02) (9.75) (17.99) (12.04) (13.49) (13.86) (13.01) 
Observations 111,573 111,573 111,573 111,573 111,573 111,573 111,573 
Adjusted R-squared 0.36 0.51 0.40 0.37 0.52 0.41 0.55 
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Monthly Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 





Table 3.10. Addressing Endogeneity using US/ Canada PUI Regression Residuals 
This table repeats our base regression model using residuals of the regression of US policy uncertainty on the Canadian policy 
uncertainty index to mitigate endogeneity concerns. A detailed description of the variables is given in appendix 1. The election 
dummy is equal to 1 for the presidential election years. Macroeconomic determinants include: 3-month T-Bill rate and the Term 
slope. Bond-specific determinants include: Amount outstanding (Amount), Coupon, Years-to-maturity (number of years to the 
bond’s maturity), Liquidity (number of monthly transactions for each bond) and Putability (Putable dummy).  S&P return is the 
return of the S&P 500 index over the same quarter as the bond. Firm-specific accounting determinants include: Pre-tax interest 
coverage dummies D1 to D3 (D4 excluded by STATA due to collinearity), Operating income to sales, Market leverage, and Total 
debt to capitalization. Eleven monthly dummies are included in the regressions to control for seasonality but are not tabulated. 
OLS t-statistics appear in the parentheses. +, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, 
based on the traditional critical t-values. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Policy uncertainty 42.68***    35.41***  34.88***  26.06***  25.04*** 
 (58.38)   (44.25)  (37.72)  (34.45)  (28.67) 
Rating     49.91*** 51.05***   23.20*** 26.11*** 
     (10.90) (11.47)   (5.42) (6.23) 
Liquidity     -4.02*** -3.63***   -5.11*** -4.73*** 
     (-5.80) (-5.27)   (-7.93) (-7.35) 
S&P return     -14.08*** -13.28***   -12.59*** -12.15*** 
     (-30.94) (-29.64)   (-28.78) (-28.04) 
Operating income to 
sales 
      -6.48*** -6.18*** -7.24*** -6.87*** 
       (-11.51) (-11.32) (-11.54) (-11.27) 
Market leverage       45.85*** 41.97*** 46.93*** 43.01*** 
       (43.39) (39.48) (38.90) (35.36) 
Total debt 
capitalization 
      -13.51*** -12.29*** -14.33*** -13.45*** 
       (-14.72) (-13.61) (-13.41) (-12.83) 
Pre-Tax coverage D1       -22.53*** -19.38*** -19.19** -16.57** 
       (-4.54) (-3.94) (-3.14) (-2.75) 
Pre-Tax coverage D2       -24.23*** -22.26*** -21.60*** -19.90*** 
       (-4.99) (-4.61) (-3.64) (-3.39) 
Pre-Tax coverage D3       -23.11*** -22.51*** -24.21*** -23.70*** 
       (-5.13) (-5.04) (-4.39) (-4.36) 
Closest bench. 
treasury 
 -42.83*** -39.03*** -22.84*** -43.53*** -26.61*** -28.05*** -17.04*** -31.93*** -20.77*** 
  (-39.02) (-34.95) (-19.55) (-33.76) (-19.92) (-26.12) (-15.15) (-26.07) (-16.40) 
Term Slope  7.46*** 10.70*** 4.12*** 9.23*** 3.05*** 6.66*** 2.13** 5.44*** 1.34 
  (9.85) (13.89) (5.95) (9.74) (3.56) (9.09) (3.16) (6.12) (1.62) 
coupon  7.01*** 6.93*** 6.66*** 2.52 1.88 5.97** 5.83** 2.18 1.72 
  (3.53) (3.49) (3.34) (1.01) (0.75) (3.15) (3.08) (0.94) (0.74) 
Years to maturity  21.30*** 21.32*** 24.13*** 25.71*** 27.46*** 16.21*** 18.70*** 20.01*** 21.77*** 
  (14.66) (14.68) (16.23) (15.57) (16.21) (11.73) (13.32) (12.70) (13.56) 
Amount  -24.44*** -25.63*** -33.59*** -19.26*** -26.05*** -21.19*** -27.39*** -15.25*** -20.45*** 
  (-10.45) (-10.92) (-13.63) (-6.38) (-8.23) (-9.63) (-11.98) (-5.33) (-6.89) 
Dummy putable  4.83 -1.33 -25.19 12.37 -11.61 0.59 -17.13 12.96 -4.39 
  (0.30) (-0.08) (-1.51) (0.57) (-0.50) (0.04) (-1.06) (0.59) (-0.19) 
Election dummy   28.37*** 27.41*** 16.28*** 16.03*** 28.08*** 27.42*** 17.80*** 17.51*** 
   (19.32) (18.76) (9.62) (9.39) (19.25) (18.95) (10.70) (10.50) 
Constant 12.85*** 139.33*** 121.34*** 74.88*** 142.61*** 93.60*** 104.96*** 71.62*** 120.02*** 86.43*** 
 (19.39) (36.84) (31.10) (18.86) (34.09) (22.07) (18.75) (12.69) (18.27) (13.27) 
Observations 156,912 156,912 156,912 156,912 106,629 106,629 156,912 156,912 106,629 106,629 
Adjusted R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.29 
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Monthly Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 








Table 3.11. Instrumental variable analysis 
This table replicates our main results reported in Table 4 using a two-stage least-squares approach with three different 
instruments, including (a) difference in the relative legislative strength of the two main parties, (b) the level of political 
polarization and (c) the interaction of the two. A detailed description of the variables is given in appendix 1. The election dummy 
is equal to 1 for the presidential election years. Macroeconomic determinants include: 3-month T-Bill rate and the Term slope. 
Bond-specific determinants include: Amount outstanding (Amount), Coupon, Years-to-maturity (number of years to the bond’s 
maturity), Liquidity (number of monthly transactions for each bond) and Putability (Putable dummy).  S&P return is the return of 
the S&P 500 index over the same quarter as the bond. Firm-specific accounting determinants include: Pre-tax interest coverage 
dummies D1 to D3 (D4 excluded by STATA due to collinearity), Operating income to sales, Market leverage, and Total debt to 
capitalization. Eleven monthly dummies are included in the regressions to control for seasonality but are not tabulated. OLS t-
statistics appear in the parentheses. +, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, based 
on the traditional critical t-values. 




Diff in rel. str 
The interaction of 
the two 
Policy uncertainty 23.35*** 43.72*** 20.39** 
 (3.69) (6.20) (3.19) 
Ratings 10.41* 12.63** 10.09* 
 (2.57) (3.24) (2.47) 
Liquidity -6.31*** -6.04*** -6.35*** 
 (-9.96) (-9.66) (-10.00) 
S&P return -13.11*** -13.20*** -13.10*** 
 (-28.71) (-29.04) (-28.59) 
Operating income to sales -6.51*** -6.06*** -6.58*** 
 (-9.47) (-8.91) (-9.52) 
Market leverage 45.82*** 42.16*** 46.35*** 
 (25.07) (22.71) (25.18) 
Total debt capitalization -12.24*** -11.45*** -12.36*** 
 (-10.89) (-10.55) (-10.93) 
Pre-Tax coverage D1 -22.94*** -21.41*** -23.16*** 
 (-3.62) (-3.47) (-3.64) 
Pre-Tax coverage D2 -23.06*** -21.88*** -23.23*** 
 (-3.77) (-3.68) (-3.78) 
Pre-Tax coverage D3 -25.80*** -24.98*** -25.92*** 
 (-4.48) (-4.47) (-4.48) 
Closest benchmark treasury rate -39.91*** -32.95*** -40.92*** 
 (-17.41) (-13.23) (-17.72) 
Term Slope -23.15*** -28.49*** -22.37*** 
 (-12.24) (-14.11) (-11.75) 
coupon 1.88 1.46 1.95 
 (0.72) (0.58) (0.74) 
Years to maturity -4.88** -3.18+ -5.13** 
 (-3.04) (-1.89) (-3.18) 
Amount 8.90* 5.39 9.42* 
 (2.35) (1.46) (2.47) 
Dummy putable 64.72** 53.07* 66.42** 
 (2.70) (2.18) (2.77) 
Election dummy 52.91*** 50.23*** 53.30*** 
 (26.45) (24.19) (26.49) 
Constant 166.43*** 146.81*** 169.28*** 
 (19.42) (16.85) (19.65) 
Observations 76,901 76,901 76,901 
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES 
Monthly Dummies YES YES YES 







Table 3.12. Cross sectional heterogeneity 
The table reports the results of the cross-sectional heterogeneity examination. Panel A reports our results for the investment 
irreversibility measures and Panel B reports our results for the dependence on government spending. A detailed description of the 
variables is given in appendix 1. In panel A, saleability, cyclicality and asset tangibility (PPE/AT) and their interactions with the 
PUI are included. DGS is the dependence on government spending, which is estimated using a Leontief approach. The election 
dummy is equal to 1 for the presidential election years. Macroeconomic determinants include: 3-month T-Bill rate and the Term 
slope. Bond-specific determinants include: Amount outstanding (Amount), Coupon, Years-to-maturity (number of years to the 
bond’s maturity), Liquidity (number of monthly transactions for each bond) and Putability (Putable dummy).  S&P return is the 
return of the S&P 500 index over the same quarter as the bond. Firm-specific accounting determinants include: Pre-tax interest 
coverage dummies D1 to D3 (D4 excluded by STATA due to collinearity), Operating income to sales, Market leverage, and Total 
debt to capitalization. Eleven monthly dummies are included in the regressions to control for seasonality but are not tabulated. 
OLS t-statistics appear in the parentheses. +, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, 
based on the traditional critical t-values. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) 
VARIABLES Panel A Panel B 
Saleability*PUI 0.01+     
 (1.90)     
Saleability  -0.00**     
 (-3.22)     
Cyclicality* PUI  14.86***    
  (12.07)    
Cyclicality   31.40***    
  (3.53)    
PPE/AT* PUI   3.13***   
   (3.75)   
PPE/AT   2.54*   
   (2.35)   
Cost Sunkness* PUI    3.93+  
    (1.69)  
Cost Sunkness    18.37***  
    (8.98)  
DGS* PUI     10.11*** 
     (5.45) 
DGS     68.93*** 
     (10.84) 
Rating 25.22*** 24.89*** 24.68*** 16.33 35.30*** 
 (3.54) (5.71) (5.82) (1.34) (3.42) 
Liquidity -3.91*** -5.02*** -5.01*** -3.99** -2.68* 
 (-3.53) (-7.75) (-7.68) (-2.60) (-2.20) 
S&P return -13.08*** -12.47*** -12.70*** -13.59*** -11.90*** 
 (-17.70) (-28.53) (-28.79) (-12.16) (-15.03) 
Operating income to sales -5.81*** -7.06*** -7.17*** -7.30*** -3.96*** 
 (-5.25) (-11.29) (-11.21) (-5.07) (-3.31) 
Market leverage 43.04*** 45.58*** 46.76*** 42.54*** 43.94*** 
 (22.88) (37.71) (38.53) (14.93) (20.49) 
Total debt capitalization -14.48*** -13.72*** -14.35*** -9.87*** -15.88*** 
 (-8.30) (-12.89) (-13.34) (-3.60) (-8.23) 
Pre-Tax coverage D1 3.99 -17.16** -20.00** -24.75+ -0.58 
 (0.45) (-2.82) (-3.26) (-1.92) (-0.06) 
Pre-Tax coverage D2 1.84 -20.71*** -22.12*** -10.30 -4.09 
 (0.22) (-3.51) (-3.74) (-0.86) (-0.49) 
Pre-Tax coverage D3 3.55 -23.94*** -24.15*** -24.08* 4.34 
 (0.47) (-4.37) (-4.41) (-2.18) (0.57) 
Closest benchmark treasury rate -33.38*** -28.80*** -32.00*** -27.84*** -48.98*** 
 (-16.49) (-23.11) (-25.76) (-9.57) (-19.61) 
Term Slope 4.40** 4.14*** 5.29*** 7.77*** 7.75*** 
 (3.27) (4.71) (5.88) (3.48) (4.49) 
coupon 1.12 2.16 2.17 13.72* -4.15 
 (0.28) (0.92) (0.93) (2.22) (-0.87) 
Years to maturity 16.70*** 20.62*** 19.71*** 18.35*** 8.81** 
 (6.65) (12.96) (12.37) (4.82) (2.91) 
Amount -10.90* -16.84*** -14.97*** -12.89* 8.12 
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 (-2.27) (-5.69) (-5.24) (-2.00) (1.34) 
Dummy putable -13.50 8.08 11.08 91.85+ -42.76 
 (-0.39) (0.36) (0.51) (1.95) (-1.34) 
Election dummy 13.98*** 17.76*** 17.75*** 32.76*** -15.18*** 
 (5.23) (10.66) (10.60) (7.94) (-4.31) 
Constant 120.43*** 94.95*** 121.00*** 109.90*** 191.06*** 
 (12.41) (12.30) (18.41) (7.52) (16.93) 
Observations 41,611 106,629 105,210 17,374 32,352 
Adjusted R-squared 0.25 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.30 
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES 
Monthly Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 




Table 3.13.  Default Probability or Market Risk Premiums 
This table studies whether policy uncertainty impacts credit spreads through its influence on firm-specific default 
probabilities or through increases in market-wide risk premiums captured through Bond-CDS spreads. Default 
probabilities are estimated using CDS data from Markit. A detailed description of the variables is given in appendix 
1. The election dummy is equal to 1 for the presidential election years. Macroeconomic determinants include: 3-
month T-Bill rate and the Term slope. Bond-specific determinants include: Amount outstanding (Amount), Coupon, 
Years-to-maturity (number of years to the bond’s maturity), Liquidity (number of monthly transactions for each 
bond) and Putability (Putable dummy).  S&P return is the return of the S&P 500 index over the same quarter as the 
bond. Firm-specific accounting determinants include: Pre-tax interest coverage dummies D1 to D3 (D4 excluded by 
STATA due to collinearity), Operating income to sales, Market leverage, and Total debt to capitalization. Eleven 
monthly dummies are included in the regressions to control for seasonality but are not tabulated. OLS t-statistics 
appear in the parentheses. +, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, 
based on the traditional critical t-values. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Default probability CDS-bond basis Default probability CDS-bond basis 
Policy uncertainty 32.50*** 34.96*** 4.20*** 18.52*** 
 (31.70) (34.86) (4.73) (16.83) 
Rating   16.76*** 20.90*** 
   (3.58) (3.66) 
Liquidity   1.71* -3.25*** 
   (2.44) (-3.91) 
S&P return   11.03*** -13.09*** 
   (26.12) (-23.70) 
Operating income to sales   -4.74*** -6.37*** 
   (-5.55) (-9.43) 
Market leverage   37.48*** 29.86*** 
   (29.55) (18.02) 
Total debt capitalization   -7.25*** -10.59*** 
   (-6.67) (-7.85) 
Pre-Tax coverage D1   -2.64 -14.91* 
   (-0.47) (-2.00) 
Pre-Tax coverage D2   -12.39* -22.64** 
   (-2.39) (-3.18) 
Pre-Tax coverage D3   -17.45*** -26.30*** 
   (-3.72) (-4.06) 
Closest benchmark treasury rate   -10.04*** -14.20*** 
   (-7.73) (-9.54) 
Term Slope   40.42*** 3.56*** 
   (44.97) (3.66) 
Coupon   -0.41 3.79 
   (-0.19) (1.24) 
Years to maturity   10.56*** 10.02*** 
   (7.37) (5.37) 
Amount   -17.63*** -16.05*** 
   (-6.95) (-4.14) 
Dummy putable   -5.35 20.57 
   (-0.38) (0.64) 
Election dummy   -4.05* 19.12*** 
   (-2.00) (10.23) 
Constant -7.40*** 11.37*** 32.02*** 71.48*** 
 (-12.02) (15.44) (5.06) (8.73) 
Observations 99,679 99,493 70,686 70,468 
Adjusted R-squared 0.14 0.25 0.40 0.37 
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Monthly Dummies YES YES YES YES 






Table 3.14. Alternative measures of policy uncertainty 
This table reports fixed effects regression estimates of the credit spreads (dependent variable) on alternative measures of policy 
uncertainty. Alternative “monetary” measures of policy uncertainty included in this table are unanticipated consumer credit, M1 
growth and unanticipated inflation. Other variables include the fiscal alternatives; namely, real GDP growth, fluctuations in terms 
of trade, government surplus/deficit, public service to GDP and government consumption to GDP.  Variables are described in 
Appendix I.  +, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, based on the traditional 
critical t-values. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Policy uncertainty 25.18*** 24.22*** 26.51*** 24.43*** 20.30*** 22.58*** 24.13*** 25.14*** 27.21*** 
 (30.32) (28.95) (31.32) (29.45) (24.87) (28.84) (28.55) (30.20) (23.24) 
Ratings 27.22*** 26.09*** 27.86*** 27.19*** 28.70*** 29.77*** 27.26*** 25.67*** 27.58*** 
 (6.54) (6.29) (6.67) (6.55) (6.84) (7.09) (6.56) (6.40) (6.79) 
Liquidity -4.53*** -4.68*** -4.55*** -4.59*** -4.53*** -4.17*** -4.56*** -4.14*** -3.61*** 
 (-7.16) (-7.46) (-7.28) (-7.31) (-7.26) (-6.88) (-7.28) (-6.83) (-6.13) 
S&P return -11.75*** -11.69*** -11.99*** -11.86*** -6.85*** -13.51*** -11.52*** -10.85*** -9.50*** 
 (-28.19) (-27.73) (-28.51) (-27.73) (-16.46) (-34.15) (-27.24) (-26.35) (-26.26) 
Operating income to sales -6.46*** -6.42*** -6.37*** -6.47*** -6.11*** -5.63*** -6.48*** -6.48*** -5.47*** 
 (-10.69) (-10.68) (-10.57) (-10.70) (-10.36) (-9.79) (-10.71) (-10.99) (-9.66) 
Market leverage 42.82*** 42.66*** 42.12*** 42.72*** 39.51*** 34.68*** 42.08*** 39.44*** 31.96*** 
 (35.48) (35.81) (35.44) (35.76) (33.33) (29.79) (35.20) (33.95) (27.96) 
Total debt capitalization -13.38*** -13.13*** -13.29*** -13.34*** -12.65*** -11.39*** -13.16*** -12.24*** -10.12*** 
 (-13.03) (-12.87) (-13.01) (-13.05) (-12.49) (-11.60) (-12.91) (-12.49) (-10.82) 
Pre-Tax coverage D1 -11.16+ -11.09+ -11.20+ -10.97+ -11.84* -13.91* -10.38+ -10.87+ -13.16* 
 (-1.89) (-1.88) (-1.89) (-1.86) (-2.03) (-2.38) (-1.76) (-1.91) (-2.39) 
Pre-Tax coverage D2 -14.71* -14.75* -14.80* -14.57* -14.92** -16.13** -14.18* -14.43** -15.58** 
 (-2.56) (-2.57) (-2.57) (-2.53) (-2.64) (-2.83) (-2.47) (-2.61) (-2.90) 
Pre-Tax coverage D3 -19.09*** -19.46*** -19.00*** -19.07*** -19.29*** -18.65*** -18.99*** -18.79*** -18.32*** 
 (-3.60) (-3.68) (-3.58) (-3.60) (-3.68) (-3.53) (-3.59) (-3.67) (-3.68) 
Closest treasury rate -21.48*** -20.29*** -23.42*** -20.89*** -18.17*** -10.55*** -21.95*** -20.33*** -13.23*** 
 (-16.51) (-16.08) (-18.48) (-16.73) (-14.77) (-8.71) (-17.69) (-17.19) (-10.89) 
Term Slope 1.74 -1.82+ 2.95** 0.96 6.31*** 4.56*** 0.90 -2.38** 3.66*** 
 (1.63) (-1.78) (3.29) (1.19) (7.33) (5.35) (1.12) (-3.09) (3.30) 
Coupon 1.85 1.77 1.90 1.82 1.64 1.27 1.87 1.60 1.24 
 (0.82) (0.79) (0.86) (0.81) (0.73) (0.58) (0.83) (0.73) (0.59) 
Years to maturity 22.04*** 22.45*** 17.46*** 21.80*** 19.12*** 11.34*** 22.14*** 21.48*** 14.57*** 
 (14.25) (14.54) (10.35) (14.00) (12.57) (7.69) (14.22) (14.39) (9.25) 
Amount -20.28*** -21.44*** -14.91*** -20.44*** -18.63*** -12.31*** -20.39*** -18.68*** -11.53*** 
 (-7.02) (-7.34) (-4.99) (-7.09) (-6.60) (-4.58) (-7.08) (-6.70) (-4.06) 
Dummy putable -10.08 -11.60 -0.27 -10.17 -7.80 -3.91 -9.40 -10.68 -7.17 
 (-0.45) (-0.52) (-0.01) (-0.46) (-0.35) (-0.18) (-0.42) (-0.48) (-0.33) 
Election dummy 16.24*** 20.40*** -0.62 16.43*** 21.15*** 25.45*** 15.72*** 18.95*** 19.49*** 
 (8.46) (11.61) (-0.20) (10.04) (12.53) (13.84) (9.68) (11.76) (6.38) 
Government surplus/ deficit 1.28        -1.51 
 (0.85)        (-1.07) 
Government consumption to 
GDP 
 5.32***       2.69** 
  (4.15)       (2.72) 
Public service to GDP   -11.70***      -6.32*** 
   (-6.01)      (-4.73) 
M1 growth    2.12***     0.41 
    (5.71)     (1.28) 
Fluctuations in terms of trade     18.56***    19.40*** 
     (25.64)    (28.62) 
Real GDP growth      30.61***   24.27*** 
      (36.97)   (38.71) 
Unanticipated inflation       -6.78***  -8.80*** 
       (-23.94)  (-31.61) 
Unanticipated consumer credit        -18.57*** -15.72*** 
        (-40.01) (-39.96) 
Constant 84.16*** 79.90*** 91.89*** 81.91*** 75.88*** 56.99*** 84.91*** 89.49*** 75.67*** 
 (12.86) (12.57) (14.42) (12.85) (12.04) (9.05) (13.37) (14.63) (12.40) 
Observations 111,573 111,573 111,573 111,573 111,573 111,573 111,573 111,573 111,573 
Adjusted R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.34 0.29 0.31 0.37 
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Monthly Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 4.1. Credit-rating changes by year for eight samples 
This table reports the descriptive statistics in two panels for eight clean samples. Panel A reports the number of 
credit-rating changes (N. Chg), average  change in notches (Mean Chg.) and relative percentage share of the credit 
rating changes (% of Sample) for firms for which S&P reported a downgrade or upgrade over the period of 2002-
2012.  Panels A1 and A2 report results for the universe of downgraded and upgraded firms while panels A3 and A4 
report results for the financially downgraded and upgraded firms, respectively. Panel B reports similar information 
for downgrades and upgrades based on the implied changes in the distance-to-default obtained by using our KMV-
like DTD model.  A financially downgraded or upgraded firm is one whose rating change is for firms that received 
high-yield loans (HYL) with interest expenses of over 200 bps above the Libor rate. The size of a credit-rating 
downgrade is -1, for example, if an issuer is downgraded from an A- to a BBB+ rating, and is -2 if the downgrade is 
from an A- to a BBB rating.  
Panel A: S&P credit-rating changes 



























2002 58 -6.8 7.54 17 6 2.82 12 -5.6 8.39 6 3.8 4.48 
2003 50 -8.1 6.50 27 4.7 4.49 15 -9 10.49 8 9.8 5.97 
2004 41 -6.4 5.33 31 7.4 5.15 8 -9 5.59 13 9 9.70 
2005 53 -6.9 6.89 37 8.1 6.15 9 -14.8 6.29 9 8 6.72 
2006 44 -6.6 5.72 48 7 7.97 8 -9.5 5.59 5 3.3 3.73 
2007 65 -6.4 8.45 57 5.6 9.47 9 -7.4 6.29 7 11.3 5.22 
2008 68 -6 8.84 44 5 7.31 18 -6.2 12.59 4 3 2.99 
2009 126 -7.5 16.38 42 8.9 6.98 16 -11.3 11.19 12 4.1 8.96 
2010 45 -5.8 5.85 97 7.6 16.11 11 -4.7 7.69 23 13 17.16 
2011 49 -5.8 6.37 107 6.7 17.77 21 -4.2 14.69 24 6.6 17.91 
2012 68 -6.6 8.84 95 4.5 15.78 16 -7.7 11.19 23 4.7 17.16 
N. 667 602 143 134 
 
 
Panel B: Model-implied credit-rating changes 
























Sample  Year 
2002 38 -4.8 3.28 25 5.6 3.92 4 -3.3 1.52 6 4.4 1.07 
2003 170 -6.7 14.93 88 6.3 7.94 4 -1 1.53 34 5.8 6.09 
2004 84 -7.6 7.37 119 7.1 10.74 7 -3.2 2.72 22 10.5 3.94 
2005 393 -7.2 34.50 353 7.5 31.86 28 -5.3 10.89 134 7.3 24.01 
2006 119 -6.5 10.45 162 6.1 14.62 27 -6.8 10.51 66 6.3 11.83 
2007 64 -9.1 5.62 102 6.4 9.21 10 -5.3 3.89 41 9.1 7.35 
2008 68 -10.9 5.97 92 6.5 8.30 14 -5.8 5.45 36 13.2 6.45 
2009 60 -15.2 5.27 22 8 1.99 17 -14.9 6.61 42 14.5 7.53 
2010 56 -14.7 4.92 47 8.6 4.24 35 -5.3 13.62 37 8.8 6.63 
2011 50 -8.7 4.39 74 9 6.68 58 -5.1 22.57 47 6.7 8.42 
2012 58 -14.9 5.09 43 11.8 3.88 60 -6.5 23.35 97 8.1 17.38 




Table 4.2. Number of firms in various notch-change credit-rating categories 
This table reports the number of firms in various notch-change credit-rating categories for our eight samples based 
on the credit-rating after the change. Panel A reports the number of credit-rating upgrades (N. Chg) for each 
category of number of notches (N. Notch) changed by S&P and implied by our KMV-like DTD model. Panel B 
reports the same information for credit-rating upgrades. A financially (fin.) downgraded or upgraded firm has high-
yield loans (HYL) with interest expenses of over 200 bps above the Libor rate. The size of a credit-rating downgrade 
is -1, for example, if an issuer is downgraded from an A to A- rating, and is -2 if the downgrade is from an A to a 
BBB+ rating.  
S&P 
Panel A: Rating Downgrades 
S&P 
Panel B: Rating Upgrades 
N.  
Notch 
By S&P Using DTD 
N. 
Notch 
By S&P Using DTD 
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Table 4.3. Two financial-performance ratios for the firms in the HYL sample around their 
loan deals 
This table reports the ratios of cash flows to interest expenses and book value of debt to total capital for the 
downgraded sample of firms with high-yield loan (HYL) originations for the prior year (t=-1) and  year of the HYL 
deal (t=0) for various credit-rating categories. Cash flow is measured using Earnings before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation and Amortization. IG and SPEC refer to “investment grade” and “speculative grade” credit-rating 
categories, respectively. A (i.e., AAA, AA & A), B (i.e., BBB, BB & B), C (CCC, CC & C) and D (Default) refer to 
S&P credit-rating categories. “All” refers to the undifferentiated total sample of credit-rating downgrades by S&P. 
 
 
    EBITDA / Interest Expenses Book value of debt/ Total Capital 
Rating Class Statistic  Pre (𝒕−𝟏) Post (𝒕𝟎) Pre (𝒕−𝟏) Post (𝒕𝟎) 
IG 
Median 7.56% 3.35% 0.47 0.59 
Mean 13.24% 9.50% 0.52 0.42 
SPEC 
Median 2.42% 1.75% 0.53 0.70 
Mean 6.03% 3.51% 0.72 0.71 
A 
Median 37.82% 16.56% 0.37 0.29 





3.37% 0.49 0.60 
Mean 8.61% 3.40% 0.51 0.67 
C 
Median 1.66% 0.73% 0.57 0.95 
Mean 1.97% 0.11% 1.06 0.97 
D 
Median 1.01% 0.49% 0.79 0.99 
Mean 2.72% 1.39% 0.92 0.67 
All HYL 
Median 3.43% 2.39% 0.61 0.68 
Mean 5.17% 2.41% 0.67 0.70 
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Table 4.4. Potential contributors to the financial credit deterioration costs of credit-rating 
downgrades by S&P 
This table provides the relative contributions to the costs of credit-rating deteriorations (CCRD) of issuers from 
three potential sources for the downgraded HYL sample for two categories (investment grade or IG and speculative 
or SPEC), the specific credit-rating classes of A, B, C and D, and the undifferentiated sample of credit-rating 
downgrades (All). IG includes issuers with bond ratings of BBB or higher, and SPEC includes issuers with 
speculative bond ratings of BB to D inclusive. Based on Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994), the potential 
sources of CCRD are industry, leverage or issuer (non-leverage) performances. The contribution to CCRD due to 
each factor is calculated as the cash shortfall due to that factor divided by the sum of the cash shortfall due to all the 
factors. As in Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) and Andrade and Kaplan (1998), the cash shortfall due to 
industry performance is the ratio of EBITDA to Interest Expense if the issuer maintained the same performance as 
its industry median for the event year and its industry median ratio of EBITDA to Sales for the year before the 
credit-rating downgrade. The cash shortfall due to the issuer performance effect is measured by calculating the 
changes in the issuer’s cash flows if the issuer had the same ratio of EBITDA to Sales as during the event year (t=0). 
The cash shortfall due to the leverage effect is the change in its cash flows if the ratio of EBITDA to Interest 
Expenses remained unchanged from its value one year before the event year (t=-1). 
  
    Portion of CCRD due to 
Credit Rating Class Statistic Industry performance Leverage Issuer performance 
IG 
Median 5.12% 30.41% 52.27% 
Mean 32.95% 16.82% 36.74% 
SPEC 
Median 1.35% 69.37% 33.72% 
Mean -2.83% 66.67% 29.05% 
A 
Median 49.83% 28.65% -18.25% 
Mean 50.72% -10.91% -84.80% 
B 
Median -3.00% 63.65% 39.41% 
Mean -3.48% 65.83% 33.42% 
C 
Median 0.57% 55.82% 43.90% 
Mean 16.08% 60.68% 23.95% 
D 
Median 1.80% 55.05% 40.98% 
Mean -1.14% 46.75% 39.23% 
All  
Median -1.77% 58.36% 29.43% 
Mean 1.09% 64.61% 35.75% 
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Table 4.5. Estimates of changes in capital values associated with S&P credit-rating changes 
This table reports estimates of the changes in firm value associated with credit-rating changes (∆CR) by S&P from 2002 to 2012 for two samples: total sample 
(All) of downgraded and upgraded firms in panels A and B, respectively; and a sample of HYL downgraded and upgraded firms in panels C and D, respectively. 
The HYL sample includes firms that received high yield loans with interest expenses of over 200 bps above the Libor rate and consequently were downgraded or 
upgraded. The total capital value (𝑇𝐶𝑉in millions of dollars), costs or benefits in % of the credit-rating value change (CCRD or BCRU), and the normalized 
(norm.) cost or benefit from the credit-rating change are reported in the panels. CCRD and BCRU are market-adjusted (𝑀-𝑎𝑑𝑗.  )  and industry-adjusted 
(𝐼𝑛𝑑-𝑎𝑑𝑗. ) for the year of the credit-rating change and for the following year. t = -1, 0 and 1 refer to the year prior to, the year of, and year after the credit-rating 
change, respectively. N is the number of observations. Each market-adjusted value for CCRD and BCRU is given by (𝑇𝐶𝑉−1 − 𝑀-𝑎𝑑𝑗.  𝑇𝐶𝑉𝑡) 𝑇𝐶𝑉−1⁄ . The 
market-adjusted TCV (𝑀-𝑎𝑑𝑗.  𝑇𝐶𝑉𝑡) is calculated by first discounting 𝑇𝐶𝑉 to year t = -1 from t = 0 and from t = 1 by the corresponding CRSP value-weighted 
index consisting of all NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX listed stocks for each year. Each industry-adjusted value is calculated by discounting 𝑇𝐶𝑉 by the return on 
an equally weighted portfolio from the stocks in the same SIC industry category.  Normalized CCRD and BCRU are obtained by dividing their respective values 
at t=0, 1 by the weighted-average numbers of notches of the CR change in each category. The Student’s t test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U test are used to 
examine the significance of the mean and median, respectively.  *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.   
Panel A: All sample of firms downgraded by S&P 
Sample N Stat 
Total capital value % CCRD, t=-1 to  % Norm. CCRD, t=-1 to 
Pre-∆CR 
t=-1 
M-adj. Ind-adj. M-adj. Ind-adj. M-adj. Ind-adj. 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
IG 251 
Median 4361 4091 4054 4193 4457 -6.2 -7.2* -3.6** 2.3* -4.1 -5.9* -3** 1.9* 
Mean 15372 14008 14586 14729 16364 -8.9 -5.1 -4.3*** 6.5*** -7.3 -4.2 -3.5*** 5.3*** 
SPEC 350 
Median 854 777 721 806 709 -9.6** -14.8*** -7.7* -16.7*** -6.5** -9.1*** -4.7* -10.2*** 
Mean 3694 3315 2240 3600 3338 -10.7* -39.4* -2.9 -9.5 -6.6* -24.2* -1.8 -5.8 
A 51 
Median 7173 7089 7331 7526 7419 -1.2 2.3 4.9*** 3.3** -1 2 4.2*** 2.8** 
Mean 26227 28018 25371 27202 26897 6.8 -3.3 3.7 2.5 5.8 -2.8 3.1 2.1 
B 501 
Median 1869 1683 1712 1743 1697 -10.2 -8.5*** -6.3 -9.2 -7.9 -6.6*** -4.9 -7.1 
Mean 6696 5793 7035 5690 5981 -13.4 4.9* -15.1*** -10.6** -10.4 3.8* -11.7*** -8.2** 
C 49 
Median 371 289 309 311 317 -19.5*** -15.6*** -16.3*** -13.3*** -10.2*** -8.1*** -8.5*** -6.9*** 
Mean 1255 1075 1092 1165 727 -14.7* -13.1** -6.9* -42.9 -7.7* -6.8** -3.6* -22.4 
Default 66 
Median 429 330 285 354 363 -27.1*** -35.8*** -20.5*** -17.6*** -5.2*** -6.9*** -3.9*** -3.4*** 
Mean 875 646 479 593 655 -26.1* -45.3*** -34.4* -26.5*** -5* -8.7*** -6.6* -5.1*** 
All 667 
Median 1514 1338 1266 1360 1325 -11.6*** -16.2*** -10.9** -13.6** -6.8*** -9.5*** -6.4** -7.9*** 






Panel B: All sample of firms upgraded by S&P 
Sample N Stat 
Total capital value % BCRU, t=-1 to % Norm. BCRU, t=-1 to  
Pre-∆CR 
t=-1 
M-adj. Ind-adj. M-adj. Ind-adj. M-adj. Ind-adj. 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
IG 253 
Median 4297 4514 4434 4576 4817 4.6 3.2 6.1* 12.0*** 3.1 2.2 4.1* 8.1*** 
Mean 10014 10451 10472 11547 10236 4.2*** 4.6*** 15.3*** 2.1*** 2.8*** 3.1*** 10.3*** 1.4*** 
SPEC 349 
Median 912 971 881 948 968 5.2 -2.5 4.6** 6.1* 4.2 -2 3.7** 5* 
Mean 2532 2824 2447 2621 2734 11.6 -3.7 3.1* 7.2* 9.4 -3 2.5* 5.9* 
A 86 
Median 6625 7479 7161 7330 7532 12.9 7.8 10.5** 13.4* 7.4 4.5 6** 7.7* 
Mean 16776 18240 18116 18627 19197 8.7** 7.9*** 11.0*** 14.4*** 5** 4.5*** 6.3*** 8.3*** 
B 510 
Median 1483 1522 1459 1599 1599 3.3 -2.1 7.4** 6.8** 2 -1.3 4.6** 4.2** 
Mean 4227 4507 4371 4454 4564 6.4* 3.6* 5.5*** 7.6*** 4* 2.2* 3.4*** 4.7*** 
C 6 
Median 254 254 263 278 252 2.4 -3.1 2.6 -6.9 2.1 -2.8 2.3 -6.2 
Mean 1562 1618 1515 1335 1422 2.5 -3.3 -14.6 -8.9 2.2 -3 -13.1 -8 
All 602 
Median 1749 1837 1894 1925 1945 5.0* 8.7* 9.3** 10.6** 3* 5.3* 5.6** 6.4** 
Mean 5946 6257 6578 7054 6624 4.9*** 10.7*** 18.4*** 11.2*** 3*** 6.5*** 11.2*** 6.8*** 
 
Panel C: HYL sample of firms downgraded by S&P 
Sample N Stat 
Total capital value % CCRD, t=-1 to % Norm. CCRD, t=-1 to 
Pre-∆CR 
t=-1 
M-adj. Ind-adj. M-adj. Ind-adj. M-adj. Ind-adj. 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
IG 11 
Median 3670 3466 3377 3582 3416 -5.7 -8.8 -4.30* -7.2 -7.1 -6.2 -3* -5.1 
Mean 5183 4877 4685 5227 4614 -6.1 -9.8 2.2 -10.4 -4.3 -6.9 1.5 -7.3 
SPEC 112 
Median 691 502 508 549 559 -23.00** -25.00** -17.70* -19.10* -14.8** -16.1** -11.4* -12.3* 
Mean 3371 2963 3000 2632 4075 -11.80** -11.60* -22.8 21 -7.6** -7.5* -14.7 13.5 
A 4 
Median 19954 19287 19103 18880 19643 -3 -4.2 -6.01 -2.2 -1.5 -2.1 -3 -1.1 
Mean 19843 20503 18714 18754 18991 4.04 -6.7 -4.8 -2.8 2 -3.4 -2.4 -1.4 
B 107 
Median 835 786 780 787 797 -10.80** -13.2 -8.90* -9.3 -9.5** -11.6 -7.8* -8.2 
Mean 3977 3754 3567 3858 3581 -5.1 -9.80* -2.5 -9.7 -4.5 -8.6* -2.2 -8.5 
C 12 
Median 479 368 382 369 379 -22.80*** -19.30* -24.00* -20.03 -10.9*** -9.3* -11.5* -9.6 
Mean 984 642 770 740 1116 -36.50* -22.30** -22.80* 15.4 -17.5* -10.7** -10.9* 7.4 
Default 20 
Median 333 222 205 259 238 -33.20*** -39.10*** -22.90** -29.90* -6.3*** -7.4*** -4.3** -5.6* 
Mean 382 219 237 259 290 -43.20** -37.80** -32.00* -23.00* -8.2** -7.1** -6* -4.3 
All 143 
Median 629 507 493 539 517 -19.60** -21.50*** -15.60* -18.4 -10.7** -11.8*** -8.5* -10.1 





Panel D: HYL sample of firms upgraded by S&P 
Sample N Stat 
Total capital value % BCRU, t=-1 to % Norm. BCRU, t=-1 to 
Pre-∆CR 
t=-1 
M-adj. Ind-adj. M-adj. Ind-adj. M-adj. Ind-adj. 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
IG 36 
Median 3441 3641 3653 3685 3599 5.60* 6.40* 6.7 4.3 1.4* 1.6* 1.7 1.1* 
Mean 12507 13458 12579 13579 15409 7.6 0.5 8.50* 23.1 1.9 0.1 2.1* 5.7 
SPEC 98 
Median 872 906 849 907 890 4.9 -2.3 4.7 3.2 2.7 -1.3 2.6 1.8 
Mean 2067 2214 2042 2101 2168 6.4 -1.7 2 4.32 3.5 -0.9 1.1 2.4 
A 4 
Median 4126 4441 4591 4589 4539 7.5 10.90* 11.40** 9.80* 1.1 1.6* 1.7** 1.5* 
Mean 21872 24192 24792 27027 24409 10.60* 13.3 23.60* 11.6 1.6* 2 3.5* 1.7 
B 126 
Median 1071 1045 1133 1123 1091 -3.3 5.22 4.80* 2.3 -1.8 2.9 2.6* 1.3 
Mean 3796 3964 4027 3930 3957 4.3 5.9 3.30* 4.10* 2.4 3.2 1.8* 2.2* 
C 4 
Median 401 359 327 382 382 -10.1 -16.2 -8.07 -6.3 -5.1 -8.1 -4 -3.2 
Mean 987 826 898 921 963 -15.6 -9.2 -6.5 -3.3 -7.8 -4.6 -3.3 -1.7 
All 134 
Median 1164 1205 1137 1233 1247 4.3 -2.09 5.00* 6.31* 2.2 -1.1 2.5* 3.2* 




Table 4.6. Determinants of the costs (benefits) to firm value of credit downgrades and 
upgrades 
This table reports the OLS regression results for a set of firm-specific variables on the costs (benefits) of credit-
rating deteriorations (improvements) for samples of downgraded and upgraded firms whose credit-rating changes 
are primarily attributed to economic factors (Economic) and to financial factors (Financial) where the Economic 
samples consist of firms with high-yield loans (HYL). These variables are mostly selected from Parsons and Titman 
(2009) that have been identified as determinants of corporate capital structure. The list also includes the magnitude 
of credit rating changes (first determinant), which is measured by the number of notches of credit-rating change in 
response to a credit event (i.e., S&P downgrade or upgrade).  All estimations account for clustered standard errors 
across time.  Variable construction and definitions are explained in Appendix B: variable description. +, *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
  Downgraded Samples Upgraded Samples 
  Economic Financial Economic Financial 
Credit Rating Changes 6.41*** 10.41*** 2.23*** 5.8*** 
  (8.34) (9.34) (4.22) (8.82) 
Market Leverage 5.37*** 6.37*** 5.67*** 4.61*** 
  (8.23) (7.23) 4.81 (12.17) 
Market to Book 11.80*** 9.8*** 5.76 5.06*** 
  (5.43) (9.43) (1.28) (9.64) 
Log (Sales)  6.72+ 4.72 3.30+ 7.49 
  (1.66) (0.34) (1.77) (0.19) 
CF Volatility 9.22*** 14.22** 3.01** 6.8*** 
  (3.69) (2.69) (2.65) (6.42) 
Profitability -5.63 -1.63 -9.08 -4.03 
  (-0.2) (-1.2) (-1.19) (-0.10) 
Tangibility -2.56* -1.56* -4.77** -0.08* 
  (-1.75) (-2.25) (-2.69) (-1.75) 
Dividend Payer 5.54* 8.54+ 1.83* 3.97 
  (1.49) (1.50) (-2.25) (1.5) 
Tax rate -0.06 0.94 -4.06 3.21 
  (-0.86) (1.14) (-0.96) (-0.21) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -10.9** -6.9 -13.9*** -3.54 
  (-3.01) (-1.01) (-4.01) (-0.44) 
Inflation Rate -4.68+ -5.68* -9.68 -7.35 
  (1.77) (-1.82) (-0.23) (-0.04) 
GDP growth 5.01 8.01 1.01 0.28+ 
  (0.03) (0.42) (0.97) (1.70) 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Clustered SE YES YES YES YES 
Adj-R2 0.39 0.43 0.19 0.29 





Table 4.7. Event study results 
This table reports the event study results for credit-rating downgrades in the left panel and for credit-rating upgrades 
in the right panel. The event window starts from 12 quarters before the event (either upgrade or downgrade) and 
ends 12 quarters after the event. The first column in each panel indicates the event date. The average control-
adjusted returns (ACAR) are reported in the second and fourth columns of each panel for the sample with all credit-
rating changes and the sample with all credit-rating changes of more than one notch. Their respective cumulated 
values (CACAR) are reported in the third and fifth columns of each panel. The number of notches associated with 
each credit-rating upgrade or downgrade is denoted by x so that x>0 includes all credit-rating upgrades or 
downgrades in respectively the left and right panels, while x>1 only includes the credit-rating upgrades or 
downgrades of more than one notch downgrades respectively in the left and right panels. The control or benchmark 
used is a propensity-score matched sample that has no high yield loans. T-values are reported in the parentheses 
based on standard errors that are robust to time clustering. +, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 
0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively.  
Left Panel: Downgrades   Right Panel: Upgrades   
Relative  ACAR CACAR ACAR CACAR Relative  ACAR CACAR ACAR CACAR 
Time x>0 x>0 x>1 x>1 Time x>0 x>0 x>1 x>1 
-12 -0.040 -0.040 -0.090 -0.090 -12 -0.030 -0.030 -0.070 -0.070 
-11 0.030 -0.010 -0.010 -0.100 -11 0.021 -0.009 0.011* -0.070 
-10 -0.009 -0.019 -0.099 -0.199* -10 -0.010 -0.019 -0.050* -0.120 
-9 0.022* 0.003 0.042 -0.157* -9 0.036** 0.017** 0.016* -0.120 
-8 0.006 0.009 0.036* -0.121* -8 0.003 0.020 0.013** -0.107 
-7 -0.015** -0.006* 0.015 -0.106 -7 -0.010 0.010 0.040 -0.067 
-6 0.030 0.024 0.020 -0.086 -6 0.001 0.011 0.031 -0.036 
-5 -0.030 -0.006 0.000 -0.086 -5 -0.002* 0.009 0.038 0.002 
-4 0.013* 0.007 0.023 -0.063 -4 0.013* 0.022* -0.027 -0.025 
-3 0.002 0.009 -0.058* -0.120* -3 -0.006 0.016 0.014 -0.011 
-2 -0.007** 0.002* -0.057* -0.178** -2 0.007 0.023 0.017 0.006 
-1 -0.027 -0.024 0.003 -0.174 -1 -0.027 -0.004 0.023* 0.029 
0 -0.055*** -0.079*** -0.075*** -0.249*** 0 0.032** 0.028** 0.072*** 0.101*** 
1 0.002 -0.077*** -0.018* -0.267*** 1 0.002** 0.03*** -0.008 0.093** 
2 -0.017** -0.094*** -0.127* -0.394*** 2 0.0170 0.047*** 0.057** 0.150*** 
3 -0.010 -0.104*** 0.000 -0.394*** 3 -0.010 0.037** 0.010* 0.160*** 
4 -0.011 -0.115*** -0.011 -0.405*** 4 -0.011 0.026** -0.001 0.159*** 
5 0.010 -0.105** 0.030 -0.375*** 5 0.010* 0.036** 0.050 0.209*** 
6 -0.025* -0.130*** -0.135 -0.510*** 6 0.012 0.048** -0.018 0.191*** 
7 -0.020 -0.150*** -0.030* -0.540*** 7 -0.015 0.033* -0.035 0.156*** 
8 0.010 -0.140*** -0.050 -0.590*** 8 0.009 0.042** 0.009* 0.165*** 
9 0.010 -0.130*** 0.000 -0.590*** 9 0.012* 0.054*** 0.022 0.187*** 
10 0.000 -0.130*** -0.030 -0.620*** 10 -0.009 0.045*** -0.009 0.178*** 
11 0.002 -0.128*** -0.108 -0.728*** 11 0.002 0.047*** -0.018 0.160*** 
12 0.010 -0.118*** -0.110 -0.838*** 12 0.095 0.142*** 0.105 0.265*** 




Table 4.8. Determinants of the costs to firm value after credit-rating downgrades  
Regression results are reported in this table for the determinants of the costs of credit-rating downgrades. The 
dependent variable is the cumulative cost to firm value over the first eight quarters after a credit-rating downgrade. 
Determinants are drawn primarily from those identified in the capital structure literature. See Appendix B for their 
definitions and construction. The number of notches associated with each credit-rating downgrade is denoted by x so 
that x>0 includes all credit-rating downgrades while x>1 only includes the credit-rating downgrades of more than 
one notch. The control or benchmark used to calculate the costs of credit-rating downgrades is a propensity-score 
matched sample that has no high yield loans. The included industry fixed effect is based on the first two digits of a 
company’s SIC code. T-values are reported in the parentheses based on standard errors that are robust to time 
clustering.  +, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively.  
 
  
 Financial Economic 
  x>0 x>1 x>0 x>1 
     
Credit Rating Changes 6.41*** 5.58*** 1.58*** 2.92*** 
  (4.34) (4.31) (7.65) (4.31) 
Market Leverage 4.37*** 4.57** -0.76*** -0.75 
  (5.23) (4.69) (4.02) (1.36) 
Market to Book 5.70*** 7.03*** 4.36*** 3.7*** 
  (15.66) (15.66) (14.32) (14.32) 
Log (Sales)  -4.72 -6.72+ -11.38* -6.72 
  (0.45) (-1.78) (2.21) (-0.78) 
CF Volatility 4.22 2.22 2.88 4.22* 
  (0.69) (1.35) (-1.31) (-1.97) 
Profitability -7.63 -6.29*** -8.29*** -7.63*** 
  (-1.20) (-3.86) (-3.86) (-3.86) 
Tangibility -4.56 -7.89 -7.22*** -6.56*** 
  (-0.75) (-0.75) (-4.08) (-6.08) 
Dividend Payer 3.54 1.54 -0.87 0.20* 
  (1.51) (-0.84) (-0.01) (-1.84) 
Tax rate -2.06 -4.72** -2.06*** 0.6*** 
  (1.14) (-3.14) (-6.47) (-4.47) 
Idio. Volatility 5.9* 4.56* 3.23* 3.23+ 
  (2.06) (2.06) (2.06) (-1.94) 
Inflation Rate 0.32 -0.20 -0.24 1.02 
  1.51 (-1.04) 1.09 0.43 
GDP growth 2.01 0.76 0.68 0.23 
  1.03 1.23 0.01 1.42 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Clustered SE YES YES YES YES 
Adj-R2 0.32 0.35 0.21 0.22 
z 
N. Observations 1280 398 5980 1844 
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Table 4.9. Determinants of the benefits to firm value after credit-rating improvements 
Regression results are reported in this table for the determinants of the benefits of credit-rating upgrades. The 
dependent variable is the cumulative benefit to firm value over the first eight quarters after a credit-rating upgrade. 
Determinants are drawn primarily from those identified in the capital structure literature. See Appendix B for their 
definitions and construction. The number of notches associated with each credit-rating upgrade is denoted by x so 
that x>0 includes all credit-rating upgrades while x>1 only includes the credit-rating upgrades of more than one 
notch. The control or benchmark used to calculate the costs of credit-rating upgrades is a propensity-score matched 
sample that has no high yield loans. The included industry fixed effect is based on the first two digits of a 
company’s SIC code. T-values are reported in the parentheses based on standard errors that are robust to time 
clustering.  +, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively.  
  Financial Economic 
  x>0 x>1 x>0 x>1 
          
Credit Ratings 0.96 2.89* 0.03 0.26* 
 (0.11) (2.44) (0.32) (-2.33) 
Market Leverage 0.02* 0.17 0.40** 1.77*** 
  (2.30) (0.07) (2.71) (9.51) 
Market to Book 0.14** 0.93** 0.28*** -0.13 
  (2.78) (2.87) (2.67) (-1.02) 
Log (Sales)  0.08* 2.23* 0.17** 0.09 
  (2.24) (1.14) (2.47) (1.37) 
CF Volatility -0.53 -0.97 -0.27 0.32 
  (-0.15) (-0.94) (-1.74) (0.76) 
Profitability 0.31* 1.14** 0.11** 0.01* 
  (2.14) (3.42) (2.93) (2.32) 
Tangibility -0.06 -1.59 -0.25* -0.02 
  (-0.51) (-1.57) (-2.53) (-0.25) 
Dividend Payer -0.14* -0.09 0.05 0.71* 
  (-2.41) (-0.18) (0.23) (1.96) 
Tax rate 0.07+ 1.06+ 0.44 0.09 
  (-1.87) (-1.79) (0.11) (0.81) 
Idio. Volatility 0.03 -0.26 -1.08** -0.32 
  -0.82 (-1.06) (-2.62) (-0.91) 
Inflation Rate -0.02 -1.77 -0.02 0.05 
  (-0.30) (-1.05) (-0.29) (0.65) 
GDP growth 0.76** 1.55+ 0.25* 0.21+ 
  (2.77) (1.68) (2.41) (1.62) 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Clustered SE YES YES YES YES 
Adj-R2 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.12 
N. Observations 1200 330 5398 1030 
N. Observations 1200 330 5398 1030 
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Table 4.10. Estimates of changes in capital values associated with implied credit-rating changes 
This table reports estimates of the changes in capital values associated with credit-rating changes from 2002 to 2012 
implied by our structural distance-to-default model for two samples: total sample (All) of downgraded and upgraded 
firms in panels A and B, respectively; and a sample of "financially" downgraded and upgraded firms (the HYL 
sample) in panels C and D. The HYL sample includes firms that received high yield loans with interest expenses of 
over 200 bps above the Libor rate and consequently were downgraded or upgraded. Panels report the total capital 
value (𝑇𝐶𝑉in millions of dollars), costs or benefits in % of the credit-rating change (CCRD or BCRU), and the 
average cost or benefit from the credit-rating change. CCRD and BCRU are market-adjusted ( 𝑀-𝑎𝑑𝑗.  )  and 
industry-adjusted (𝐼𝑛𝑑 − 𝑎𝑑𝑗. ) for the year of the credit-rating change and for the following year. t = -1, 0 and 1 
refer to the year prior to, the year of, and year after the credit-rating change, respectively. N is the number of 
observations. Each market-adjusted value for CCRD and BCRU is (𝑇𝐶𝑉−1 − 𝑀-𝑎𝑑𝑗.  𝑇𝐶𝑉𝑡) 𝑇𝐶𝑉−1⁄ . The market 
adjusted TCV (𝑀-𝑎𝑑𝑗.  𝑇𝐶𝑉𝑡) is calculated by first discounting 𝑇𝐶𝑉 to year t = -1 from t = 0 and t = 1 by the 
corresponding CRSP value-weighted index consisting of all NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX listed stocks for each 
year. Similarly, each industry-adjusted value is calculated by discounting 𝑇𝐶𝑉 by the return of an equally weighted 
portfolio of the stocks in the same SIC industry category.  The Student’s t test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U 
test are used to examine the significance of the mean and median, respectively.  *, ** and *** indicate significance 
at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.   
Panel A: All sample of implied firm downgrades 




Total capital value (million $) %CCRD from t=-1 to  
M-adj. Ind-adj. M-adj. Ind-adj. 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
IG 504 
Median 2456 2409 2383 2389 2449 -2.2 -3.6 -3.6 -1.3 
Mean 10651 10161 11037 9943 10885 -4.9 3.7 -6.4 2.3 
SPEC 656 
Median 762 730 705 746 736 -4.4*** -7.6 -5.3* -6.1 
Mean 2584 2705 1927 2476 2430 5.3 -26.6* -4.6 -6.9 
A 109 
Median 6951 7371 6822 6851 6742 5.6 -1.7 -1.1 -3.4 
Mean 15208 14948 14776 14983 14720 -1.9 -2.7 -1.5 -3.4 
B 847 
Median 1632 1725 1751 1603 1603 4.5* 5.9 -3.4 -1.0 
Mean 1995 1991 2056 2058 1706 0.6 3.3 3.0 -13.4 
C 123 
Median 459 370 391 374 372 -14.9* -15.2* -12.8** -17.3* 
Mean 1412 1443 987 1342 1192 4.3 -31.9 -5.3* -14.1 
Default 81 
Median 365 344 288 307 337 -10.4** -16.9** -8.1*** -6.4* 
Mean 735 710 499 731 553 -5.6* -29.2* -4.3 -23.2 
All 1160 
Median 1499 1414 1409 1405 1406 -4.3** -7.1* -5.0* -6.3 




Panel B: All sample of implied firm upgrades 
Sample N Stat 
Pre-Credit 
Chg. t=-1 
Total capital value (million $) % BCRU from t=-1 to  
M-adj. Ind-adj. M-adj. Ind-adj. 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
IG 162 
Median 3702 3680 3715 3753 3795 -0.4 0.5 1.5* 2.1* 
Mean 12589 12446 12276 13198 13034 -1.1** -2.3* 4.7* 3.3 
SPEC 965 
Median 1025 1077 1037 1060 1014 2.1* -1.5 3.2 0.3 
Mean 5004 4931 4878 4701 5084 -1.4 -2.3 -6.6 1.1 
A 40 
Median 8571 8963 8840 8807 9205 4.6* 3.3** 3.1 7.2 
Mean 15447 16858 15209 16282 16584 9.3** -1.7* 5.2** 7.2* 
B 793 
Median 2630 2715 2702 2704 2602 2.3 3.1 3.1* -0.4 
Mean 6549 5072 5677 7408 6134 -22.7* -13.3 12.8** -6.8 
C 294 
Median 631 623 681 586 710 2.9 5.3 -10.4 7.6 
Mean 1428 1330 1525 1036 1295 -7.2 4.9 -28.3 -10.2 
All 1127 
Median 1946 1986 1961 1980 1896 1.1 0.2 2.0* -2.5 
Mean 5022 4859 5106 5185 5193 -3.8 2.1*** 3.4* 3.9 
 
Panel C: HYL sample of implied firm downgrades 
Sample N Stat 
Pre-Credit 
Chg. t=-1 
Total capital value (million $) % CCRD from t=-1 to 
M-adj. Ind-adj. M-adj. Ind-adj. 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
IG 31 
Median 2138 2020 2204 2193 2096 -5.3 2.1 3.0 -1.5 
Mean 4961 3936 5129 4812 5035 -20.7 3.3 -3.1 1.2 
SPEC 207 
Median 1093 1029 846 947 928 -6.1* -23.4** -12.3* -14.1 
Mean 4088 4272 1748 3568 3702 4.5 -56.9 -12.8 -9.3 
A 3 
Median 14602 14123 14019 15037 14240 -3.4* -4.0 3.1 -2.5 
Mean 15604 16087 14871 17995 15249 3.0 -4.8 15.2 -2.3 
B 213 
Median 1561 1600 1691 1574 1602 2.8* 8.9* -0.1 3.3 
Mean 3529 3148 3424 3991 3607 -10.3 -2.5 12.8 1.7 
C 22 
Median 854 526 550 639 931 -38.1 -34.9* -27.4 8.1 
Mean 977 820 1217 715 746 -14.6* 22.8* -28.3 -23.3 
Default 26 
Median 562 492 435 313 533 -9.3* -22.9** -42.8* -5.3 
Mean 587 499 417 560 571 -12.3** -32.2* -3.5* -0.9 
All 264 
Median 784 701 750 792 756 -12.7* -3.4** 3.1* -3.2 





Panel D: HYL sample of implied firm upgrades 




Total capital value (million $) % BCRU from t=-1 
M-adj. Ind-adj. M-adj. Ind-adj. 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
IG 221 
Median 2256 2282 2306 2193 2342 1.4 2.6 -3.4* 4.3* 
Mean 8825 9650 8585 8867 8662 9.4 -2.5* 0.4* -1.7 
SPEC 341 
Median 1421 1538 1357 1471 1471 7.1 -5.0 2.3 3.1 
Mean 2014 2152 1537 2184 2277 6.4 -22.8 8.3 13.3 
A 51 
Median 14231 14450 14536 13903 14978 1.5* 2.1** -2.2 5.3 
Mean 14693 14380 15127 19615 15354 -2.3 2.9 33.4 4.5 
B 441 
Median 1748 1815 1587 1785 1810 3.4 -8.5 3.1 3.1 
Mean 3662 3597 3574 3581 3841 -1.7 -2.5 -2.6 4.8 
C 70 
Median 725 750 625 695 647 3.1 -14.0 -3.3 -10.4 
Mean 985 1115 929 1019 1056 13.5 -7.7 4.3 8.3* 
All 562 
Median 1264 1343 1298 1240 1306 5.3 2.9 -3.1* 4.7** 
Mean 5425 5675 5341 5599 5615 4.9 -1.2 3.4 3.4 
 153 
 
Table 4.11. Control for business risk  
This table reports the result of the financial costs (benefits) of credit deterioration (improvement) controlling for business risk. To do so, the HYL sample is split 
into two sub-samples (high and low business risk) sing the relative measure of the business risk variable as computed in Aivazian, Booth, and Cleary  (2003). 
Reported in this table are estimates of the changes in firm values associated with credit-rating changes (∆CR) by S&P from 2002 to 2012 for a sample of HYL 
downgraded and upgraded firms. The HYL sample includes firms that received high yield loans with interest expenses of over 200 bps above the Libor rate and 
consequently were downgraded or upgraded. The total capital value (𝑇𝐶𝑉in millions of dollars), costs or benefits in % of the credit-rating value changes (CCRD 
or BCRU), and the normalized (norm.) costs or benefits from the credit-rating changes are reported in the panels. CCRD and BCRU are market-adjusted 
(𝑀-𝑎𝑑𝑗. ) and industry-adjusted (𝐼𝑛𝑑-𝑎𝑑𝑗. ) for the year of the credit-rating change and for the following year. t = -1, 0 and 1 refer to the year prior to, the year of, 
and year after the credit-rating change, respectively. N is the number of observations. Each market-adjusted value for CCRD and BCRU is given 
by (𝑇𝐶𝑉−1 − 𝑀-𝑎𝑑𝑗.  𝑇𝐶𝑉𝑡) 𝑇𝐶𝑉−1⁄ . The market-adjusted TCV (𝑀-𝑎𝑑𝑗.  𝑇𝐶𝑉𝑡) is calculated by first discounting 𝑇𝐶𝑉 to year t = -1 from t = 0 and from t = 1 by 
the corresponding CRSP value-weighted index consisting of all NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX listed stocks for each year. Each industry-adjusted value is 
calculated by discounting 𝑇𝐶𝑉 by the return on an equally weighted portfolio from the stocks from the same SIC industry category.  Normalized CCRD and 
BCRU are obtained by dividing their respective values at t=0, 1 by the weighted-average numbers of notches of the CR change in each category. The Student’s t 
test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U test are used to examine the significance of the mean and median, respectively.  *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Sample N Stat 
Total capital value 
% CCRD, t=-1 to t=(0,1)  
High Business Risk 
 % CCRD, t=-1 to t=(0,1)   
Low Business Risk 




M-adj. Ind-adj. M-adj. Ind-adj. M-adj. Ind-adj. M-adj. Ind-adj. 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
IG 251 
Median 4361 4091 4054 4193 4457 -6.2 -7.2* -3.6** 2.3* -5.1 -5.9* -3** 1.9* -1.1 -1.3 -0.6 0.4 
Mean 15372 14008 14586 14729 16364 -8.9 -5.1 -4.3*** 6.5*** -7.3 -4.2 -3.5*** 5.3*** -1.6* -0.9 -0.8 1.2 
SPEC 350 
Median 854 777 721 806 709 -9.6** -14.8*** -7.7* -16.7*** -5.9** -9.1*** -4.7* -10.2*** -3.7* -5.7** -3 -6.5** 
Mean 3694 3315 2240 3600 3338 -10.7* -39.4* -2.9 -9.5 -6.6* -24.2* -1.8 -5.8 -4.1* -15.2** -1.1 -3.7 
A 51 
Median 7173 7089 7331 7526 7419 -1.2 2.3 4.9*** 3.3** -1 2 4.2*** 2.8** -0.2 0.3 0.7 0.5 
Mean 26227 28018 25371 27202 26897 6.8 -3.3 3.7 2.5 5.8 -2.8 3.1 2.1 1 -0.5 0.6 0.4 
B 501 
Median 1869 1683 1712 1743 1697 -10.2 -8.5*** -6.3 -9.2 -7.9 -6.6*** -4.9 -7.1 -2.3* -1.9* -1.4* -2.1 
Mean 6696 5793 7035 5690 5981 -13.4 4.9* -15.1*** -10.6** -10.4 3.8* -11.7*** -8.2** -3* 1.1 -3.4* -2.4 
C 49 
Median 371 289 309 311 317 -19.5*** -15.6*** -16.3*** -13.3*** -10.2*** -8.1*** -8.5*** -6.9*** -9.3** -7.5** -7.8** -6.4** 
Mean 1255 1075 1092 1165 727 -14.7* -13.1** -6.9* -42.9 -7.7* -6.8** -3.6* -22.4 -7 -6.3** -3.3 -20.5*** 
Default 66 
Median 429 330 285 354 363 -27.1*** -35.8*** -20.5*** -17.6*** -5.2*** -6.9*** -3.9*** -3.4*** -21.9*** -28.9*** -16.6*** -14.2*** 
Mean 875 646 479 593 655 -26.1* -45.3*** -34.4* -26.5*** -5* -8.7*** -6.6* -5.1*** -21.1*** -36.6*** -27.8*** -21.4*** 
All 667 
Median 1514 1338 1266 1360 1325 -11.6*** -16.2*** -10.9** -13.6** -6.8*** -9.5*** -6.4** -7.9*** -4.8* -6.7** -4.5* -5.7* 




Figure 2.1. Creditor rights index for various countries 
This graph shows the median HHI debt-type heterogeneity index for firms in various countries. Higher 
levels of the index indicate more debt-type heterogeneity (i.e. concentration on fewer debt types). 
 

















































Figure 2.2. Fitted relation between debt-type heterogeneity and creditor rights index 
This graph provides primary evidence for the relation between the strength of creditor rights and debt-type 
heterogeneity. Each dot in the graph represents country-averaged values for debt-type heterogeneity as proxied by a 
normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman index where 0 is the lowest Heterogeneity and 1 is the highest. Construction of 









Figure 4.1. (Cumulative) Average Control-adjusted Returns for Credit Downgrades 
and Upgrades for the HYL Sample 
This figure plots the average control-adjusted returns (ACAR) represented by the dotted lines and cumulative 
average control-adjusted returns (CACAR) represented by the solid lines based on the firm value changes around 
credit-rating changes for the HYL sample. Downgrades and upgrades are depicted in the upper and lower panels, 
respectively. The event windows are from quarter 12 before each credit event up to and including quarter 12 after 
the credit event (i.e., downgrade or upgrade). 
Panel A- Downgraded sample  
 




Figure 4.2. (Cumulative) Average Control-adjusted Returns for Credit Downgrades and 
Upgrades Greater than One Notch for the HYL Sample 
This figure plots the average control-adjusted returns (ACAR) represented by the dotted lines and cumulative 
average control-adjusted returns (CACAR) represented by the solid lines based on the firm value changes around 
credit rating changes of more than one notch for the HYL sample. Credit rating deteriorations are reported in the 
upper panel and credit rating upgrades in the lower panel. The event windows are from quarter 12 before each credit 
event up to and including quarter 12 after the credit event (i.e., downgrade or upgrade).  
Panel A- Downgraded sample  
 
 
Panel B- Upgraded sample 
 
 
 
 
